Introduction In the fast-paced and increasingly competitive landscape of legal education, the internships race has emerged as more than just a resume booster. For many law students across India, it represents a rite of passage, a gateway to future opportunities, and, in some unfortunate cases, a source of unacknowledged labor. But as the internships race becomes more widespread and sometimes even toxic, a pressing question emerges: are internships truly about learning, or have they morphed into an exploitative cycle disguised as professional exposure? The Pressure to Intern — Constantly From the first semester itself, students are told: “Start interning early.” The advice is well-meaning. After all, internships help students apply their theoretical knowledge, develop practical skills, and network with practicing professionals. However, the pressure to secure internships, especially at prestigious law firms or senior advocates’ chambers, can be overwhelming. This pressure comes not only from peers but also from faculty, placement cells, and even family. The legal industry’s evolving expectations mean that students feel they must intern every break—sometimes during the semester too. The rush to collect certificates and credentials has led to a mindset where quantity often trumps quality. As summer and winter breaks approach, the scramble begins. Students compete for the same positions, often without stipends, working long hours, and sometimes doing little more than photocopying or observing proceedings. The underlying fear is clear: if you don’t have a line-up of internships on your CV, you’re already falling behind. The relentless cycle of comparison breeds anxiety, burnout, and in some cases, disillusionment with the profession itself. Unequal Access, Unequal Opportunities One of the most glaring issues in the internships race is unequal access. Students from National Law Universities (NLUs) often have better placement cells, alumni networks, and visibility. On the other hand, students from state or private colleges have to rely on cold emails, referrals, or social media calls. This disparity results in an informal hierarchy where merit often takes a backseat to connections. Students with influential backgrounds or mentors tend to secure internships in Tier-1 law firms or prestigious litigation chambers. Meanwhile, equally deserving candidates may get overlooked due to lack of exposure, geographical location, or institutional recognition. Students from rural backgrounds or those who are first-generation learners face additional challenges — from lack of guidance to unfamiliarity with networking norms. The result is a growing divide between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ within legal academia, which directly impacts post-graduate prospects. Moreover, English fluency, urban-centric attitudes, and cultural biases play subtle yet significant roles in determining who gets selected. Thus, the internships race ends up replicating existing societal inequalities within the legal ecosystem. Unpaid Labor or Institutionalized Exploitation? The notion that internships are a “learning opportunity” has long been used as a shield to justify unpaid labor in the legal sector—particularly in litigation chambers, policy think tanks, and NGOs. But this defense begins to crumble under closer scrutiny. In metropolitan hubs like Delhi and Mumbai, where the cost of living is exorbitant, expecting students—many from modest or underprivileged backgrounds—to work for free is not only unjust, it’s exclusionary. The supposed “learning experience” turns into a privilege only a few can afford. This system perpetuates a deeply classist model where opportunity is dictated not by merit or enthusiasm but by financial capacity. Students from non-elite law colleges, first-generation learners, and those from smaller towns are effectively priced out of meaningful exposure simply because they cannot shoulder the economic burden of unpaid internships. Worse still is the nature of work assigned. Far from receiving intellectually stimulating tasks or supervised learning, many interns are reduced to performing clerical duties—photocopying, scanning, organizing files, or silently trailing senior associates. These activities, while tangentially related to legal practice, offer little to no educational value when not accompanied by mentorship, context, or feedback. Numerous students have described their internship experience as “exploitative,” with repetitive menial work becoming the norm. There is often no structure, no defined deliverables, and certainly no assurance that effort will be recognized. Some are even treated as errand runners—fetching coffee or food—without dignity or acknowledgment. The situation is particularly egregious in large law firms and senior litigation chambers where hierarchical work cultures dominate. Interns are expected to comply unconditionally and speak only when spoken to. The fear of being labeled “entitled,” “demanding,” or “unfit for the profession” keeps many from voicing concerns. This institutional culture of silence and endurance enables systemic exploitation under the veneer of “professional grooming.” This is not professional development—it is a form of unpaid, unregulated labor that relies on status anxiety and competitive desperation. The legal profession must reckon with this hypocrisy: while it champions justice and fairness in the courtroom, it turns a blind eye to unfair labor practices within its own institutions. True legal education and training must be rooted in mentorship, accessibility, and mutual respect. If internships are to be considered a cornerstone of legal learning, they must not come at the cost of a student’s dignity or basic rights. The Rise of Online Internships Post-COVID, online internships have surged, making opportunities more accessible. However, they come with their own challenges: lack of supervision, minimal engagement, and in some cases, dubious organizations offering certificates with little to no work involved. Yet, online internships have also democratized access in some ways. Students from remote regions or with financial limitations can now intern with organizations in other cities. The challenge lies in maintaining quality and accountability. When structured well, remote internships can include research assignments, virtual discussions, and regular feedback. But this requires intent and investment from the host organization. Without these, online internships become performative exercises that add little value beyond a LinkedIn post. Another issue is the overuse of interns by pseudo-legal blogs, portals, and companies that offer unpaid “content internships” without any real legal learning. This turns the internships race into a commodified certificate-collection exercise, undermining both skill-building and self-worth. What Should Change? Transparency in Selection: Firms, chambers, and organizations should create clear, accessible, and inclusive internship application processes. No student should
Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia v. M/s. Girdharilal Parshottamdas & Co., AIR 1966 SC 543
