Bench A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: Justice R.M. Lodha Justice J.S. Khehar Justice Dipak Misra Justice C. Nagappan Justice S.K. Singh Facts The case revolved around the procedure for reviewing death penalty cases in the Supreme Court. In India, after the Supreme Court upholds a death sentence, a convict can file a review petition under Article 137 of the Constitution, which allows the Supreme Court to reconsider its judgment. According to Order XL Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, review petitions were generally heard in chambers (private hearings without lawyers), meaning that the lawyers could not argue in front of the judges. Mohd. Arif, a death row convict, filed a petition arguing that review petitions in death penalty cases must be heard in open court, with oral arguments from lawyers instead of being decided in chambers. He claimed that denying an oral hearing violated his fundamental right to life (Article 21) because the death penalty is the most severe punishment, and every possible safeguard should be given. The case was taken up by the Supreme Court to decide whether all review petitions in death penalty cases should be heard in open court with full arguments rather than being decided in chambers. Issues Whether review petitions in death penalty cases should be heard in open court instead of chambers. Whether the procedure under Order XL Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, which denied oral hearings in review petitions, violated Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty). Whether principles of natural justice require an open court hearing for review petitions in death penalty cases. Ratio Decidendi (Legal Reasoning) Open Court Hearing for Death Penalty Review Petitions The Court ruled that review petitions in death penalty cases must be heard in open court with oral arguments. Since the death penalty is irreversible, the convict must get every possible opportunity to present their case properly before the court makes a final decision. A closed-door hearing (chamber hearing) is not enough in such serious matters. Fair Trial and Natural Justice The Court emphasized that a fair trial and the right to be heard are fundamental rights under Article 21. In cases where a person’s life is at stake, the principle of audi alteram partem (right to be heard) must be followed. Oral arguments allow the convict’s lawyer to highlight errors in the previous judgment that might have led to a wrongful death sentence. Modification of Supreme Court Rules The Court ruled that Order XL Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules must be changed so that all review petitions in death penalty cases are heard in open court with full arguments. This ensures transparency and gives the convict a fair chance to explain why the judgment should be reconsidered. Balancing Judicial Efficiency and Fundamental Rights The government argued that giving oral hearings in all review petitions would slow down the judicial process. However, the Supreme Court clarified that efficiency should not come at the cost of justice, especially in cases where a person’s life is at risk. The Court stated that even though most review petitions are decided in chambers, an exception must be made for death penalty cases due to their extreme nature. Observations of the Court Death penalty is the most serious punishment and must be given only after ensuring all legal safeguards. Errors in judicial decisions can lead to wrongful executions, which are irreversible mistakes. Principle of audi alteram partem (right to be heard) is essential in criminal justice. The Supreme Court acknowledged that its own past decisions in death penalty cases might have errors, and a full review hearing reduces the risk of wrongful execution. The Court also noted that this change does not mean all convicts will escape the death penalty, but it ensures that justice is delivered in the fairest way possible. Decision of the Court The Supreme Court allowed review petitions in death penalty cases to be heard in open court with oral arguments. The Court directed the amendment of Supreme Court Rules to reflect this change. The Court held that this change applies to both pending and future cases. Important Terms Order XL Rule 3 (Supreme Court Rules) – A rule that earlier allowed review petitions to be decided in chambers without oral hearings, which was modified in this case. Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty) – The fundamental right that protects individuals from arbitrary deprivation of life, requiring due process before imposing the death penalty. Review Petition – A legal remedy allowing a party to seek re-examination of a Supreme Court judgment on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record. Natural Justice – A legal principle that ensures fair hearing (audi alteram partem) and absence of bias (nemo judex in causa sua) in judicial proceedings. Death Penalty Jurisprudence – The evolving legal standards and procedural safeguards applicable to capital punishment cases to prevent wrongful executions.

