Vijay Kumar Sharma & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (1990) 2 SCC 562 Bench: Justice Ranganath Misra Justice P.B. Sawant Justice K. Ramaswamy Facts: The Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Karnataka Act’) was enacted by the State Legislature to acquire contract carriages and their permits, effectively nationalizing the contract carriage transport sector in the state. Sections 14 and 20 of the Karnataka Act prohibited the issuance or renewal of permits for contract carriages to private operators, reserving this right exclusively for the State Transport Undertaking (STU). Subsequently, the Central Government enacted the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘MV Act’), which liberalized the grant of permits for contract carriages, allowing private operators to apply for and obtain such permits. This legislative change led to a conflict between the provisions of the Karnataka Act and the MV Act. Issues: Whether Sections 14 and 20 of the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976, are repugnant to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, particularly Sections 73, 74, and 80. Whether the State Legislature had the competence to enact the Karnataka Act in light of the provisions of the MV Act. Arguments: Petitioners (Vijay Kumar Sharma & Others): The petitioners argued that the Karnataka Act’s provisions, specifically Sections 14 and 20, were in direct conflict with the MV Act, 1988. They contended that while the MV Act permitted private operators to apply for and obtain contract carriage permits, the Karnataka Act prohibited such applications and grants, thereby creating a repugnancy between the state and central legislation. They further asserted that, as per Article 254(1) of the Constitution, in cases of inconsistency between central and state laws on subjects in the Concurrent List, the central law would prevail, rendering the conflicting state law provisions void. Respondents (State of Karnataka & Others): The respondents contended that the Karnataka Act was enacted under Entry 42 of the Concurrent List, dealing with the acquisition of property, while the MV Act was enacted under Entry 35, concerning mechanically propelled vehicles. They argued that since the two Acts were enacted under different entries of the Concurrent List, there was no question of repugnancy. Additionally, they maintained that the Karnataka Act had received the President’s assent, thereby protecting it under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. Decision: The Supreme Court, in a majority decision, held that Sections 14 and 20 of the Karnataka Act were repugnant to Sections 73, 74, and 80 of the MV Act, 1988. The Court observed that the MV Act aimed to liberalize the grant of permits for contract carriages, allowing private operators to apply for and obtain such permits. In contrast, the Karnataka Act restricted this right exclusively to the STU, thereby creating a direct conflict between the two legislations. The Court further noted that both Acts were enacted under the Concurrent List, and in cases of inconsistency between central and state laws on subjects in this list, the central law would prevail as per Article 254(1) of the Constitution. Although the Karnataka Act had received the President’s assent, the subsequent enactment of the MV Act, 1988, without any provision saving the Karnataka Act, implied that the central legislation would prevail over the state law. Consequently, the Court declared Sections 14 and 20 of the Karnataka Act void to the extent of their repugnancy with the MV Act, 1988, thereby allowing private operators to apply for and obtain contract carriage permits in the state. Important Terms: Doctrine of Repugnancy: A constitutional principle that addresses conflicts between central and state laws on subjects in the Concurrent List, stipulating that central laws prevail in cases of inconsistency. Concurrent List: One of the three lists in the Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution, enumerating subjects on which both the central and state governments can legislate. Article 254 of the Constitution: A provision that deals with inconsistencies between laws made by Parliament and laws made by state legislatures concerning subjects in the Concurrent List. Contract Carriage: A motor vehicle that carries passengers under a contract for hire or reward, either for a fixed period or journey. State Transport Undertaking (STU): A government-owned corporation or entity engaged in the business of providing road transport services. The Supreme Court’s decision in Vijay Kumar Sharma & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. underscores the supremacy of central legislation over state laws in matters listed in the Concurrent List when inconsistencies arise. The judgment clarifies that state laws conflicting with central laws on the same subject matter are rendered void to the extent of the repugnancy, thereby ensuring uniformity and coherence in the legal framework governing such matters.

Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 45 Bench: Justice Y.V. Chandrachud (Chief Justice) Justice A.C. Gupta Justice A.P. Sen Justice E.S. Venkataramiah Justice R.S. Pathak Facts: Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd., a multinational pharmaceutical company, challenged the validity of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1976, which imposed an additional tax on the sale of drugs and medicines in Bihar. The company argued that this additional tax conflicted with The Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1970, issued by the Union Government under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The Order fixed the maximum sale price of drugs, and the company contended that the imposition of an additional sales tax by the Bihar government would increase the price beyond the limit fixed by the central law. The company filed a writ petition in the Patna High Court, claiming that the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1976, was unconstitutional because: It encroached upon a subject reserved for Parliament under the Union List. It was repugnant to the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1970, and hence void under Article 254 of the Constitution (which deals with repugnancy between State and Union laws). The Patna High Court dismissed the petition, upholding the validity of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1976. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals then appealed to the Supreme Court of India. Issues: Whether the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1976, which imposed an additional sales tax on drugs and medicines, was constitutionally valid. Whether the Bihar Sales Tax Act was repugnant to the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1970, issued by the Union Government, and thus void under Article 254 of the Constitution. Whether the State Legislature had the legislative competence to enact a sales tax law affecting the sale of drugs, which were already regulated by the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (a Union law). Arguments: Petitioners (Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd.): The Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1976, effectively increased the price of medicines, which was contrary to the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1970, a law enacted under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Since the price of drugs was already controlled by the Union Government, the State Legislature had no power to impose a tax that would affect those prices. Article 254(1) states that if there is an inconsistency between a State law and a Central law, the Central law prevails, and the State law becomes void. The State law was not reserved for the President’s assent, and thus, it should be declared unconstitutional due to repugnancy with the Central law. Respondents (State of Bihar): The State Legislature was empowered to impose a sales tax under Entry 54 of the State List (which deals with “Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers”). The Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1970, only regulated the pricing of drugs but did not deal with sales tax, which was a separate matter. There was no repugnancy between the two laws because they operated in different legislative fields—the Union law controlled prices, while the State law imposed a tax. Article 254(1) applies only when two laws are inconsistent with each other. In this case, the sales tax did not directly contradict the price control mechanism, and thus Article 254(1) did not apply. Ratio Decidendi (Legal Reasoning): Doctrine of Repugnancy: The Supreme Court held that Article 254 applies only when there is an actual conflict between a Union and a State law in the Concurrent List. Since sales tax falls under the State List, and price control falls under the Union List, there was no repugnancy. Legislative Competence of the State: The Bihar Legislature had full authority to impose a sales tax under Entry 54 of the State List. The fact that the tax indirectly affected drug prices did not make it unconstitutional. Separate Legislative Fields: The Court ruled that the Central Government’s power to control drug prices under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and the State Government’s power to impose sales tax were separate legislative fields. Effect of Taxation on Pricing: The mere fact that a State tax increased the price of a commodity did not make the tax unconstitutional unless the Central law explicitly prohibited the levy of such a tax. Observations: Doctrine of Pith and Substance: The Court reaffirmed that if a law is in pith and substance within a Legislature’s competence, it is valid even if it incidentally affects another subject. Here, the sales tax law was primarily a taxation law and only incidentally affected drug prices. Article 254 Does Not Apply to State List Laws: The Court clarified that Article 254 applies only when both the Central and State laws fall within the Concurrent List. Since the Bihar Sales Tax Act was enacted under the State List, Article 254 was not applicable. No Express Conflict: Since the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1970, did not explicitly prohibit the imposition of sales tax, there was no direct conflict, and both laws could coexist harmoniously. Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1976, ruling that: The State Legislature was competent to enact the sales tax law. There was no repugnancy between the State and Central laws because they operated in different legislative fields. The Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1970, did not prohibit the imposition of sales tax, so the Bihar law was not unconstitutional. The appeal was dismissed, and the Bihar Sales Tax Act remained valid and enforceable. Important Terms: Article 254 of the Constitution: Governs conflicts between State and Central laws in the Concurrent List, stating that Central law prevails in case of inconsistency. Entry 54 of the State List: Grants State Legislatures the power to levy sales tax on goods. Doctrine of Pith and Substance: A principle that determines the true nature of legislation to decide its validity, even if it incidentally affects another subject. Doctrine of Repugnancy: States that if two laws conflict, the Central law prevails and the State law becomes void under Article 254(1). Essential Commodities Act, 1955: A Union law that allows the government to regulate the supply, distribution, and pricing