Introduction Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia v. M/s. Girdharilal Parshottamdas & Co., AIR 1966 SC 543, is a landmark Supreme Court decision that clarified when and where a contract is concluded under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, especially in cases involving telephonic or instantaneous communication. It established the principle that a contract is concluded at the place where the acceptance is communicated to the offeror, not necessarily where it is spoken. Bench Justice R.S. Bachawat Justice J.C. Shah Justice K.N. Wanchoo Court: Supreme Court of India Facts The plaintiff, Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia, operated a business in Ahmedabad. The defendant firm, M/s. Girdharilal Parshottamdas & Co., was located in Bombay. The plaintiff made an offer via telephone from Ahmedabad to sell a quantity of cottonseed cakes to the defendant in Bombay. The offer was communicated over the telephone and included all essential terms. The defendant, after receiving the offer, accepted it verbally over the telephone. However, there was no written confirmation immediately sent by either party. The plaintiff later refused to deliver the goods, denying the existence of a valid contract. The defendant sued, claiming that a binding contract had been formed over the phone, and that the place of contract formation was Bombay, where the acceptance was made. The central dispute revolved around the place and time of completion of the contract when acceptance is communicated instantaneously, such as by telephone. Issues Where is a contract concluded when acceptance is made over telephone or instantaneous communication? Does the location of the acceptor or the offeror determine the place of contract formation? Was there a valid and enforceable contract between the parties in this case? Arguments Appellant (Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia): The appellant contended that since the offer was made from Ahmedabad and the contract was to be performed there, the acceptance needed to be communicated in Ahmedabad to complete the contract. They argued that mere oral acceptance on the phone from Bombay was insufficient to bind the contract in Bombay. Respondent (M/s. Girdharilal Parshottamdas & Co.): The respondent claimed that the contract was completed the moment they verbally accepted the offer over the telephone in Bombay. They emphasized that in cases of instantaneous communication, the contract is complete when and where the acceptance is heard by the offeror. Ratio Decidendi The Supreme Court held that in the case of instantaneous communication methods like telephone, the contract is formed at the place where the acceptance is heard, i.e., where the offeror is located, and not where the acceptor speaks the words of acceptance. The Court distinguished between postal communication and instantaneous modes of communication. In postal contracts, acceptance is complete when the letter is posted. But in telephone or telegraph communication, the contract is concluded only when the offeror receives and hears the acceptance. Thus, a contract through the telephone is complete at the place where the acceptance is heard by the offeror, not where it is spoken by the acceptor. In this case, since Bhagwandas was in Ahmedabad and heard the acceptance there, the contract was formed in Ahmedabad. This principle reinforced that for a contract to be binding, communication of acceptance must reach the offeror through an intelligible and effective mode. If that mode is instantaneous, the place where the message is heard (not spoken) becomes critical. Observation The Court observed that communication of acceptance is essential to form a valid contract under Section 4 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In modern methods of communication, the Court must look at the actual time and place when the acceptance comes to the knowledge of the offeror, which aligns with the foundational idea of mutual assent. The decision also reflected the Court’s approach to adapting contract law to technological advances, ensuring that principles remained relevant in the face of faster, real-time communication tools like telephone and telegraph. Decision The Supreme Court ruled that the contract was formed in Ahmedabad, not Bombay, because that is where the offeror (Bhagwandas) was located and where the acceptance was heard. The Court declared that telephonic contracts are concluded where the acceptance is received, aligning with the need for effective communication under Section 4 of the Indian Contract Act. Since Bhagwandas heard the acceptance in Ahmedabad, the legal cause of action arose there, and Bombay courts did not have jurisdiction. The appeal was allowed, and the Bombay High Court’s decision was set aside. Conclusion Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia v. M/s. Girdharilal Parshottamdas & Co. is a landmark judgment that clarified the place of contract formation in instantaneous communication. The Supreme Court ruled that in telephonic contracts, acceptance must be heard and understood by the offeror to complete the contract. The decision emphasized effective communication as a requirement for mutual consent and helped align Indian contract law with evolving communication technologies. This case remains a guiding precedent in determining jurisdiction, offer and acceptance, and contract formation in modern commercial transactions. Important Terms Offer and Acceptance: Fundamental elements required to form a valid contract. Instantaneous Communication: Real-time communication such as telephone or fax, as opposed to postal communication.
Lalman Shukla v. Gauri Datt (1913)
Introduction Landmark Case on Communication of Offer and Acceptance in Indian Contract Law. Lalman Shukla v. Gauri Datt is a significant case in Indian contract law that deals with the fundamental principle that for a contract to be valid, an offer must be known to the person accepting it. This case clarified that a person who performs the terms of an offer without having knowledge of it cannot be said to have accepted it, and hence no contract is formed. It is often cited in discussions surrounding unilateral contracts and the requirement of communication of offers. Bench Justice Banerjee Court: Allahabad High Court, British India Facts Gauri Datt, the defendant, was a wealthy man whose nephew had run away from home. In a state of distress, he sent his servant, Lalman Shukla, to search for the missing boy. Before Lalman set out, no reward had been announced. After Lalman left, Gauri Datt published handbills offering a monetary reward of Rs. 501 to anyone who would find and return the missing nephew. Lalman, unaware of the reward offer, eventually succeeded in finding the boy and brought him back to Gauri Datt. Later, upon learning about the public offer, Lalman demanded the reward. Gauri Datt refused to pay him, stating that Lalman had no knowledge of the offer when he performed the act and therefore had no legal right to claim the reward. Lalman then filed a suit in the Allahabad High Court, arguing that he had fulfilled the conditions of the offer and was thus entitled to the reward under contract law. Issues Whether an offer must be known to the person accepting it for a contract to be formed. Whether Lalman Shukla, by fulfilling the condition of the offer without knowledge of it, was entitled to the reward. Arguments Plaintiff (Lalman Shukla): He contended that he had performed the act specified in the offer—he had found and brought back the missing boy. He argued that fulfilling the conditions of the offer should be enough to entitle him to the reward, regardless of whether he was aware of the offer at the time he acted. Defendant (Gauri Datt): The defendant argued that there was no contract, as the essential element of communication of the offer was missing. Lalman did not act in response to the offer, since he was unaware of it. Therefore, he could not have accepted the offer and was not entitled to claim the reward. Ratio Decidendi In this Lalman Shukla v. Gauri Datt the Allahabad High Court held that knowledge of the offer is a necessary condition for acceptance. The Court explained that a contract is formed only when an offer is made and accepted, and acceptance must be made with the knowledge of the offer. A person who performs the terms of an offer without knowing that such an offer exists cannot be considered to have accepted it in the eyes of the law. The Court drew upon common law principles and emphasized that in cases of general or public offers (such as reward cases), a person must have knowledge of the offer and must perform the act in response to it. In this case, although Lalman did perform the act (finding the boy), he did so as part of his duty as a servant, and not in response to the published offer. Thus, there was no meeting of minds and no contract. The judgment clarified that there is no contractual obligation without communication of the offer and that acceptance must