Bench A 5-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: Justice R.M. Lodha Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan Justice A.K. Patnaik Justice Dipak Misra Justice S.J. Mukhopadhaya Facts The case arose from a challenge to the constitutional validity of the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005 (NTT Act). The National Tax Tribunal (NTT) was created under the Act to handle direct tax appeals, replacing the jurisdiction of High Courts under Sections 260A and 260B of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Madras Bar Association (MBA) filed a petition arguing that the Act violated the independence of the judiciary by vesting adjudicatory powers in a tribunal controlled by the executive. The key issues included: Judicial independence: The Act transferred powers of High Courts to a tribunal controlled by the executive. Separation of powers: The government had a say in the appointment, tenure, and removal of tribunal members, raising concerns about judicial independence. Qualifications of tribunal members: The Act allowed non-judicial members to be appointed, raising questions about competence. Issues Whether the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005, violated the doctrine of separation of powers by transferring judicial functions to a tribunal controlled by the executive. Whether the exclusion of High Court jurisdiction over tax appeals was unconstitutional. Whether the composition and appointment process of the tribunal violated judicial independence. Ratio Decidendi Judicial Independence: The Supreme Court held that judicial independence is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, and any law that allows executive control over the judiciary is unconstitutional. Exclusion of High Courts Unconstitutional: The Court ruled that removing tax appeals from High Court jurisdiction and transferring them to a tribunal is unconstitutional, as it violates the separation of powers. Composition of Tribunal Violates Judicial Standards: The NTT Act allowed non-judicial members to be appointed, which was held to be unconstitutional as tribunals performing judicial functions must be headed by judges or persons with judicial experience. Observations The power of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 (High Courts) and Article 32 (Supreme Court) is a basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be taken away. A tribunal cannot replace a High Court in tax matters, especially when the tribunal does not have the same independence as courts. The Court reaffirmed that tribunals must function as an extension of the judiciary and not as executive-controlled bodies. Decision The Supreme Court declared the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005, unconstitutional. The transfer of High Court jurisdiction over tax matters to a tribunal was struck down. The Court ruled that tribunals must follow the same independence and judicial standards as courts. Important Terms Separation of Powers – The doctrine that divides power between the legislature, executive, and judiciary, preventing one branch from interfering in another. Judicial Independence – The principle that the judiciary must function free from executive or legislative control. Article 226 & 227 – Give High Courts judicial review powers, ensuring they can review executive and tribunal decisions. Basic Structure Doctrine – A constitutional principle that certain fundamental features (such as judicial independence) cannot be altered by Parliament. National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005 – The law that sought to create a tribunal to replace High Court jurisdiction over tax appeals, later struck down as unconstitutional. Judicial Review – The power of courts to review and strike down unconstitutional laws or executive actions.

Bench A 7-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: Justice A.M. Ahmadi (Chief Justice of India) Justice M.K. Mukherjee Justice K. Venkataswami Justice B.N. Kirpal Justice S.C. Sen Justice Saghir Ahmad Justice G.T. Nanavati Facts The case arose from multiple writ petitions challenging the validity of Articles 323A and 323B of the Constitution, which provided for the establishment of Administrative Tribunals and barred the jurisdiction of High Courts over matters decided by these tribunals. The 42nd Constitutional Amendment (1976) introduced Articles 323A and 323B, allowing Parliament to create tribunals for adjudicating service matters, tax disputes, and other specialized fields. The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, was enacted under Article 323A, leading to the formation of Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) and State Administrative Tribunals (SATs) for service matters. The petitioners argued that excluding judicial review by High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 violated the basic structure doctrine, as judicial review is a fundamental feature of the Constitution. Issues Whether the exclusion of jurisdiction of the High Courts and Supreme Court over tribunal decisions under Articles 323A and 323B was unconstitutional. Whether Administrative Tribunals could replace High Courts as the final adjudicators in service and administrative matters. Whether judicial review by High Courts and the Supreme Court is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Ratio Decidendi Judicial Review as a Basic Structure: The Supreme Court ruled that judicial review by High Courts and the Supreme Court is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be removed by any constitutional amendment. Tribunals Cannot Replace High Courts: The Court held that tribunals like the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) or State Administrative Tribunals (SATs) cannot function as substitutes for High Courts. High Court’s Supervisory Jurisdiction Restored: The Court struck down provisions that barred the jurisdiction of High Courts under Articles 226 and 227, ruling that tribunal decisions must be subject to judicial review by High Courts. Tribunals to Function as Supplementary Bodies: While tribunals were recognized as useful for reducing the burden on courts, they were to function as subsidiary bodies, with their decisions being reviewable by High Courts. Observations Tribunals Play a Limited Role: The Court observed that tribunals serve an important role in reducing the case load of courts but cannot be considered as replacements for High Courts. Judicial Review is Essential for Democracy: The Supreme Court reaffirmed that judicial review is essential for upholding constitutional rights and ensuring accountability of the executive. Parliament Cannot Oust High Court’s Powers: The ruling made it clear that any law that attempts to exclude judicial review is unconstitutional. Decision The Supreme Court struck down provisions barring judicial review of tribunal decisions, ruling them unconstitutional. The Court held that High Courts have jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to review tribunal decisions. The tribunals would continue to function, but their decisions would remain subject to review by High Courts and ultimately by the Supreme Court under Article 136. Important Terms Article 323A – Allows Parliament to create tribunals for service matters and excludes the jurisdiction of High Courts. Article 323B – Allows tribunals for tax, industrial, and other disputes, with the possibility of excluding the jurisdiction of High Courts. Judicial Review – The power of courts to review and strike down unconstitutional laws or executive actions. Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 – The law that created Central and State Administrative Tribunals to handle service matters. Basic Structure Doctrine – A principle that certain features of the Constitution, such as judicial review, cannot be altered by Parliament. Article 226 & 227 – Grant High Courts the power of judicial review over all lower courts and tribunals. Article 136 – Gives the Supreme Court the power to grant special leave to appeal against any judgment from any tribunal or High Court.