Zaverbhai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 752 Bench: Chief Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan Justice B.K. Mukherjea Justice Vivian Bose Justice N.H. Bhagwati Justice T.L. Venkatarama Aiyar Facts: The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, was enacted by the Union Legislature to control the distribution of essential commodities. The Bombay Legislature later passed the Bombay Essential Supplies Act, 1947, which included stricter punishments for hoarding and black marketing. The petitioner, Zaverbhai, was convicted under the Bombay Act and challenged its validity, arguing that: The Union law (Essential Supplies Act, 1946) occupied the entire field of essential commodity regulation. The Bombay Act, 1947, being a State law, was repugnant to the Union law under Article 254(1) of the Constitution. Issues: Whether the Bombay Essential Supplies Act, 1947, was repugnant to the Union Essential Supplies Act, 1946. Whether the Bombay Legislature had the competence to enact a law in the same field occupied by a Union law. Arguments: Petitioner (Zaverbhai): The Bombay Act created harsher penalties than the Union Act, leading to repugnancy under Article 254(1). Since the Union had legislated on essential supplies, the Bombay Legislature had no competence to enact a conflicting law. Respondent (State of Bombay): The State had the power to impose stricter penalties as a matter of public interest. The Bombay Act did not directly contradict the Union Act but merely supplemented it. Ratio Decidendi: Doctrine of Repugnancy (Article 254(1)): The Supreme Court held that if there is an inconsistency between a Union and a State law on a Concurrent List subject, the Union law prevails. Since the Union Act already occupied the field of essential supplies, the Bombay Act was repugnant. Stricter State Penalties Invalid: Even though the Bombay Legislature tried to increase penalties, it could not do so without Presidential assent as required under Article 254(2). Supremacy of Union Law in Concurrent List Matters: The judgment reinforced that once Parliament enacts a law on a Concurrent List subject, States cannot override it unless expressly authorized. Observations: The case reaffirmed the principle that State laws cannot conflict with Union laws on Concurrent List subjects. The ruling clarified that harsher punishments imposed by a State law could still create repugnancy under Article 254(1). The Court emphasized that Article 254(2) provides a remedy—Presidential assent—for State laws seeking to override a Union law. Decision: The Supreme Court struck down the Bombay Act, holding it repugnant to the Essential Supplies Act, 1946 under Article 254(1). Important Terms: Article 254(1) (Doctrine of Repugnancy): When a State law conflicts with a Union law on a Concurrent List subject, the Union law prevails. Article 254(2) (Presidential Assent): Allows a State law to override a Union law on the same Concurrent List subject, but only with Presidential approval. Occupied Field Doctrine: If Parliament has legislated comprehensively on a subject, States cannot legislate further unless specifically allowed.

Bench: Chief Justice S.M. Sikri Justice J.M. Shelat Justice A.N. Ray Justice I.D. Dua Justice G.K. Mitter Justice S.C. Roy Justice D.G. Palekar Facts: The Wealth Tax Act of 1957 imposed a tax on the net wealth of individuals and companies, explicitly excluding agricultural land from its ambit. However, the Finance Act of 1969 amended the Wealth Tax Act to include the capital value of agricultural land in the computation of net wealth. H.S. Dhillon, an assessee affected by this amendment, challenged its constitutionality in the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The High Court, by a majority, held that the amendment was ultra vires, stating that Parliament lacked the competence to tax agricultural land, as this subject fell under the State List (Entry 49, List II) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The Union of India appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. Issues: Whether the amended Wealth Tax Act, which included agricultural land in the computation of net wealth, was within the legislative competence of Parliament. Whether the tax imposed by the amended Act fell under Entry 86 of List I (Union List) or Entry 49 of List II (State List) of the Seventh Schedule. Whether Parliament could exercise its residuary powers under Entry 97 of List I and Article 248 of the Constitution to impose a wealth tax on agricultural land. Arguments: Appellant (Union of India): The tax imposed by the amended Wealth Tax Act did not fall under Entry 49 of List II, which pertains to “Taxes on lands and buildings,” but rather under Entry 86 of List I, which deals with “Taxes on the capital value of the assets, exclusive of agricultural land, of individuals and companies.” The exclusion of agricultural land in Entry 86 of List I does not preclude Parliament from taxing it under its residuary powers granted by Entry 97 of List I and Article 248. Parliament possesses comprehensive residuary powers to legislate on matters not enumerated in any of the three lists, including taxation of subjects not specified elsewhere. Respondent (H.S. Dhillon): The power to tax agricultural land is vested exclusively in the State Legislature under Entry 49 of List II. The exclusion of agricultural land from Entry 86 of List I indicates the framers’ intent to keep taxation of agricultural land within the States’ domain. The amendment to include agricultural land in the Wealth Tax Act encroaches upon the States’ legislative powers and is thus unconstitutional. Ratio Decidendi: Scope of Entry 86, List I: The Supreme Court held that Entry 86 of List I authorizes Parliament to tax the capital value of assets, excluding agricultural land. The explicit exclusion signifies that Parliament cannot tax agricultural land under this entry. Interpretation of Entry 49, List II: Entry 49 of List II pertains to taxes directly on lands and buildings, such as property taxes. The Court clarified that a tax on the capital value of assets, including agricultural land, is distinct from a direct tax on land and does not fall under Entry 49. Residuary Powers under Entry 97, List I, and Article 248: The Court emphasized that Parliament holds residuary powers to legislate on matters not enumerated in any of the three lists. Since a tax on the capital value of agricultural land is not explicitly mentioned in any entry, it falls within Parliament’s residuary powers. Observations: The Court noted that the Constitution’s framers intended to vest residuary legislative powers in Parliament to ensure comprehensive authority over unforeseen matters. The exclusion of agricultural land from Entry 86 of List I does not imply a prohibition but rather indicates that such taxation is not covered under that specific entry. Parliament can still legislate on this matter under its residuary powers. The decision underscores the importance of a harmonious interpretation of the legislative lists to maintain the federal balance while ensuring legislative efficacy. Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the amended Wealth Tax Act, affirming Parliament’s authority to include agricultural land in the computation of net wealth under its residuary legislative powers. The appeal by the Union of India was allowed, and the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court was set aside. Important Terms: Residuary Powers: Legislative powers granted to Parliament to legislate on matters not enumerated in any of the three lists of the Seventh Schedule. Entry 86, List I: Pertains to taxes on the capital value of assets, excluding agricultural land, of individuals and companies. Entry 49, List II: Relates to taxes on lands and buildings, typically understood as property taxes imposed by State Legislatures. Article 248: Grants Parliament exclusive power to make laws on any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent or State List, encompassing residuary subjects. Wealth Tax: A tax levied on the net wealth of individuals or entities, considering the total value of assets minus liabilities. This landmark judgment clarified the extent of Parliament’s residuary legislative powers, particularly concerning taxation not explicitly mentioned in the legislative lists. It established that Parliament could impose taxes on subjects not enumerated in any list, provided they do not encroach upon the exclusive domain of State Legislatures. The decision reinforced the principle that the Constitution’s distribution of powers must be interpreted to allow both Union and State Legislatures to function effectively within their respective domains.

Bench: Chief Justice M. Patanjali Sastri Justice B.K. Mukherjea Justice S.R. Das Justice N.H. Bhagwati Justice Ghulam Hasan Facts: The Orissa State Legislature passed the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1952, aiming to acquire estates owned by zamindars (landowners) and redistribute the land. K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo, a zamindar, challenged the constitutionality of the Act, arguing that it was a colorable exercise of legislative power and violated fundamental rights. He contended that the Act was enacted under the guise of land reforms but was, in reality, an attempt to deprive zamindars of their property without proper compensation. The petitioner approached the Supreme Court, questioning the legislative competence of the Orissa Legislature and alleging malafide intent. Issues: Whether the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1952, was a valid exercise of legislative power or a case of colorable legislation. Whether the Act violated Article 14 (right to equality) and Article 31 (right to property) of the Constitution. Whether the Orissa State Legislature had the authority to enact the law under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Arguments: Petitioners (K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo & Zamindars): The Act was not a genuine land reform measure but a politically motivated attempt to take over zamindari estates. The State Legislature had exceeded its constitutional power, making the Act a case of colorable legislation. The Act violated Article 14 (equality before law) and Article 31 (right to property), as it arbitrarily targeted zamindars. Respondents (State of Orissa): The Act was within the legislative competence of the State Legislature under Entry 18 of the State List, which deals with land and land tenure. The law aimed at equitable land distribution and was protected under Article 31A, which allowed the acquisition of zamindari estates for public purposes. The State denied any malafide intent and justified the law as a step toward land reforms and reducing inequality. Ratio Decidendi: Doctrine of Colorable Legislation: The Supreme Court held that the doctrine applies when a Legislature enacts a law that appears to be within its power but, in reality, transgresses constitutional limits. However, in this case, the Act was within the legislative competence of the State. Validity of Land Reforms: The Court ruled that land reforms and abolition of zamindari estates were valid state subjects under Entry 18, List II of the Constitution. No Malafide Intent: The Court found no evidence that the law was enacted with malafide intent. Instead, it was a legitimate step toward land redistribution. Protection Under Article 31A: The Court held that the Act was protected under Article 31A, which allows the government to acquire zamindari estates without violating property rights. Observations: The Doctrine of Colorable Legislation does not apply if a law is within the Legislature’s competence. The test for determining malafide intent is whether the law has an apparent public purpose and a reasonable basis for classification. The Supreme Court upheld the importance of land reforms as a constitutional objective under Directive Principles of State Policy. Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1952 and dismissed the zamindars’ challenge. The Court ruled that the Act was a valid piece of legislation enacted for public welfare and not a case of colorable legislation. Important Terms: Doctrine of Colorable Legislation: A legal principle that invalidates laws when a Legislature enacts a law under the guise of a legitimate power but actually exceeds its jurisdiction. Article 31A of the Constitution: Protects land reform laws from being challenged under fundamental rights. Entry 18, List II (State List): Grants State Legislatures the power to make laws on land, land tenure, and land revenue. Zamindari Abolition: A policy aimed at redistributing land from large landowners (zamindars) to peasants. Malafide Intent: A law enacted with an improper motive rather than for a genuine public purpose.