be in reference to the offer known to the acceptor. Observation The Court observed that a contract requires not just performance but also the mental element of intent to accept a known offer. The intention to create legal relations must be evident. In reward cases, this means that the person performing the act must be aware that a reward has been offered and must perform the act in expectation of that reward. This case also illustrated the difference between mere performance of a task and performance in response to an offer. The former, even if aligned with the terms of an offer, does not constitute acceptance unless the offer was known and intended to be accepted. Decision The Court dismissed the suit filed by Lalman Shukla and ruled in favour of the defendant, Gauri Datt. It held that since Lalman did not know about the offer when he set out to find the missing boy, he could not be said to have accepted the offer. His actions, though in line with the conditions of the reward, were carried out without the intention to accept any offer, and thus there was no contract between him and Gauri Datt. As there was no valid contract, there could be no breach, and consequently, Lalman was not entitled to the reward of Rs. 501. The judgment clearly stated that knowledge of the offer is essential in the formation of a unilateral contract and that Lalman, acting only under his duty as a servant, had no legal claim to the reward. Conclusion Lalman Shukla v. Gauri Datt is a cornerstone in Indian contract law regarding the concept of communication of offer. It clearly establishes that a person must have knowledge of an offer before they can accept it and claim any reward or benefit arising from it. This case is particularly relevant in the context of unilateral contracts, where performance of the act is the mode of acceptance. The decision serves as a strong reminder that mere fulfillment of the terms of an offer, without knowledge or intent, does not constitute legal acceptance and does not create enforceable obligations. Important Terms Offer: A proposal by one party to another indicating a willingness to enter into a contract. Acceptance: A final and unqualified expression of assent to the terms of an offer. Unilateral Contract: A contract formed when one party promises something in return for the act of another, such as a reward for a lost item. Communication of Offer:
Harvey v. Facey (1893) AC 552
Introduction Harvey v. Facey (1893) is a leading decision by the Privy Council that clarified a fundamental principle of contract law: the distinction between an offer and an invitation to treat. The case is frequently cited to explain that a response to a query about price does not constitute an offer. The court held that unless there is a clear expression of willingness to be bound, no contract is formed, even if the communication appears definite. Bench Lord Watson Lord Fitzgerald Lord Hobhouse Court: Judicial Committee of the Privy Council Facts In Harvey v. Facey (1893), the dispute arose in the context of negotiations over the sale of a property known as “Bumper Hall Pen” in Jamaica. The appellants, Harvey and another party, were interested in purchasing the property owned by the respondent, Facey. The sequence of telegrams exchanged between the parties is crucial to understanding the facts: Harvey sent a telegram to Facey stating: “Will you sell us Bumper Hall Pen? Telegraph lowest cash price.” Facey responded by telegram: “Lowest price for Bumper Hall Pen £900.” Harvey immediately replied: “We agree to buy Bumper Hall Pen for £900 asked by you.” Facey, however, did not respond to this last message. When Harvey sought to enforce what he believed was a contract, Facey denied that any binding agreement had been made. Harvey then brought an action against Facey, claiming that a valid contract had been formed when he accepted the quoted price. The central issue revolved around whether Facey’s response constituted a legal offer or merely a statement of price. Harvey assumed that quoting the lowest price amounted to an offer, and that his response created a binding contract. Facey contended otherwise. Issues Whether Facey’s reply, quoting the lowest price, constituted a legal offer to sell the property. Whether Harvey’s acceptance of that quoted price created a binding contract under contract law. Arguments Harvey argued that Facey’s telegram stating the lowest price of £900 was a clear and specific offer. Since he immediately accepted the price, he believed that a valid contract had been formed. He relied on the communication sequence to support his claim of agreement. Facey, on the other hand, argued that he never made an offer to sell. He maintained that he merely responded to a question about price and had not expressed any intention to be bound. He pointed out that he never agreed to sell the property or accepted any offer. Ratio Decidendi The Privy Council held that there was no valid contract between Harvey and Facey. The Court ruled that quoting a lowest price in response to a query does not, in itself, constitute a legal offer. In contract law, an offer must demonstrate a clear willingness to be bound upon acceptance. In this case, Facey’s statement was merely a response to a question asking for his minimum acceptable price. He never expressed a willingness to sell the property to Harvey or to anyone else for that price. Therefore, his reply was considered an invitation to treat, not an offer. The decision in Harvey v. Facey (1893) clarified that an essential requirement of contract formation is an unequivocal offer that can be accepted. A price quote, without more, does not indicate intent to form a contract. Observation The Court observed that mere communication of the minimum price at which a person might be willing to sell does not amount to a contractual offer. The communication must include a clear and definitive expression of willingness to enter into a contract on specified terms. This case also demonstrates the importance of precise communication in contractual negotiations. A response to a query about price, even if direct, is not binding unless it is accompanied by an offer. In Harvey v. Facey (1893), the judges emphasized that a contract cannot arise from a misunderstanding of statements that were never intended to form a binding agreement. Decision The Privy Council held that no contract had been formed between Harvey and Facey. The first telegram from Harvey was an inquiry, not an offer. The second telegram from Facey was a reply to that inquiry, stating the lowest price but not offering to sell. The third telegram from Harvey was an attempted acceptance, but it was of an offer that never existed. Since there was never a complete offer, there could be no valid acceptance, and therefore, no binding contract was formed. The Court concluded that Facey was not legally bound to sell the property to Harvey. The appeal was dismissed, and judgment was given in favor of Facey. The Court reaffirmed that clear communication of intention is necessary for a contract to arise. Conclusion Harvey v. Facey (1893) is a foundational case in contract law that teaches the critical distinction between an offer and a statement of price. It established that responding to a request for price information does not amount to making a legal offer. For a binding contract to be formed, there must be a clear offer followed by acceptance. This case remains essential for law students and legal professionals in understanding contract formation, offer, and invitation to treat. It highlights that not every communication in a negotiation leads to a contract, and that intention must be evident. Important Terms Offer: A proposal showing readiness to form a contract upon acceptance. Invitation to Treat: An invitation to negotiate or make offers, not binding by itself. Acceptance: Agreement to the terms of an offer, creating a binding contract. Price Quote: A communication of possible sale terms, not necessarily an offer. Contract Formation: The legal process requiring offer, acceptance, and intent to create legal relations.