Bench A 5-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: Justice J.S. Khehar Justice J. Chelameswar Justice Madan B. Lokur Justice Kurian Joseph Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel Facts The 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014, introduced the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) to replace the collegium system for appointing Supreme Court and High Court judges. The NJAC comprised: The Chief Justice of India (CJI) as Chairperson. Two senior-most judges of the Supreme Court. The Union Minister of Law and Justice. Two eminent persons, nominated by a committee consisting of the Prime Minister, CJI, and the Leader of the Opposition. The NJAC Act, 2014, was passed to regulate the functions of the NJAC. The NJAC was challenged by Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association (SCAORA) and others, arguing that it violated judicial independence, a basic structure principle of the Constitution. Issues Whether the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014, and the NJAC Act, 2014, violated the basic structure doctrine by affecting judicial independence. Whether the collegium system should be retained or replaced with NJAC. Whether the inclusion of executive members (Law Minister and two eminent persons) in the NJAC compromised judicial independence. Whether judicial primacy in appointments should be maintained. Ratio Decidendi The Supreme Court held: NJAC is unconstitutional: The 99th Constitutional Amendment and NJAC Act were struck down as they violated the basic structure of the Constitution by undermining judicial independence. Judicial Primacy in Appointments: The Court ruled that appointments to the judiciary must remain independent of executive control. Collegium System Restored: Since the NJAC was struck down, the collegium system was reinstated. Role of the Executive is Limited: The Court held that allowing the executive a say in judicial appointments created a conflict of interest, as the government is a frequent litigant before the judiciary. Observations The independence of the judiciary is a basic structure principle and cannot be altered by constitutional amendments. The Law Minister’s presence in the NJAC would allow the executive to influence judicial appointments, violating the principle of separation of powers. While the collegium system has flaws, the solution lies in reforming it, not in increasing executive control. Judicial accountability is necessary, but judicial independence cannot be compromised to achieve it. Decision The 99th Constitutional Amendment and NJAC Act were declared unconstitutional. The collegium system was restored as the only valid mechanism for appointing judges. The Court recommended reforms to improve transparency in the collegium system. Important Terms Article 124 (Appointment of Supreme Court Judges) – Judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President in consultation with the CJI and senior judges. Article 217 (Appointment of High Court Judges) – High Court judges are appointed by the President after consultation with the CJI, the Governor, and the Chief Justice of the High Court. Article 222 (Transfer of High Court Judges) – The President can transfer a High Court judge to another High Court after consulting the CJI and the concerned Chief Justices. Collegium System – A system where judges recommend appointments and transfers, reducing executive interference. National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) – A body introduced by the 99th Constitutional Amendment to replace the collegium system, but later struck down as unconstitutional. Basic Structure Doctrine – A constitutional principle stating that certain fundamental aspects of the Constitution (such as judicial independence) cannot be altered by amendments. Judicial Independence – The principle that the judiciary should function free from executive or legislative influence. Judicial Primacy – The concept that the judiciary must have the final say in its own appointments, rather than the executive or legislature. Judicial Review – The power of courts to review and strike down laws or government actions that violate the Constitution.