Bench: Justice V.N. Khare Justice Ruma Pal Facts: The respondent, Drive-in Enterprises, owned a drive-in-theatre on the outskirts of Bangalore, where films were screened. In this type of cinema, viewers could watch movies while sitting in their cars. The Karnataka Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1971, defined drive-in-cinema as an open-air theatre where admissions were granted to people who wished to watch films from inside their vehicles. The Karnataka Entertainments Tax Act, 1958, imposed entertainment tax on admissions to cinemas. The state government later amended the Act, introducing sub-clause (v) in clause (i) of Section 2, which levied tax on vehicles entering a drive-in-theatre, in addition to the entertainment tax on the viewers. The proprietors of drive-in-theatres challenged this additional tax, arguing that it was beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. The Karnataka High Court struck down the tax, ruling that the levy was not on a person entertained but on an inanimate object (a car), making it ultra vires. The State of Karnataka appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. Issues: Whether the Karnataka Entertainments Tax Act, 1958, as amended, was within the legislative competence of the State Legislature. Whether levying tax on vehicles entering the drive-in-theatre amounted to an entertainment tax under Entry 62 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Whether the additional tax on vehicles constituted an arbitrary and unreasonable imposition. Arguments: Petitioners (State of Karnataka): The tax was not on the vehicle itself but on the person entertained, as the car was only a means to enjoy the entertainment in comfort. The State Legislature was competent to impose such a levy under Entry 62 of List II, which allows states to tax luxuries, entertainments, amusements, betting, and gambling. The amended Act was a valid piece of legislation, and the tax was justified as it was related to the quality of entertainment received. Respondents (Drive-in Enterprises): The tax was levied on the vehicle and not the person, making it unconstitutional under Entry 62, which permits tax only on persons entertained. Cars were inanimate objects and could not be taxed under the category of entertainment. The amendment was an arbitrary exercise of legislative power, creating an unreasonable classification between drive-in-theatres and conventional cinema halls. Ratio Decidendi: Pith and Substance of the Levy: The Supreme Court held that the real nature and character of the levy must be examined. The tax was imposed not on the car but on the person using the car for entertainment. The levy was, therefore, on the person entertained, making it valid under Entry 62. Comfort and Quality of Entertainment: The Court observed that entertainment tax could vary based on the comfort and experience provided to the viewer. A person choosing to watch a movie while seated in a car was availing an additional luxury, justifying the additional tax. Legislative Competence: The Court ruled that the State Legislature was within its rights to impose an entertainment tax on those opting for a higher level of comfort while enjoying a film at a drive-in-theatre. The tax had a direct nexus with entertainment and was not merely a tax on vehicles. Observations: The term “entertainment” under Entry 62 is broad and includes not just the act of watching a film but also the means and manner in which the entertainment is consumed. The principle of legislative competence requires that the essence of the tax be examined rather than its mere nomenclature. The doctrine of pith and substance was applied to confirm that the levy was a tax on entertainment and not an indirect attempt to tax vehicles. Decision: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s ruling and upheld the validity of the entertainment tax on vehicles entering the drive-in-theatre. The appeal was allowed, and the levy was deemed constitutional. Important Terms: Entry 62, List II (Seventh Schedule): Grants the State Legislature power to levy taxes on luxuries, entertainment, amusements, betting, and gambling. Doctrine of Pith and Substance: A legal principle used to determine the true nature of a law by analyzing its substance rather than its form. Entertainment Tax: A tax levied on persons entertained in cinemas, amusement parks, and other recreational activities. Legislative Competence: The authority of a legislative body to make laws within its jurisdiction. Arbitrary Taxation: The imposition of a tax without reasonable justification or classification.

Bench: Chief Justice S.R. Das Justice S.K. Das Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar Justice K.N. Wanchoo Justice M. Hidayatullah Facts: The Ajmer Legislative Assembly enacted the Ajmer (Sound Amplifiers Control) Act, 1952, which received the President’s assent in 1953. The Act sought to regulate the use of sound amplifiers by imposing restrictions to control noise pollution and maintain public order. The respondents were prosecuted under Section 3 of the Act for violating conditions attached to their permit to use sound amplifiers on May 15 and 16, 1954. The prosecution alleged that the amplifiers were tuned to be audible beyond 30 yards (Condition 1) and placed at a height exceeding six feet from the ground (Condition 2). The second respondent operated the sound amplifiers for a Sammelan (public gathering) with prior permission. The Judicial Commissioner of Ajmer, upon reference under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, held that the pith and substance of the Act fell within Entry 31 of the Union List (which includes “Posts and Telegraphs; Telephones, wireless, broadcasting and other like forms of communication”) and not Entry 6 of the State List (which includes “Public health and sanitation, hospitals and dispensaries”). Consequently, the Act was declared ultra vires the State Legislature. The State of Rajasthan, which substituted the State of Ajmer after the reorganization of states, appealed the decision before the Supreme Court. Issues: Whether the Ajmer (Sound Amplifiers Control) Act, 1952, was within the legislative competence of the State Legislature. Whether the Act fell under Entry 31 of the Union List, making it ultra vires the State Legislature. Whether the Act could be justified under Entry 6 (Public Health) or Entry 1 (Public Order) of the State List. Arguments: Petitioner’s (State of Rajasthan) Arguments: The control of sound amplifiers was necessary to maintain public order and protect public health, which fell within the State List. The Act did not seek to regulate broadcasting or wireless communication, which was the subject of Entry 31 of the Union List. Instead, it merely controlled the use of amplifiers to prevent disturbances. The power to regulate excessive noise was an essential part of public health and order, justifying the State’s legislative competence. Respondent’s (Chawla’s) Arguments: The Act essentially regulated sound amplifiers, which are instruments of broadcasting and communication, thus falling under Entry 31 of the Union List. The State Legislature lacked the authority to legislate on matters covered by the Union List. The Judicial Commissioner correctly held that the Act was unconstitutional. Ratio Decidendi: Doctrine of Pith and Substance: The Court emphasized that when determining the validity of a law, its pith and substance must be examined. If a law primarily falls within the legislative competence of a particular government, incidental encroachment on another field does not make it invalid. Regulation of Sound Amplifiers as a Matter of Public Health and Order: The Court held that although sound amplifiers could be considered a means of broadcasting, their regulation was necessary to maintain public health and order. The use of amplifiers, when unregulated, could create public disturbances and affect tranquility. Legislative Competence of the State: The Court ruled that the Act, in substance, regulated noise pollution rather than broadcasting. The legislation was aimed at maintaining public order and ensuring public health, which were matters within the State List. Observations: The Court noted that legislative powers in a federal system are not always mutually exclusive and may overlap. While broadcasting as a whole was under Union jurisdiction, controlling excessive noise from amplifiers in public places was a matter of public order and health, making it a subject within the State’s legislative competence. The regulation of sound amplifiers was a necessary measure to protect citizens from disturbances caused by their unregulated use. Decision: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Judicial Commissioner and upheld the validity of the Ajmer (Sound Amplifiers Control) Act, 1952. The Court ruled that the Act was within the competence of the State Legislature as it primarily dealt with public health and public order rather than broadcasting. The appeal was allowed. Important Terms: Doctrine of Pith and Substance: Used to determine the true nature of a law by analyzing its primary objective rather than incidental effects. Entry 31 of the Union List: Covers subjects related to “Posts and Telegraphs; Telephones, wireless, broadcasting, and other like forms of communication.” Entry 6 of the State List: Pertains to “Public health and sanitation, hospitals, and dispensaries,” under which states can regulate issues affecting public health. Entry 1 of the State List: Covers “Public order,” granting states the authority to enact laws to maintain peace and order. Legislative Competence: Refers to the authority of a legislative body to make laws on a particular subject, as outlined in the constitutional division of powers.