Balfour v. Balfour (1918-19)
Introduction Balfour v. Balfour is a foundational case in English contract law, decided by the Court of Appeal in 1919. The case clarified the principle that not all agreements are contracts, especially those made in a domestic or social context. It established the rule that for an agreement to be legally enforceable, the parties must have had an intention to create legal relations. This decision continues to guide courts in distinguishing between social promises and enforceable contracts, particularly within family relationships. Landmark Case on Intention to Create Legal Relations in Domestic Agreements Bench Lord Justice Warrington Lord Justice Duke Lord Justice Atkin Court: Court of Appeal (England and Wales) Facts Mr. and Mrs. Balfour were a married couple who lived in Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka), where Mr. Balfour worked as a government engineer. In 1915, they travelled together to England for a holiday. During their stay, Mrs. Balfour developed rheumatoid arthritis, and her doctor advised her not to return to the tropical climate of Ceylon due to health concerns. Therefore, the couple decided that Mrs. Balfour would stay back in England for treatment, while Mr. Balfour would return alone to resume his job. Before leaving, Mr. Balfour promised to send his wife £30 per month as financial support during her stay. This arrangement was oral, informal, and made between husband and wife. For several months, Mr. Balfour followed through on this promise and sent the payments as agreed. However, over time, their relationship deteriorated. They began living separately, and eventually, Mr. Balfour stopped sending the money. In response, Mrs. Balfour sued him in court, claiming that his promise was a contractual agreement and that his failure to pay was a breach of contract. She argued that she had relied on the monthly allowance, and it was made with the intention that it would be legally enforceable. The case was initially heard by the King’s Bench Division, which ruled in favour of Mrs. Balfour, accepting that the promise to pay constituted a binding contract. However, Mr. Balfour appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal, arguing that no enforceable contract had ever existed between them. Issues Was the agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Balfour intended to create legal obligations? Could a domestic arrangement between spouses be considered a legally enforceable contract? Arguments Appellant (Mr. Balfour): He contended that the arrangement with his wife was simply a private, domestic understanding and not a legal contract. It was made at a time when they were living as husband and wife, and such agreements were part of the normal course of married life. He argued that neither of them expected or intended that this would be legally enforceable, and therefore, no binding contract was ever formed. Respondent (Mrs. Balfour): She argued that the agreement had clear terms—£30 per month—and was specific and certain, which made it enforceable in law. She claimed that circumstances had changed, especially since the couple had separated, and she was now financially dependent on that allowance. Therefore, she believed that the agreement should be treated as a binding contract, enforceable in a court of law. Ratio Decidendi The Court in Balfour v. Balfour (1918-19) established that agreements between spouses made in domestic contexts are presumed not to have legal intent. The Court of Appeal ruled that intention to create legal relations is a necessary element for the formation of a valid contract. In this case, the Court found that no such intention existed when Mr. and Mrs. Balfour made their agreement. Lord Atkin, delivering the leading judgment, emphasized that domestic agreements between spouses, made while they are cohabiting, are presumed not to have legal intent. These agreements are typically based on trust, love, and mutual convenience, not legal enforceability. Courts cannot enforce every promise made within a marriage, as doing so would blur the line between family life and legal obligations. Lord Atkin stated: “The common law does not regulate the form of agreements between spouses. Their promises are often made in an atmosphere which does not contemplate legal consequences.” He explained that the law draws a clear line between social or domestic arrangements and commercial contracts. In business dealings, there is usually a clear intention to be legally bound, but in family or personal relationships, that intention is often missing. Therefore, even though there was consideration (Mr. Balfour’s promise to pay and Mrs. Balfour’s staying in England), the agreement still failed as a contract because it lacked the necessary legal intention. Observation The Court noted that legal systems should not interfere unnecessarily in domestic life. If every domestic promise could be litigated in court, it would open the floodgates to personal disputes being treated as legal claims, which is not what contract law is meant to do. This case reinforced the idea that legal enforceability requires more than mutual consent—it requires a serious intention to enter into a legal relationship. Decision The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, ruling in favour of Mr. Balfour, and set aside the earlier decision of the lower court. The judges unanimously held that the promise made by Mr. Balfour was a domestic arrangement made within a functioning marriage and lacked legal intent. Because both parties did not intend to be legally bound, there was no valid contract. Even though the promise was clear, specific, and acted upon for a while, the Court said that such promises are not enforceable unless the parties explicitly indicate a legal intent—which they had not done in this case. The Court emphasized that legal agreements between spouses must be distinguished from commercial transactions. In the absence of a written agreement or clear evidence of legal intent, such domestic understandings cannot be enforced in court. Therefore, the Court dismissed Mrs. Balfour’s claim, and Mr. Balfour was not legally obligated to continue the payments. Conclusion Balfour v. Balfour (1919) is a landmark case in contract law that established the vital principle that intention to create legal relations is essential for any agreement to become a binding contract. It also
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v. Boots Cash Chemists Southern Ltd. 1952
Introduction The case of Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v. Boots Cash Chemists Southern Ltd. 1952 is a seminal decision in the area of contract law, particularly on the concept of offer and acceptance and how it applies to self-service retail transactions. Decided by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in 1952, the ruling established that the display of goods in a store does not constitute a legal offer, but merely an invitation to treat. This case has become essential reading for students learning about formation of contracts, consumer law, and commercial practices. Bench Lord Chief Justice Goddard Lord Justice Somervell Lord Justice Birkett Court: Court of Appeal (England and Wales) Facts Boots Cash Chemists was operating a self-service retail store—a fairly new concept at the time. In this setup, customers could walk through aisles, select goods from shelves, and place them in their shopping baskets. After making their selection, customers would proceed to a cashier counter to pay for the items. Some of the items on display included pharmaceutical drugs, including those classified under Part I of the Poisons List, as regulated by the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933. According to this Act, any sale of such medicines had to take place under the supervision of a registered pharmacist. The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain, responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Act, filed a legal action against Boots. They argued that in a self-service model, the sale was completed at the moment the customer picked up the drug from the shelf, and since no pharmacist was present in the aisles, such a sale was in violation of the law. Boots disagreed. They maintained that the sale was not complete when the customer picked up the item. Instead, the customer made an offer to buy at the cashier’s counter, and the pharmacist stationed at the counter had the authority to approve or reject the sale, thus ensuring compliance with the law. Legal Issues Does the display of goods on the shelves of a self-service store constitute a legal “offer” or an “invitation to treat”? Is a contract of sale completed when the customer selects the goods or when the goods are accepted at the counter? Did Boots violate the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933, by allowing customers to pick up drugs without pharmacist supervision? Arguments For the Pharmaceutical Society (Appellant): They argued that the act of placing drugs on a shelf with a price tag constituted a definitive offer to the public. When a customer picked up a drug and put it into their basket, it amounted to acceptance, thereby completing the sale before reaching the cashier. Since this occurred without supervision from a registered pharmacist, the process violated Section 18 of the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933. The self-service system circumvented necessary legal safeguards around the sale of dangerous drugs. For Boots Cash Chemists (Respondent): Boots argued that the display of goods was only an invitation to treat, a well-known concept in contract law. The customer makes the offer at the checkout counter, and the company accepts the offer at that point. Because a registered pharmacist was always present at the cash counter, every sale of medicine was made under proper supervision and thus legally valid. No contract was formed until the pharmacist approved the sale. Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle Applied) The Court of Appeal held that the display of goods in a self-service store is merely an invitation to treat, not a legal offer. When a customer places an item into a basket, no binding contract is formed at that moment. The customer only makes an offer to buy the product at the cashier’s desk. The acceptance of that offer occurs when the cashier (or the pharmacist in this case) agrees to complete the transaction. This principle was grounded in established contract law precedents distinguishing between offers and invitations to treat, such as Fisher v. Bell and Partridge v. Crittenden. By applying these principles to a modern retail setting, the Court provided a clear framework for evaluating contract formation in commercial environments. Observation The judges observed that modern commerce, especially the emerging model of self-service stores, should be assessed with a practical and legal perspective. The Court emphasized that legal formalism should not obstruct evolving trade practices, provided consumer protection laws are respected. Lord Justice Somervell noted that allowing every shelf display to constitute an “offer” would create confusion and unfair obligations on store owners, as customers would be able to “accept” offers by picking up goods—even if pricing errors or other practical issues were present. The law must distinguish between mere willingness to deal and a clear intent to be legally bound. Decision The Court of Appeal unanimously ruled in favour of Boots Cash Chemists. The Court held that: The sale of goods is not completed until the customer’s offer is accepted at the cashier’s counter. The display of goods on shelves is not an offer, but an invitation to treat. Since a registered pharmacist was present at the point of sale, the transaction was legally valid under the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933. Therefore, no breach of law had occurred, and the self-service model used by Boots was legally sound. Conclusion The decision in Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v. Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd. is a foundational case in modern contract law, particularly in defining how contracts are formed in retail environments, especially self-service stores. This case firmly established the principle that when goods are displayed on store shelves, such displays are not legal offers, but invitations to treat. The actual offer is made by the customer at the point of payment, and the acceptance occurs when the seller agrees to complete the transaction—in this case, under the supervision of a qualified pharmacist. The ruling had a significant impact on how legal systems approach the concept of offer and acceptance in practical, day-to-day commercial contexts. It ensured that retail operations, including pharmacies and supermarkets, could confidently adopt self-service business models without
Felthouse v. Bindley (1862) 11 CB 869
Introduction Felthouse v. Bindley (1862) is a leading English contract law case that clarifies the principle that silence does not constitute acceptance. This case is foundational in understanding that for a contract to be legally enforceable, acceptance must be communicated clearly and unambiguously. The decision sets a boundary in contract law to prevent one party from being bound by terms to which they have not explicitly agreed. Landmark Case on Silence as Acceptance in Contract Law Bench Chief Justice Willes Justice Keating Justice Byles Court: Court of Common Pleas, England Facts Felthouse v. Bindley (1862) involved a dispute between an uncle and his nephew over the sale of a horse. The uncle, Felthouse, wished to purchase a horse from his nephew and sent him a letter offering £30 for the horse. In the letter, he stated that if he did not hear back, he would assume the horse to be his. The nephew intended to sell the horse and had planned to accept the offer. However, he never communicated this acceptance to the uncle. The nephew had other horses being sold at auction and instructed the auctioneer, Bindley, not to include the horse in question as it was already sold. Despite this, the auctioneer mistakenly sold the horse. The uncle, Felthouse, later sued the auctioneer, claiming that the horse belonged to him due to a concluded contract and that Bindley had wrongfully sold his property. The critical issue in Felthouse v. Bindley (1862) was whether there was a valid and enforceable contract between the uncle and nephew, given that the nephew had never explicitly communicated acceptance of the uncle’s offer. Issues Whether silence or non-response to an offer can amount to legal acceptance under contract law. Whether the uncle and nephew had formed a legally binding contract for the sale of the horse. Whether Felthouse had legal ownership of the horse at the time the auctioneer sold it. Arguments Plaintiff (Felthouse): Felthouse argued that his letter clearly stated his intent to buy the horse and that the absence of a reply from the nephew should be interpreted as acceptance. He also argued that the nephew’s instructions to the auctioneer to exclude the horse showed his intent to accept the offer. Thus, he believed a contract was formed. Defendant (Bindley): Bindley contended that no contract existed between the uncle and the nephew because there was no communicated acceptance. He argued that instructions