Bench: Lord Wright Lord Porter Lord Uthwatt Sir Madhavan Nair Sir John Beaumont Facts: The case involved the challenge to the validity of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940, which was enacted to regulate money lending and provide relief to borrowers. The Act limited the total recoverable amount in respect of principal and interest and was retrospective in nature, allowing borrowers to rely on its provisions in ongoing cases. The Bank of Commerce, Khulna, challenged the Act, arguing that it was ultra vires because it interfered with subjects reserved for the Federal Legislature under the Government of India Act, 1935, particularly “Banking” and “Promissory Notes,” which were under List I (Federal List). The Bank contended that since moneylenders often used promissory notes as security for loans, the Act affected negotiability and banking practices, making it a matter within the exclusive domain of the Federal Legislature. The High Court ruled in favor of the bank, declaring the Act ultra vires in so far as it dealt with promissory notes and banking. The case was then appealed to the Privy Council. Issues: Whether the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940, was within the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature, given that it affected promissory notes and banking, which were subjects in the Federal List. Whether the Act, in pith and substance, related to money lending, a subject under the Provincial List, or whether it encroached upon the Federal List in a manner that rendered it unconstitutional. Whether incidental encroachments on a subject in the Federal List would invalidate a Provincial law. Arguments: Petitioners (Bank of Commerce, Khulna): The Act regulated promissory notes, which was a subject under the Federal List. It also impacted banking transactions, an exclusive Federal subject. Since the Act encroached upon the Federal domain, it was ultra vires the Provincial Legislature. Respondents (State of Bengal): The Act was primarily concerned with money lending, which fell under the Provincial List. Any impact on promissory notes and banking was incidental and did not invalidate the legislation. The doctrine of pith and substance should be applied to determine the true nature of the law. Ratio Decidendi: Doctrine of Pith and Substance: The Privy Council ruled that in cases of legislative conflict, courts must determine the true nature and character of the impugned law. If the core subject matter of the legislation falls within a Legislature’s competence, incidental effects on another field do not render it invalid. Since the Bengal Money-Lenders Act primarily dealt with money lending, a Provincial subject, it was within the Provincial Legislature’s competence. Incidental Encroachment on Federal Subjects: The Court held that a law is not invalid merely because it incidentally touches upon a subject in another legislative list. Since the Act’s primary purpose was to regulate money lending, incidental effects on promissory notes and banking did not make it ultra vires. Overlapping Powers in a Federal Structure: The decision acknowledged that legislative powers in a federal system inevitably overlap, and absolute separation of subjects is impractical. The hierarchy of lists must be respected, but minor overlaps do not necessarily invalidate a law. Observations: The Court emphasized that the interpretation of legislative lists should not be rigid and that absolute separation of powers is not always feasible. The precedent set in this case influenced subsequent Indian constitutional law, particularly in cases interpreting Article 246 and the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. The ruling reaffirmed the doctrine of pith and substance as a guiding principle in resolving legislative conflicts. Decision: The Privy Council ruled in favor of the State of Bengal, holding that the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940, was valid as it was in pith and substance a law regulating money lending, a Provincial subject. The incidental impact on promissory notes and banking did not render it unconstitutional. Important Terms: Doctrine of Pith and Substance: A principle used to determine the true nature of legislation by examining its primary purpose rather than incidental effects. Legislative Lists in Government of India Act, 1935: Divided subjects between the Federal and Provincial Legislatures, similar to the Seventh Schedule in the Indian Constitution. Money Lending vs. Banking: Money lending was a Provincial subject, while banking was a Federal subject. The case clarified the distinction between the two. Incidental Encroachment: A law that primarily belongs to one legislative field may incidentally touch upon another without being unconstitutional. Ultra Vires: A legal principle meaning “beyond the powers,” used to determine whether a legislative body exceeded its constitutional authority.

Bench: Chief Justice Bhuvaneshwar Prasad Sinha Justice S.J. Imam Justice K. Subba Rao Justice K.N. Wanchoo Justice J.C. Shah Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar Facts: Shrikant Mudholkar, son of Krishna Ranganath Mudholkar, passed the Secondary School Certificate (SSC) Examination in Bombay in March 1960. His mother tongue was Marathi, and he completed his education in Marathi. He enrolled at St. Xavier’s College, affiliated with Gujarat University, for the First Year Arts course, where the medium of instruction was English. After successfully completing this course, he applied for the Intermediate Arts course, intending to continue his education in English. However, the Gujarat University Act, 1949, and subsequent amendments in 1961, particularly Statutes 207, 208, and 209, restricted English as a medium of instruction. The University refused to allow him to pursue studies in English, citing its policy to promote Gujarati and Hindi as the exclusive media of instruction. The Mudholkars challenged this decision in the Gujarat High Court, arguing that it violated their rights and the University’s legal authority. The High Court ruled in favor of Mudholkar, leading the University to appeal to the Supreme Court. Issues: Whether Gujarat University had the authority under the Gujarat University Act, 1949, to prescribe Gujarati or Hindi as the exclusive medium of instruction. Whether the State Legislature had the legislative competence to impose such restrictions, considering Entry 66 of List I (Union List) of the Constitution, which pertains to the coordination and determination of standards in higher education. Arguments: Petitioners (Mudholkars): The Gujarat University Act, 1949, did not authorize the University to impose an exclusive medium of instruction. The State Legislature could not legislate on matters affecting the coordination and determination of educational standards, which fall under Entry 66 of the Union List. Respondents (Gujarat University and the State of Gujarat): The University had the authority to determine the medium of instruction under its powers conferred by the Gujarat University Act. Education, including universities, was a subject under the State List (Entry 11 of List II at the time, now Entry 25 of List III). Ratio Decidendi: University’s Lack of Authority: The Supreme Court held that neither the Gujarat University Act, 1949, nor its amendments conferred power on the University to impose Gujarati or Hindi as the exclusive medium of instruction. Legislative Competence and Entry 66: The Court ruled that the power to coordinate and determine standards in higher education was vested in the Union under Entry 66 of List I. The State Legislature could not enact laws that affected these standards. Overlap Between Lists: Although “education” was under the State List, the Union’s power to legislate on “coordination and determination of standards” under Entry 66 prevailed. Any State law that impacted this coordination would be invalid. Observations: The power to prescribe a medium of instruction falls under the broader subject of education. However, if the imposition of a regional language affects national educational standards, it encroaches upon the Union’s domain under Entry 66. The State has the power to regulate education but cannot make laws that disrupt uniformity and coordination in higher education across India. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of a statute may help in understanding the legislative intent, but they cannot override the actual provisions of the law. Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the Gujarat High Court’s ruling and struck down the University’s policy. It declared that Gujarat University had no authority to impose Gujarati or Hindi as the sole medium of instruction. The decision reinforced that matters related to the coordination and determination of standards in higher education fall under the exclusive domain of the Union. Important Terms: Entry 66 of List I (Union List): Grants the Union Parliament power over coordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education and research. Entry 25 of List III (Concurrent List): Covers education, including technical and medical education, and universities. Medium of Instruction: The language used to teach students; in this case, the Court ruled that universities could not unilaterally impose a specific medium. Doctrine of Repugnancy: If a State law conflicts with a Union law in a subject where both have jurisdiction, the Union law prevails. Legislative Competence: The authority of a legislative body to make laws on specific subjects as per the Constitution.

Bench: Chief Justice Maurice Gwyer Justice Sir Shah Muhammad Sulaiman Justice M.R. Jayakar Facts: The Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, imposed a tax of 5% on the retail sale of motor spirit and lubricants. The Act required every retail dealer to register and maintain records of sales. The Governor-General referred the Act to the Federal Court under Section 213 of the Government of India Act, 1935, for an advisory opinion on whether the Act, in whole or in part, was ultra vires the Legislature of the Central Provinces and Berar. The core issue revolved around the constitutional distribution of taxing powers between the federal and provincial governments. Issues: Whether the tax imposed under the Act was an excise duty, falling under the exclusive legislative domain of the Central Legislature. Whether the Provincial Legislature had the competence to levy a tax on the retail sale of motor spirit and lubricants under the Government of India Act, 1935. Whether the doctrine of pith and substance applied to determine the true nature of the tax. Arguments: Petitioner’s Arguments (Government of India): The tax, though levied at the point of retail sale, was in essence an excise duty since it targeted goods that were manufactured or produced. Excise duties fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Central Legislature under Entry 45 of the Federal Legislative List. Respondent’s Arguments (Provincial Government): The tax was levied at the point of sale and was thus distinct from an excise duty, falling within the legislative competence of the province under Entry 48 of the Provincial Legislative List (taxes on the sale of goods). The Act was not an attempt to encroach upon the federal power but a legitimate exercise of provincial legislative authority. Ratio Decidendi: Distinction Between Excise Duty and Sales Tax: The Federal Court held that excise duties are imposed on the manufacture or production of goods, whereas sales taxes are levied on transactions of sale. Since the impugned tax was applied at the retail sale stage, it was a sales tax and not an excise duty. Legislative Competence: The Court ruled that the provincial legislature had the competence to enact the Act under Entry 48 of the Provincial Legislative List. The tax’s nature as a sales tax, rather than an excise duty, placed it within provincial jurisdiction. Doctrine of Pith and Substance: The Court emphasized that the true character of legislation must be determined by its primary purpose rather than incidental effects. Since the Act primarily taxed retail sales and not production, it fell within the provincial domain. Observations: The Court stressed that the legislative powers of the Centre and Provinces should be interpreted harmoniously to avoid conflicts. The judgment clarified the demarcation between excise duties and sales taxes, establishing that a tax on retail sales could not be construed as an excise duty. The Court noted that while excise duties could be collected at various stages, they fundamentally targeted production, whereas sales tax focused on the point of sale. Decision: The Federal Court held that the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, was within the legislative competence of the provincial legislature and was not ultra vires. It ruled that the tax imposed was a valid sales tax and did not infringe upon the central power to levy excise duties. Important Terms: Excise Duty: A tax levied on the manufacture or production of goods within a country, typically imposed at the production stage. Sales Tax: A tax imposed on the sale of goods, usually collected at the retail level. Pith and Substance Doctrine: A constitutional principle used to determine the true nature of legislation by examining its primary purpose rather than incidental effects. Government of India Act, 1935: The statute that laid the foundation for the division of legislative powers between the Centre and the Provinces in British India. Entry 45 (Federal List) vs. Entry 48 (Provincial List): While Entry 45 granted the Centre exclusive authority over excise duties, Entry 48 empowered provinces to impose taxes on the sale of goods.

Bench: Chief Justice S.H. Kapadia Justice B. Sudershan Reddy Justice K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan Justice Surinder Singh Nijjar Justice Swatanter Kumar Facts: G.V.K. Industries Ltd. (GVK), an Indian company, sought to establish a gas-based power project in Andhra Pradesh. To facilitate financing, GVK entered into an agreement with M/s. NRDC, a non-resident company based in the USA, for consultancy services to secure loans from international financial institutions. Upon completion of the services, NRDC invoiced GVK for a “success fee.” GVK applied to the Income Tax Officer (ITO) for a ‘No Objection Certificate’ (NOC) to remit the payment without tax deduction at source, asserting that NRDC had no business connection in India under Section 9(1)(i) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and that the services did not qualify as technical services under Section 9(1)(vii). The ITO rejected this application, leading GVK to appeal to the Commissioner of Income Tax, who initially granted the NOC but later revoked it, directing GVK to deduct tax at source. GVK challenged this order in the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which held that while Section 9(1)(i) was inapplicable, the payments fell under Section 9(1)(vii)(b) as fees for technical services, thereby requiring tax deduction at source. GVK subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court. Issues: Whether the Parliament has the authority under Article 245 of the Constitution to enact laws with extra-territorial application. Whether the consultancy fees paid to NRDC by GVK are deemed to accrue or arise in India under Section 9(1)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, thereby necessitating tax deduction at source. Arguments: Petitioner’s (GVK) Arguments: The consultancy services provided by NRDC were rendered entirely outside India, and NRDC had no business connection within India. Therefore, the income did not accrue or arise in India under Section 9(1)(i) of the Income Tax Act. The services rendered were not in the nature of technical services as defined under Section 9(1)(vii) and its Explanation 2; thus, the payments should not be subject to tax deduction at source. Respondent’s (Income Tax Department) Arguments: The consultancy services provided by NRDC fall within the definition of “fees for technical services” under Section 9(1)(vii) of the Income Tax Act. Parliament possesses the authority to legislate on extra-territorial aspects or causes that have a nexus with India, as per Article 245 of the Constitution. Ratio Decidendi: Parliament’s Legislative Competence: The Supreme Court held that Parliament has the authority to enact laws with extra-territorial application, provided there is a real and substantial nexus between the subject matter of the law and India. The Court clarified that laws lacking such nexus would be ultra vires. Fees for Technical Services: The Court interpreted “fees for technical services” under Section 9(1)(vii) of the Income Tax Act to include consultancy services. Since NRDC provided consultancy services to GVK, the fees paid were deemed to accrue or arise in India, necessitating tax deduction at source. Observations: The Court emphasized that while Parliament can legislate on extra-territorial matters, such legislation must serve the interest, welfare, or security of India. The term “fees for technical services” encompasses various services, including managerial, technical, or consultancy services, as defined in Explanation 2 to Section 9(1)(vii) of the Income Tax Act. Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed GVK’s appeal, upholding the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s decision that the consultancy fees paid to NRDC were subject to tax deduction at source under Section 9(1)(vii) of the Income Tax Act. Important Terms: Article 245 of the Constitution: Empowers Parliament to make laws for the whole or any part of India and allows for laws with extra-territorial operation, provided there is a nexus with India. Section 9(1)(i) of the Income Tax Act: Specifies that income accruing or arising, directly or indirectly, through or from any business connection in India is deemed to accrue or arise in India. Section 9(1)(vii) of the Income Tax Act: Pertains to income by way of fees for technical services payable by a resident, except where the fees are payable in respect of services utilized in a business or profession carried on outside India or for earning income from any source outside India. Explanation 2 to Section 9(1)(vii): Defines “fees for technical services” to mean any consideration for the rendering of managerial, technical, or consultancy services, including the provision of services of technical or other personnel. No Objection Certificate (NOC): A certificate issued by the Income Tax Department allowing remittance of funds abroad without deduction of tax at source.

Bench: Chief Justice S.R. Das Justice S.K. Das Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar Justice K.N. Wanchoo Justice M. Hidayatullah Facts: Charusila Dasi, the widow of Akshaya Kumar Ghose, created the “Srimati Charusila Trust” in 1938 through a trust deed. She owned several properties, including land and buildings in Deoghar, Bihar (Schedules B and C), and properties in Calcutta (Schedule D), amounting to an estimated value of ₹8,50,000, generating an annual income of about ₹87,839. The trust was primarily aimed at constructing and maintaining two temples—one for Lord Shiva and another for Goddess Lakshmi Narayan—as well as a charitable hospital for Hindu women in Deoghar. The trust deed provided specific instructions: Completion of temple construction and installation of the deity “Iswar Srigopal” and a marble image of Sri Balanand Brahmachari. Conduct of religious rituals and festivals for the deities with an annual expenditure of ₹13,600. Establishment of the “Akshaya Kumar Female Hospital” and an outdoor dispensary in Deoghar, with an annual expenditure of ₹12,000 for healthcare services. The Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts, under the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950, issued a notice under Section 59 of the Act, requiring Charusila Dasi to submit details regarding the trust. She refused, claiming that the trust was private and outside the jurisdiction of the Act. The Board insisted that the trust was public and subject to the Act. Subsequently, a demand was made under Section 70 to levy a fee on the trust. Charusila Dasi filed a writ petition in the Patna High Court under Article 226, seeking to quash the proceedings, arguing that: The trust was private and beyond the scope of the Act. The Act itself was unconstitutional as it interfered with her fundamental rights under Article 19. The Patna High Court ruled in her favor, quashing the Board’s proceedings and holding that the trust was private and not subject to the Act. The State of Bihar appealed to the Supreme Court. Issues: Whether the Srimati Charusila Trust was a private or a public religious trust. Whether the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950, could regulate trusts with properties located outside Bihar. Arguments: Petitioner’s (State of Bihar) Arguments: The trust was created for religious and charitable purposes and had a public element, making it a public religious trust under the Act. Since the temples were located in Bihar and served the local Hindu community, the trust was subject to state regulation. The Act could be applied based on the doctrine of territorial nexus since a significant portion of the trust’s assets were in Bihar. Respondent’s (Charusila Dasi) Arguments: The trust was established solely for the worship of a family deity and was, therefore, a private trust. The Act could not apply to the trust since its properties extended beyond Bihar, making it extra-territorial and beyond the Bihar Legislature’s power. The Act violated her fundamental rights by interfering with private religious endowments. Ratio Decidendi: Public vs. Private Religious Trusts: The Supreme Court held that a trust intended for the benefit of the public, particularly for religious and charitable purposes, is a public trust. Since the temples and hospital were intended for public use, the Srimati Charusila Trust was classified as a public religious trust. Application of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950: The Court ruled that the Act applied to all religious trusts with properties in Bihar, even if they owned assets outside the state. The doctrine of territorial nexus justified Bihar’s authority to regulate the trust. Legislative Competence: The Bihar Legislature had the power under Article 245 of the Constitution to legislate for matters within its territory. Since the trust’s main religious endowments were in Bihar, the Act validly applied to it. Observations: The Court emphasized that Hindu religious trusts are often intended for public purposes, even if they originate as family endowments. The doctrine of territorial nexus applies when a trust has substantial assets or activities within a state’s jurisdiction. The Court distinguished between private trusts for family worship and public trusts that involve community participation in religious or charitable activities. Decision: The Supreme Court reversed the Patna High Court’s ruling, holding that the Srimati Charusila Trust was a public religious trust and was subject to the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950. The appeal was allowed, and the Board’s actions were upheld. Important Terms: Private vs. Public Religious Trusts: A private religious trust serves a specific family, while a public religious trust benefits a wider religious community. Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950: Legislation to regulate Hindu religious trusts in Bihar, ensuring transparency and accountability. Doctrine of Territorial Nexus: A legal principle allowing a state to regulate entities with a substantial connection (nexus) to its territory, even if parts of their assets lie outside the state. Article 245 of the Constitution: Grants legislative power to Parliament and State Legislatures within their respective territories. Certiorari and Prohibition: Writs used to quash illegal administrative actions and prevent overreach by authorities.