given to a third party (the auctioneer) do not constitute valid acceptance under contract law and that silence alone is not sufficient. Ratio Decidendi The Court ruled in Felthouse v. Bindley (1862) that silence cannot be considered acceptance of an offer, even if the offeror states otherwise. Acceptance must be clearly communicated to the offeror, either verbally or in writing. The Court emphasized that the law does not permit one party to impose a contract on another merely by declaring that silence will be taken as consent. In this case, the nephew had never directly informed Felthouse that he accepted the offer, and therefore no binding contract was formed. Even though the nephew had mentally agreed to sell the horse and instructed the auctioneer accordingly, a contract cannot be formed based on uncommunicated intention. The principle set in Felthouse v. Bindley (1862) is that mutual consent must be both present and expressed through appropriate communication. Observation The Court observed that while the nephew may have intended to accept the offer, intention alone is not sufficient to form a valid contract. The decision makes it clear that the law requires more than internal agreement—it requires actual communication of acceptance to the offeror. Felthouse v. Bindley (1862) also served as a safeguard against parties being involuntarily bound by terms they have not explicitly agreed to. The case helped establish an important protection in contract law: one party cannot unilaterally define the terms of silence or non-response. Decision The Court concluded that there was no contract between Felthouse and his nephew, as the nephew never communicated acceptance of the offer. Since there was no legal ownership transferred, Felthouse could not claim that the horse had become his property. Therefore, the auctioneer, Bindley, was not liable for selling the horse. The action failed, and the court ruled in favor of the defendant. Felthouse v. Bindley (1862) continues to be cited for the principle that silence cannot amount to acceptance, and it remains a key case in understanding contract formation. Conclusion Felthouse v. Bindley (1862) is a fundamental case in contract law that reinforces the requirement of communication in the acceptance of an offer. It established that a contract cannot be created by silence, even when the offeror suggests that silence will be considered acceptance. This case protects offerees from being forced into agreements they have not explicitly accepted and ensures that contracts arise only through mutual, communicated assent. The case is essential for students and practitioners to understand the core rules of offer and acceptance, especially in situations involving implied consent or lack of reply. Felthouse v. Bindley (1862) sets a lasting precedent for the necessity of clear and mutual agreement in contract law.
Trial by Media: Undermining India’s Fair Trials
Introduction In any robust democracy governed by the rule of law, the presumption of innocence is a cardinal principle. It ensures that every accused individual is treated as innocent until proven guilty by a court of law. However, in India’s rapidly evolving media ecosystem, this foundational value is increasingly at risk. The pervasive phenomenon of Trial by Media threatens not just the integrity of judicial proceedings but also the social and psychological well-being of the individuals involved. Trial by Media refers to media-led commentary, portrayal, and public judgment of an individual involved in a legal case—particularly in criminal matters—often before courts have even begun or concluded their work. This editorial explores in exhaustive detail how Trial by Media affects justice delivery, examines judicial responses, discusses international practices, and outlines urgent reforms. The Phenomenon of Trial by Media 1. The Rise of Media Vigilantism Modern journalism in India has undergone a seismic shift in the past two decades. With the explosion of television news and digital platforms, competition for eyeballs has intensified. In the race to break news first and gain traction on social media, journalistic standards are often sacrificed at the altar of sensationalism. High-profile criminal cases are especially vulnerable to this phenomenon. The moment an FIR is filed or an arrest is made, the media descends like vultures, passing judgment and constructing a narrative around the accused. Some of the most glaring examples include: Aarushi Talwar murder case (2008) – where both parents were portrayed as cold-blooded murderers despite no conclusive evidence. Sushant Singh Rajput case (2020) – in which Rhea Chakraborty was subjected to an unprecedented media witch-hunt. 2. The Impact on Judicial Proceedings While India doesn’t have a jury system susceptible to media influence like the United States, the pressure from continuous media coverage can still influence judicial officers. Judges, though trained to be impartial, operate within a larger social context. Public outrage fueled by aggressive media coverage can create an environment where harsh judgments are expected. The Supreme Court has acknowledged this danger. In State of Maharashtra v. Rajendra Jawanmal Gandhi (1997), it cautioned that media trials pose a real risk to the administration of justice. Legal and Constitutional Context 1. Article 21: Right to a Fair Trial The right to a fair trial is a component of Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. A media trial jeopardizes this right by influencing public and judicial opinion prematurely. 2. Article 19(1)(a): Freedom of Speech vs. Right to Reputation Freedom of the press is protected under Article 19(1)(a), but it is not absolute. It is subject to reasonable restrictions such as contempt of court, defamation, and incitement. Trial by Media blurs these lines, often engaging in character assassination without due diligence. 3. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 The Act allows courts to prevent publications that interfere with legal proceedings. However, enforcement is rare and penalties minimal, making it a weak deterrent. 4. Indian Penal Code Provisions Sections 228A (disclosure of identity of victims in sexual offences), 499 (defamation), and 505 (statements conducive to public mischief) are regularly violated by media houses in their bid to sensationalize. Commercialization of News: When News Becomes a Show In a democracy, the media is supposed to inform people, hold the powerful accountable, and protect the truth. But in recent years, something has gone wrong. A large part of our news industry has become less about facts — and more about sensationalism and profit. Especially when it comes to high-profile legal cases, this shift has created a serious problem: “Trial by Media.” 1. The TRP Trap: Why Sensational Stories Dominate Television news channels and digital websites compete with each other to get your attention. The more people watch or click, the more money they make through advertisements. This is measured using something called TRPs (Television Rating Points). And guess what kind of news brings in the highest TRPs? Stories that are shocking, emotional, or dramatic — especially crime stories, celebrity controversies, or anything involving religion or politics. So what do many newsrooms do? They: Focus only on the most dramatic parts of a case. Show angry debates instead of calm discussions. Use bold, shouting headlines to make everything look urgent or scandalous. All of this might increase viewership — but it damages the justice system. The real facts get lost. The accused are judged before the court says anything. And sometimes, the victim’s privacy is also ignored. 