Bench: Chief Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das Justice T.L. Venkatarama Aiyar Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha Justice S.K. Das Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar Facts: R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala was the managing director of R.M.D.C. (Mysore) Ltd., a company incorporated in Mysore (now Karnataka), with its head office in Bangalore. The company organized prize competitions, including crossword puzzles, which were published in newspapers and magazines circulated in various states, including Bombay (now Mumbai, Maharashtra). Participants from Bombay would send their entries along with entry fees to the company’s Bangalore office. The State of Bombay enacted the Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competitions Control and Tax Act, 1948, which sought to regulate and tax prize competitions, including those conducted by entities outside the state but having participants within Bombay. The Act imposed taxes on gross receipts from entry fees paid by people in Bombay. Challenging the applicability of this Act to their competitions, Chamarbaugwala filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court, contending that the Act was ultra vires (beyond the powers) of the State Legislature, especially concerning competitions conducted outside Bombay but participated in by its residents. The High Court ruled in favor of Chamarbaugwala, leading the State of Bombay to appeal to the Supreme Court. Issues: Whether the State of Bombay had the legislative competence to enact a law regulating and taxing prize competitions organized outside its territorial limits but having participants within the state. Whether the Act violated Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business. Whether the Act infringed upon the freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse guaranteed under Article 301 of the Constitution. Arguments: Appellant (State of Bombay): The State argued that the Act was within its legislative competence as there was a sufficient territorial nexus between the state and the prize competitions, given that participants from Bombay paid entry fees to partake in these competitions. The State contended that prize competitions involving substantial chance were in the nature of gambling and, therefore, could be regulated and taxed under the state’s powers. Respondent (R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala): Chamarbaugwala argued that the Act was extra-territorial and could not apply to competitions organized and conducted outside Bombay. He contended that the Act violated the fundamental right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g) and imposed unreasonable restrictions not protected by Article 19(6). He also argued that the Act infringed upon the freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse under Article 301. Ratio Decidendi: Legislative Competence and Territorial Nexus: The Supreme Court held that the State of Bombay had the legislative competence to enact the law due to a sufficient territorial nexus between the state and the prize competitions. The Court observed that the entry fees were paid by participants residing in Bombay, establishing a clear connection justifying the state’s regulatory and taxing authority. Nature of Prize Competitions: The Court distinguished between games of skill and games of chance. It held that competitions substantially involving chance, even if they required some skill, fell under the category of gambling. Such activities were considered res extra commercium (outside the scope of commerce) and, therefore, not protected by Article 19(1)(g). Freedom of Trade and Commerce: The Court held that activities in the nature of gambling do not constitute trade, commerce, or intercourse within the meaning of Article 301. Therefore, the restrictions imposed by the Act did not violate the freedom guaranteed under this provision. Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Bombay High Court’s decision. The Court upheld the validity of the Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competitions Control and Tax Act, 1948, as applied to prize competitions involving substantial chance, even if organized outside the state but having participants within Bombay. The Court ruled that the State of Bombay had the legislative competence to regulate and tax such competitions and that the Act did not violate Articles 19(1)(g) or 301 of the Constitution. Important Terms: Territorial Nexus: A legal doctrine allowing a state to legislate on matters outside its territorial limits if a sufficient connection exists between the state and the subject matter. Res Extra Commercium: Activities considered outside the scope of commerce and trade, often due to their immoral or harmful nature, such as gambling. Article 19(1)(g): A provision in the Indian Constitution guaranteeing citizens the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business. Article 301: A provision in the Indian Constitution ensuring the freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse throughout the territory of India.

Bench: Chief Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das Justice T.L. Venkatarama Aiyar Justice S.K. Das Justice A.K. Sarkar Justice Vivian Bose Facts: Tata Iron & Steel Company (TISCO), headquartered in Jamshedpur, Bihar, manufactured iron and steel products. The company sold these products to buyers both within and outside Bihar. For sales to buyers in other states, TISCO entered into contracts where goods were dispatched from its Jamshedpur plant to destinations outside Bihar. The State of Bihar imposed sales tax on these transactions under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, asserting that the sales were completed within Bihar. TISCO contested this imposition, arguing that the sales occurred outside Bihar and, therefore, were beyond the state’s taxation authority. Issues: Did the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, apply to sales where goods were dispatched from Bihar to buyers in other states? Was the State of Bihar constitutionally competent to levy sales tax on transactions where the goods were delivered outside its territorial jurisdiction? Arguments: Appellant (TISCO): TISCO contended that the sales in question were inter-state transactions, with goods delivered to buyers outside Bihar. Therefore, these sales fell outside the purview of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, as the state lacked the territorial nexus to tax such transactions. Respondent (State of Bihar): The State argued that since the goods originated from Bihar and the sales agreements were executed within the state, it had the authority to levy sales tax on these transactions. The State maintained that a sufficient territorial nexus existed to justify the tax imposition. Ratio Decidendi: Territorial Nexus Doctrine: The Supreme Court applied the doctrine of territorial nexus, which allows a state to levy taxes if a sufficient connection exists between the state and the transaction. The Court observed that the goods were manufactured and dispatched from Bihar, establishing a substantial link between the state and the sales. State’s Taxing Authority: The Court held that the presence of goods within Bihar at the time of the sales provided the state with the authority to impose sales tax. The physical location of the goods within the state’s territory constituted an adequate territorial nexus for taxation purposes. Observations: Nature of Sales Tax: The Court clarified that sales tax is levied on the act of sale, not merely on the movement of goods. Therefore, if the sale transaction has a substantial connection with the taxing state, the state is justified in imposing the tax. Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, as applied to the disputed transactions. The Court ruled that the State of Bihar possessed the legislative competence to levy sales tax on goods manufactured and sold within its territory, even if the goods were subsequently transported to purchasers outside the state. Consequently, TISCO’s appeal was dismissed, and the company was held liable to pay the assessed sales tax. Important Terms: Territorial Nexus: A legal principle that permits a state to tax transactions or entities if a significant connection exists between the state and the subject matter of the tax. Sales Tax: A tax imposed by the government on the sale of goods and services. Inter-State Sales: Transactions where goods are sold and transported from one state to another within a country.

Bench: Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud Justice A.N. Sen Justice R. Misra Facts: In 1953, Rudul Sah was arrested on charges of murdering his wife. On June 3, 1968, the Additional Sessions Judge of Muzaffarpur acquitted him, ordering his immediate release. Despite this acquittal, Sah remained incarcerated until October 16, 1982, resulting in an additional 14 years of unlawful detention. In response, Sah filed a habeas corpus petition under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, seeking his release and compensation for the violation of his fundamental rights. Issues: Whether the prolonged detention of Rudul Sah after his acquittal constituted a violation of his fundamental rights under Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty) of the Constitution. Whether the Supreme Court has the authority under Article 32 to award monetary compensation for the violation of fundamental rights. Arguments: Petitioner’s Arguments: Sah argued that his continued detention after acquittal was illegal and violated his fundamental rights under Article 21. He sought immediate release and compensation for the unlawful imprisonment. Respondent’s Arguments: The State of Bihar acknowledged the wrongful detention but contended that Sah’s release was delayed due to administrative lapses. The State also argued that monetary compensation should be sought through a civil suit rather than a writ petition under Article 32. Ratio Decidendi: Violation of Fundamental Rights: The Supreme Court held that Sah’s prolonged detention after acquittal was a clear violation of his fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21. Award of Compensation under Article 32: The Court established that it possesses the authority to award monetary compensation under Article 32 as a remedy for the violation of fundamental rights. It emphasized that such compensation serves as a necessary relief to ensure the enforcement of fundamental rights and to deter future violations by the state.  Observations: State Accountability: The Court underscored the responsibility of the state to protect individual rights and held that administrative lapses leading to unlawful detention cannot be justified. Scope of Article 32: The judgment broadened the scope of Article 32, allowing the Supreme Court to grant remedial relief, including monetary compensation, for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Decision: The Supreme Court ordered the immediate release of Rudul Sah and awarded him compensation of ₹30,000 for the 14 years of unlawful detention. Additionally, the Court granted ₹5,000 to cover Sah’s expenses for medical treatment and rehabilitation. The Court also directed the State of Bihar to initiate proceedings to investigate the circumstances leading to Sah’s prolonged detention and to take appropriate action against those responsible. Important Terms: Article 21 of the Constitution: Guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, stating that no person shall be deprived of these rights except according to the procedure established by law. Article 32 of the Constitution: Provides individuals the right to approach the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights, empowering the Court to issue directions or orders, including writs like habeas corpus. Habeas Corpus: A legal writ requiring a person under arrest to be brought before a judge or into court, ensuring that a prisoner can be released from unlawful detention. Monetary Compensation: Financial reparation awarded to an individual for loss or injury suffered due to the unlawful actions of another party, in this case, the state.

Bench: Justice P.N. Bhagwati Justice R.S. Pathak Justice A.N. Sen Facts: Bandhua Mukti Morcha, a non-governmental organization dedicated to eradicating bonded labor, conducted a survey in the stone quarries of Faridabad district near Delhi. They discovered that numerous laborers were working under deplorable conditions, lacking basic amenities, and were subjected to bonded labor practices. The organization addressed a letter to Justice P.N. Bhagwati of the Supreme Court, highlighting these issues and seeking intervention for the release and rehabilitation of these workers. The Supreme Court treated this letter as a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, which allows individuals to approach the Court for enforcement of fundamental rights. Issues: Whether the laborers identified in the stone quarries were bonded laborers. Whether their fundamental rights under Articles 21 (Right to Life) and 23 (Prohibition of Forced Labor) of the Constitution were violated. Whether the Supreme Court had the authority to appoint commissions or investigative bodies under Article 32 to ascertain facts related to the case. Whether the State was obligated to ensure the enforcement of labor laws and the rehabilitation of bonded laborers. Arguments: Petitioner’s Arguments: The petitioner contended that the laborers were subjected to bonded labor, working in inhumane conditions without adequate wages, shelter, or healthcare. This situation amounted to a violation of their fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 23 of the Constitution. The petitioner urged the Court to intervene and direct the authorities to take necessary actions for the laborers’ release and rehabilitation. Respondent’s Arguments: The respondents, including the Union of India and the State of Haryana, argued that existing laws were adequate to address the issues raised. They contended that the laborers were not bonded but were working voluntarily under contractual agreements. The respondents also questioned the maintainability of the writ petition, suggesting that the petitioner lacked locus standi (the right to bring the action). Ratio Decidendi: Recognition of Bonded Labor: The Court recognized that the laborers were indeed bonded, as they were working under coercive conditions with little to no remuneration, unable to leave due to debts or other obligations. Violation of Fundamental Rights: The Court held that the exploitation of laborers in such conditions violated their fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 23. The right to life was interpreted to include the right to live with human dignity, encompassing protection against exploitation. Judicial Activism and PIL: The Court affirmed its authority to treat letters or informal communications as writ petitions in cases of public interest, especially when fundamental rights of marginalized sections are involved. Appointment of Commissions: The Court asserted its power to appoint commissions or investigative bodies under Article 32 to gather facts and ensure effective adjudication, especially when state machinery fails to protect citizens’ rights. Observations: State’s Responsibility: The Court emphasized the duty of the State to identify, release, and rehabilitate bonded laborers. It highlighted the necessity for vigilance committees and the enforcement of labor laws to prevent such exploitation. Human Dignity: The judgment underscored that the right to life includes living with human dignity, free from exploitation and inhumane working conditions. Decision: The Supreme Court directed the State of Haryana to: Establish vigilance committees in each district and subdivision within six weeks to identify and oversee the release of bonded laborers. Appoint District Magistrates to conduct surveys and identify bonded laborers. Collaborate with non-governmental organizations for the rehabilitation of freed laborers. Ensure the implementation of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, and other labor welfare legislations. The Court also instructed the Central Government to: Conduct periodic inspections of workplaces to ensure compliance with labor laws. Organize educational programs to inform workers of their rights and benefits under the law. Important Terms: Article 21 of the Constitution: Guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, which includes living with human dignity. Article 23 of the Constitution: Prohibits trafficking in human beings and forced labor. Bonded Labor: A system where laborers are forced to work to repay debts, often under exploitative conditions, violating their fundamental rights. Public Interest Litigation (PIL): Legal actions initiated in a court of law for the enforcement of public interest where the rights of an individual or a group are affected. Locus Standi: The right or capacity to bring an action or to appear in a court.

Bench: Justice M. Hidayatullah Justice J.C. Shah Justice S.M. Sikri Justice G.K. Mitter Justice V. Ramaswami Facts: The petitioners, Tilokchand Motichand & Ors., collected sales tax from their customers under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953. The Sales Tax Officer ordered the forfeiture of ₹26,563.50 under Section 21(4) of the Act, alleging that the petitioners had not refunded the collected tax to their customers as required. The petitioners filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court on March 28, 1958, challenging the forfeiture order and the validity of Section 21(4), claiming it violated their fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the petition on November 28, 1958, upholding the validity of Section 21(4) and the forfeiture order. In a separate case, Kantilal Babulal & Bros. v. H.C. Patel, the Supreme Court struck down Section 12A(4) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946, on September 29, 1967, on similar grounds. Relying on this judgment, the petitioners filed a writ petition under Article 32 before the Supreme Court on February 9, 1968, seeking a refund of the forfeited amount. Issues: Whether a writ petition under Article 32 is maintainable after a significant delay following the High Court’s dismissal of the initial petition. Whether the doctrine of laches (unreasonable delay) applies to petitions filed under Article 32 for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Arguments: Petitioners’ Arguments: Argued that the forfeiture was unconstitutional, as Section 21(4) violated their fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f). Contended that the right to approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 is itself a fundamental right and should not be barred by any limitation period or the doctrine of laches. Respondents’ Arguments: Asserted that the petitioners had delayed unreasonably in approaching the Supreme Court, as the forfeiture occurred in 1958, and the petition under Article 32 was filed only in 1968. Emphasized that the doctrine of laches should apply to prevent the abuse of the judicial process and ensure finality in litigation. Ratio Decidendi: Application of the Doctrine of Laches: The Supreme Court held that while Article 32 provides a guaranteed remedy for the enforcement of fundamental rights, this remedy is subject to the doctrine of laches. Emphasized that unreasonable delay in filing a petition can lead to its dismissal, even when fundamental rights are at stake. Discretionary Nature of Relief under Article 32: The Court observed that the power to grant relief under Article 32 is discretionary and can be denied if there is an undue delay in seeking the remedy. Observations: Public Policy and Judicial Discipline: The Court noted that the doctrine of laches is founded on public policy, aiming to bring finality to litigation and maintain judicial discipline. Fundamental Rights and Procedural Limitations: While Article 32 provides a guaranteed remedy for the enforcement of fundamental rights, this remedy is subject to procedural limitations, including the doctrine of laches, to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition under Article 32, holding that it was barred by the doctrine of laches due to the petitioners’ unreasonable delay in approaching the Court. Important Terms: Article 32 of the Constitution: Provides individuals the right to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Doctrine of Laches: A legal principle that bars claims where there has been an unreasonable delay in pursuing them, resulting in prejudice to the other party. Ultra Vires: Acts or decisions made beyond the scope of the authority granted by law or corporate charter. Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution: Provided citizens the fundamental right to acquire, hold, and dispose of property; this provision was later repealed by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978.