2. When News Channels Act Like Judges Today, many news anchors act like they are running their own courtroom. Instead of reporting what’s happening, they start: Showing leaked police documents and calling them “proof.” Inviting guests to argue who is guilty or innocent. Running dramatic re-enactments of crimes that have not even gone to trial. Delivering their own verdicts on live TV. This turns news from a source of information into a form of entertainment — with real people’s lives at stake. Imagine being accused of a crime. Before you even get a chance to speak in court, the whole country has seen you being called a criminal on television. Even if you’re later found innocent, the damage is already done — to your reputation, your career, your family. This is not fair. And it is not justice. Why Is This Happening? There are some deep reasons behind this problem: Big media companies care more about profit than accuracy. There are very few rules to stop TV channels from going too far. Some journalists don’t understand legal procedures, and rush to conclusions. Fake or misleading content spreads faster, especially on social media. And worst of all: there are hardly any consequences. Even when channels break the law or spread lies, they rarely face any punishment. What This Means for You As citizens, we all need to ask: Is this the kind of media we want? When news becomes a race for drama, it stops being about the truth. We get more heat, less light. And our courts,
Bulldozer Politics: Crushing Due Process in India
Introduction In recent years, a striking image has come to dominate India’s media landscape: the bulldozer. No longer a mere machine for urban development, it has been transformed into a symbol of power, authority, and political messaging. The emergence of what many are calling “Bulldozer Politics” reflects a deepening crisis in India’s democratic fabric—where due process is increasingly sacrificed at the altar of swift action, populist appeal, and majoritarian impulses. This editorial explores the troubling rise of Bulldozer Politics in India, focusing on how it bypasses constitutional norms and erodes the very principles of justice and fairness that underpin our democracy. The Rise of Bulldozer Politics in India Bulldozer Politics gained visibility particularly after high-profile demolitions in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, where state authorities razed alleged encroachments tied to individuals accused of criminal activities. Often, these actions followed communal unrest, protests, or social agitation. The message was clear: dissent or alleged law-breaking would be met not with court summons, but with swift demolition. Though framed as actions against illegal constructions, these demolitions increasingly appear as tools of political retribution. The use of bulldozers outside the legal process—without court orders, adequate notice, or the chance for a fair hearing—signals a dangerous drift toward extrajudicial governance. Bulldozer Politics and the Collapse of Due Process What is Due Process? Due process is a legal guarantee under Article 14 and Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which ensures equality before law and protection of life and personal liberty. It means that before taking punitive action against a citizen—like arrest, seizure of property, or demolition—the state must follow a fair, transparent, and legally sanctioned procedure. Bulldozer Politics vs. Rule of Law The hallmark of Bulldozer Politics is the deliberate circumvention of this process. In several cases, demolitions were executed without: Proper legal notice Judicial review Verification of property documents Opportunity for the accused to respond Such actions send a chilling message: the state can act first and answer questions later. It redefines justice as force, not fairness. A nation governed by the rule of law must be one where institutions operate based on legal principles, not political impulses. When due process is disregarded, the democratic contract between the state and citizen is shattered. Political Calculus and Populist Spectacle There is a growing trend among political leaders to use law-and-order crackdowns as performative governance. Bulldozers offer a visual spectacle—a headline-grabbing assertion of control and decisiveness. This kind of governance thrives on: Majoritarian optics: Appealing to the dominant community by punishing minorities perceived as troublemakers. Speed over justice: Promising instant results to bypass the “slow” legal system. Authoritarian signaling: Demonstrating strength as a substitute for fairness or administrative competence. It is governance by display—not to maintain order, but to communicate dominance. The problem is not just the absence of legality, but the deliberate publicization of unlawful acts as political virtue. Targeting the Marginalized: Disproportionate Impact Human rights organizations and civil liberties advocates have documented a troubling pattern: Bulldozer Politics disproportionately affects the poor, minorities, and political dissenters. These groups often lack access to legal resources and are unable to contest arbitrary demolitions. Examples include: Muslim households demolished after communal clashes. Dalit and tribal settlements razed for “illegal encroachment.” Properties linked to opposition voices or protest leaders targeted under administrative pretexts. The cumulative effect is a two-tier justice system: due process for the privileged, punishment for the vulnerable. This form of structural violence is not only unconstitutional but corrodes the basic human dignity that democracy promises to each citizen. Legal and Ethical Implications Violation of Constitutional Rights Article 14: Equality before the law Article 19: Freedom of speech and expression Article 21: Protection of life and personal liberty Unlawful demolitions not only violate these rights but also undermine the very architecture of democratic justice. Judicial Responses and Challenges Though Indian courts have intervened in some cases to stop demolitions, their response has been inconsistent. For example, in Jahangirpuri (Delhi) in 2022, the Supreme Court halted a demolition drive against alleged rioters. Yet, similar demolitions continue in other parts of the country, raising concerns about selective judicial enforcement. A robust judicial framework is needed to ensure executive accountability. Courts must treat such demolitions as contempt of constitutional principles, not just administrative overreach. Media’s Role in Normalizing Bulldozer Politics Mainstream media often glorifies Bulldozer Politics. Sensational headlines, live telecasts, and dramatic framing portray it as bold governance. This skews public perception, transforming acts of questionable legality into moments of mass approval. When newspapers become echo chambers and news channels behave like campaign arms of ruling governments, the democratic check on state power is compromised. Social media further amplifies this distortion. Hashtags like #BulldozerBaba trend not because of legal merit, but because of their symbolic defiance. Cultural Legitimacy and Popular Support One of the most troubling aspects of Bulldozer Politics is its growing cultural acceptance. Many citizens, frustrated by slow legal processes and corruption, begin to admire strong-arm tactics. This creates a toxic political culture where governance is measured by intimidation rather than integrity. This acceptance is deeply rooted in colonial hangovers, feudal nostalgia, and patriarchal ideals of “discipline” and “order.” We must challenge these narratives and assert that true strength lies in the restraint and adherence to democratic norms. International Implications and Reputation India, as the world’s largest democracy, carries a significant moral weight. Bulldozer Politics not only damages its internal social fabric but also affects its global reputation. International watchdogs, including Human Rights Watch and the UN Special Rapporteurs, have expressed concerns over such practices. If India continues down this path, it risks undermining its diplomatic credibility, especially on platforms where it champions democratic governance and human rights. Consequences for Democracy The rise and normalization of Bulldozer Politics—a form of governance where state actions like property demolitions are carried out without proper legal procedure—have far-reaching implications for the health of democracy in India. This isn’t merely about a method of punishment; it reflects a systemic shift in how state power is exercised and perceived. Authoritarian Drift: State