Bench Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar Justice A.K. Sarkar Justice K.N. Wanchoo Justice K.C. Das Gupta Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar Facts Land Dispute: The petitioners, Daryao and others, claimed to have been in possession of certain lands for over fifty years. The respondents sought possession of this land under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms (Amendment) Act XVI of 1953. Proceedings Before the Revenue Authorities: The respondents initiated proceedings before the revenue authorities, asserting their right to the land based on the aforementioned Act. The Board of Revenue ruled in favor of the respondents, granting them possession of the disputed land. Writ Petition Under Article 226: Aggrieved by the Board’s decision, the petitioners filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Allahabad High Court, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the Board’s decision. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the merits. Writ Petition Under Article 32: Subsequently, the petitioners approached the Supreme Court under Article 32, alleging a violation of their fundamental rights and seeking similar relief. Issues Does the principle of res judicata apply to writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution after a similar petition has been dismissed by a High Court under Article 226? Arguments Petitioners’ Arguments: Contended that the principle of res judicata, being a technical rule, should not bar the enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Argued that the right to approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 is itself a fundamental right and should not be curtailed by procedural doctrines. Respondents’ Arguments: Asserted that the principle of res judicata is based on public policy to ensure finality in litigation and prevent abuse of the judicial process. Emphasized that allowing multiple petitions on the same matter would lead to endless litigation and undermine the authority of judicial decisions. Ratio Decidendi Applicability of Res Judicata to Writ Petitions: The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of res judicata applies to writ petitions under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. Emphasized that finality of decisions is essential for the effective administration of justice and to prevent the misuse of judicial resources. Binding Nature of High Court Decisions: If a writ petition under Article 226 is dismissed on merits by a High Court, the decision is binding on the parties, and a subsequent petition on the same matter under Article 32 is barred by res judicata. Exceptions to the Rule: If a writ petition is dismissed by a High Court not on merits but due to reasons like laches (delay) or availability of an alternative remedy, the principle of res judicata does not apply, and a petition under Article 32 is maintainable. Observations Public Policy and Judicial Discipline: The Court observed that the doctrine of res judicata is founded on public policy, aiming to bring finality to litigation and maintain judicial discipline. Fundamental Rights and Procedural Limitations: While Article 32 provides a guaranteed remedy for the enforcement of fundamental rights, this remedy is subject to the principles of res judicata to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Decision The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petitions filed under Article 32, holding that they were barred by the principle of res judicata, as the matters had already been adjudicated upon by the High Court under Article 226. Important Terms Article 226 of the Constitution: Empowers High Courts to issue certain writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other purpose. Article 32 of the Constitution: Provides the right to individuals to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Res Judicata: A legal doctrine that bars re-litigation of the same issue between the same parties once it has been conclusively decided by a competent court. Laches: An unreasonable delay in pursuing a legal remedy, potentially barring the claim.

Bench Justice P. Venkatarama Reddi Justice A.K. Mathur Facts Conviction and Sentencing: Zakarius Lakra was convicted and sentenced to death by the Additional Sessions Judge, Dehradun, for an offense committed on November 15, 1994. The High Court confirmed the death sentence, and the Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence upon appeal. Writ Petition Filed: The parents of the accused filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, challenging the death sentence on the grounds that Zakarius was a juvenile at the time of the offense. They presented school certificates indicating that his date of birth was January 4, 1980, suggesting he was 14 years old when the crime occurred. These certificates were not considered during the initial trial or appeals. Issues Whether the death sentence imposed on Zakarius Lakra should be quashed on the grounds that he was a juvenile at the time of the offense. Arguments Petitioners’ Arguments: Claimed Zakarius was a juvenile at the time of the offense, based on school certificates indicating a birth date of January 4, 1980. Cited previous Supreme Court decisions where the juvenile status of offenders was considered even at advanced stages of legal proceedings, leading to modifications in sentencing. Respondent’s Arguments: Highlighted inconsistencies in Zakarius’s age declarations, noting he had opened a bank account in 1994, which typically requires the individual to be a major. Emphasized the finality of the Supreme Court’s previous decisions upholding the death sentence. Ratio Decidendi (Legal Reasoning) Juvenile Status Consideration: The Court acknowledged the importance of determining the accused’s age at the time of the offense, as it directly impacts the applicability of the Juvenile Justice Act, which prohibits capital punishment for juveniles. Procedural Appropriateness: The Court noted that a writ petition under Article 32 was not the appropriate remedy for challenging the sentence after the dismissal of a review petition. Referred to the precedent set in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, which established the curative petition as the proper legal recourse in such situations. Observations The trial court, while hearing the accused on the question of sentence, noted that Zakarius claimed to be 17 years old at the time of the offense. However, evidence showed he had opened a bank account in 1994, suggesting he was a major. The Supreme Court, in its earlier judgment, had considered this aspect and found no fault in the trial court and High Court’s approach regarding Zakarius’s age. The Court acknowledged that the school certificates indicating Zakarius’s juvenile status were not brought to its notice during the appeal hearing. Decision The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition, stating it was not maintainable under Article 32 for the relief sought. However, the Court permitted the petitioners to convert the writ petition into a curative petition, following the procedure outlined in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, to address the claim of Zakarius’s juvenile status at the time of the offense. Important Terms Article 32 of the Constitution: Provides individuals the right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights. Curative Petition: A legal mechanism allowing the Supreme Court to re-examine its final judgments to prevent miscarriage of justice, even after the dismissal of a review petition. Juvenile Justice Act: Legislation that provides for the care, protection, and rehabilitation of juveniles in conflict with the law, prohibiting capital punishment for offenses committed as juveniles.

Bench A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court comprising: Chief Justice S.P. Bharucha Justice S.S.M. Quadri Justice U.C. Banerjee Justice S.N. Variava Justice Shivaraj V. Patil Facts The case arose from a matrimonial dispute between Rupa Ashok Hurra and Ashok Hurra, who had been separated for several years. Initially, both parties consented to a mutual divorce. However, Rupa Hurra later withdrew her consent, leading to a legal dispute over the validity of the divorce decree. The matter escalated through various courts and ultimately reached the Supreme Court of India, where the primary issue was the validity of the divorce decree granted earlier. After the Supreme Court’s final judgment, Rupa Hurra sought to challenge it, even after her review petition was dismissed, raising questions about the availability of any further relief. Issues Whether an aggrieved person is entitled to any relief against the final judgment or order of the Supreme Court after the dismissal of a review petition. Whether the Supreme Court has the inherent power to reconsider its judgments to prevent abuse of its process and to cure gross miscarriage of justice. Ratio Decidendi (Legal Reasoning) Inherent Powers of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court acknowledged that it possesses inherent powers to reconsider and rectify its judgments to prevent miscarriage of justice. This is crucial to maintain public confidence in the judiciary and ensure fairness. Introduction of the Curative Petition To address situations where gross miscarriage of justice occurs, the Court introduced the concept of a Curative Petition. This allows the Court to re-examine its final judgments in exceptional cases, even after the dismissal of a review petition. Conditions for Filing a Curative PetitionThe Court specified that a Curative Petition can be filed under the following conditions: Violation of Principles of Natural Justice: If the petitioner was not given a fair hearing or was unaware of the proceedings that led to the judgment. Apprehension of Bias: If the judgment was passed by a judge who had a conflict of interest or bias, affecting the impartiality of the decision. Certification by a Senior Advocate: The petition must include a certification by a senior advocate, affirming that the grounds mentioned are substantial. First Raised in Review Petition: The grounds for filing the Curative Petition should have been initially raised in the review petition, which was subsequently dismissed. Observations of the Court The Court emphasized that the Curative Petition is not a regular remedy but an exceptional one, invoked only in cases where there is a gross miscarriage of justice. It underscored the importance of finality of judgments for legal certainty but recognized that procedural fairness and justice are paramount. The Court also noted that frivolous curative petitions would be discouraged, and exemplary costs could be imposed to prevent misuse of this remedy. Decision of the Court The Supreme Court held that an aggrieved person could file a Curative Petition even after the dismissal of a review petition, but only on limited grounds such as violation of principles of natural justice or bias in adjudication. The Court laid down specific guidelines for entertaining Curative Petitions to ensure they are filed in exceptional circumstances and not as a matter of routine. Important Terms Curative Petition: A legal mechanism devised by the Supreme Court to reconsider its final judgments to prevent miscarriage of justice, even after the dismissal of a review petition. Principles of Natural Justice: Fundamental legal principles ensuring fairness, impartiality, and the opportunity to be heard in legal proceedings. Review Petition: A petition filed for re-examination of a court’s judgment, typically on the grounds of apparent errors or new evidence. Miscarriage of Justice: A situation where a grossly unfair outcome occurs in a judicial proceeding, leading to the conviction or punishment of an innocent person. Inherent Powers: Powers possessed by a court to ensure complete justice is done in a case, even if not explicitly provided for by statute or rules.