Glorification of Power in Democracy
Introduction The glorification of power in democracy signals a departure from the foundational values of civil liberty and institutional trust. In a democracy, the true measure of progress is not how stern the hand of the state feels, but how secure and dignified its citizens live. Yet, in recent years, the glorification of power in democracy has led to a strange inversion of civic values — one where people find themselves applauding displays of executive arrogance, celebrating public humiliation, and confusing intimidation with efficiency. Across many parts of India, videos of officials “disciplining” citizens — scolding, berating, even humiliating — go viral with alarming frequency. These clips often show powerful figures pointing fingers, making people stand in lines with folded hands, or issuing performative rebukes under the public gaze. What is most unsettling is how the glorification of power in democracy turns public misconduct into a source of applause. This public reaction reinforces the glorification of power in democracy, signaling a dangerous cultural shift: authoritarianism is being repackaged as entertainment, and executive overreach is being romanticized as courage. The message is subtle but clear — governance through fear is being accepted, even desired. Power as a Performance Public servants are meant to serve, not perform. Yet what we increasingly see is a theatrical mode of governance, amplified by camera phones and media headlines. A district officer rebuking citizens becomes a “hero.” A bureaucrat enforcing rules with excessive force is seen as “tough.” The glorification of power in democracy feeds a narrative that demands citizen submission, that “discipline” justifies all excesses. In the process, our democratic compact — where the state is answerable to the people — is quietly being reversed. The stage is now set for a culture where coercion becomes a celebrated virtue, overshadowing the more difficult but necessary work of participatory governance and institutional fairness. This performative authoritarianism reinforces the glorification of power in democracy, creating a distorted reality where individuals in power are evaluated not on their commitment to constitutional principles, but on their ability to dominate or “teach lessons.” The implications are profound — respect for the rule of law gives way to admiration for brute willpower. What gets lost in the applause is the silent erosion of democratic norms. These dangerous shifts are direct outcomes of the glorification of power in democracy, and aren’t accidental. They often emerge in response to structural inefficiencies. Frustrated by years of bureaucratic delay, judicial backlog, and rising insecurity, people become more receptive to forms of authority that promise immediate, visible action. The more dramatic the gesture, the stronger the public response. And here lies the danger. The applause for stern, visible action is rarely accompanied by questions about proportionality or legality. Citizens begin to value outcome over process — a dangerous slope in any democracy. Fear as Governance This rising glorification of power in democracy through fear-based governance has deep roots in societal frustration. Disillusioned by corruption, delayed justice, and inefficient systems, people begin to crave “strong” leadership — even if it comes at the cost of dignity or legality. But strength without accountability is just authoritarianism in disguise. Democracy cannot survive where fear thrives. When officials start acting like monarchs, and people learn to clap instead of question, the rule of law becomes the rule of men. The entire logic of democratic government is built on the understanding that power must be limited, checked, and transparent. When these foundations weaken, citizens no longer engage as free individuals; they react as subjects. What makes this dynamic even more perilous is the selective use of fear. Often, those who bear the brunt of such public humiliations are from marginalized or economically weaker backgrounds. This establishes not only a regime of fear but also a hierarchy of worthiness — where some are deemed fit for dignity, while others are not. This erodes the very premise of equal citizenship. The psychological consequences of being governed through fear are profound. It cultivates distrust, paranoia, and passive disengagement from civic life. Individuals stop speaking out. Communities grow silent. The chain of accountability, once broken, becomes harder to mend. This performative authoritarianism represents a dangerous form of glorification of power in democracy, where fear replaces justice. A Culture of Silence and Spectacle Compounding the problem is the silence of political and institutional leadership. Instead of condemning such public misconduct, many reward it. Promotions, awards, and media space follow. The more dramatic the performance, the higher the praise. This fosters a culture where ethical, restrained governance is sidelined by spectacles that please the crowd but erode public trust. Even more worrying is the entertainment value derived from public shame. The persecution of individuals — often poor, marginalized, or voiceless — becomes content for clicks. The powerful punish, and the public watches, laughs, and shares. This voyeuristic culture contributes to a collective moral decay. Television debates and social media trends then reinforce these narratives, turning administrative overreach into prime-time drama. Entire discussions are framed around who was “right” or “wrong” in these videos, while larger questions about legality, ethics, and public accountability are conveniently ignored. This spectacle reduces real people into props. It transforms governance from a duty into a performance, and citizens from stakeholders into spectators. The illusion of justice replaces the substance of it. The normalisation of persecution also creates a chilling effect across professions — teachers, health workers, transport employees — everyone learns to perform for public applause, not public welfare. Historical Echoes and Cultural Roots India, like many postcolonial societies, has a complicated relationship with power. Centuries of colonial rule and hierarchical social structures have conditioned citizens to equate authority with superiority. The remnants of this mindset persist — from revering government officials as unquestionable figures to interpreting dissent as disobedience. These cultural beliefs enable the glorification of power in democracy, which is often exploited by the powerful. Officials who assert control are not viewed critically but as protectors of order. A patriarchal mindset — one that associates power with aggression and