Bench A 5-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: Justice Dipak Misra Justice A.M. Khanwilkar Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud Justice Ashok Bhushan Justice S. Abdul Nazeer Facts The case was filed by Shanti Bhushan, a senior advocate and former Law Minister, challenging the absolute discretionary power of the Chief Justice of India (CJI) as the “Master of the Roster” in the allocation of cases. Bhushan argued that the power to allocate cases should be exercised collectively by a collegium of judges, rather than being the exclusive prerogative of the CJI. The petition stemmed from concerns over alleged arbitrary allocation of cases and the lack of transparency in the Supreme Court’s internal functioning. The case was filed after a letter written by four senior Supreme Court judges (Justices J. Chelameswar, Ranjan Gogoi, Madan B. Lokur, and Kurian Joseph) became public, raising concerns over the CJI’s case allocation powers. Issues Whether the Chief Justice of India is the sole authority for the allocation of cases as the “Master of the Roster”. Whether the power to allocate cases should be exercised collegially rather than solely by the CJI. Whether the principles of transparency and accountability require a change in the existing system. Ratio Decidendi The Supreme Court upheld that the CJI, as the head of the institution, has the exclusive authority to allocate cases and constitute benches. The Court ruled that the CJI is an institution in himself, and his discretion in bench formation is essential for judicial discipline and smooth functioning. The Court rejected the argument for a collegium-based approach, stating that vesting this power in a collective body would create administrative difficulties and delays. The Court clarified that the CJI’s role as “Master of the Roster” is derived from the Supreme Court Rules and past precedents. Observations The Supreme Court noted that the power to allocate cases must be exercised judiciously and in a fair manner, ensuring that no impression of bias or favoritism arises. It reaffirmed that the CJI is the first among equals and is entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring the efficient functioning of the Supreme Court. While maintaining the status quo, the Court acknowledged the need for greater transparency in the Supreme Court’s internal functioning. Decision The Supreme Court dismissed Shanti Bhushan’s petition, ruling that the CJI alone has the authority to allocate cases and constitute benches. The Court held that the existing system does not violate constitutional principles, and the CJI’s powers as “Master of the Roster” are necessary for the proper administration of justice. Important Terms Master of the Roster – A term used to describe the CJI’s exclusive authority to allocate cases and constitute benches in the Supreme Court. Judicial Independence – The principle that the judiciary must function without external interference, including interference in internal court administration. Collegium System – A system in which senior judges collectively decide on judicial appointments; Bhushan proposed a similar approach for case allocation. Separation of Powers – The doctrine ensuring distinct roles for the executive, legislature, and judiciary; Bhushan argued that the CJI’s unchecked power violated this principle. Judicial Transparency – The idea that court processes, including case allocation, should be open and accountable to the public and legal community.

This case is also known as the Fourth Judges Case, as it dealt with the constitutional validity of the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014, and the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, 2014, which sought to replace the collegium system of judicial appointments with the NJAC. Bench A 5-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: Justice J.S. Khehar Justice J. Chelameswar Justice Madan B. Lokur Justice Kurian Joseph Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel Facts The 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014, was enacted to replace the collegium system with a National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) for the appointment and transfer of judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts. The NJAC consisted of six members: The Chief Justice of India (CJI) as Chairperson. Two senior-most judges of the Supreme Court. The Union Minister of Law and Justice. Two eminent persons, nominated by a committee comprising the Prime Minister, CJI, and the Leader of the Opposition. The NJAC sought to give the executive a greater role in judicial appointments and increase transparency. Several petitions were filed by Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association (SCAORA) and others, challenging the constitutional validity of the NJAC, arguing that it violated the independence of the judiciary, which is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Issues Whether the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014, and the NJAC Act, 2014, violated the basic structure doctrine by affecting the independence of the judiciary. Whether the collegium system should be retained or replaced with an alternative system of judicial appointments. Whether the inclusion of the Union Law Minister and two eminent persons in the NJAC diluted judicial primacy in appointments. Whether the role of the executive in judicial appointments created a conflict of interest, as the government itself is a litigant in most cases before the courts. Ratio Decidendi The Supreme Court held: NJAC Unconstitutional: The Court struck down the 99th Constitutional Amendment and NJAC Act as unconstitutional, holding that they violated the basic structure doctrine by undermining the independence of the judiciary. Primacy of Judiciary in Appointments: The Court reaffirmed that judicial appointments must remain independent of executive influence. The collegium system was reinstated, ensuring that the judiciary retained control over its own composition. Executive’s Role Limited: The Court held that giving the executive a say in judicial appointments created a conflict of interest, as the government itself is a frequent litigant before the judiciary. Judicial Review of Appointment Process: The appointment and transfer of judges remain subject to judicial review to ensure fairness and transparency. Transparency in the Collegium System: The Court acknowledged concerns about lack of transparency in the collegium system and called for reforms to improve its functioning. Observations The independence of the judiciary is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be altered by constitutional amendments. The presence of the Union Law Minister and two eminent persons in NJAC would allow the executive to veto judicial appointments, which violates the principle of judicial primacy. The Court emphasized that while judicial accountability is important, it cannot come at the cost of judicial independence. The collegium system is not perfect, but the solution is reform, not executive interference. Decision The 99th Constitutional Amendment and NJAC Act were declared unconstitutional. The collegium system was restored. The Court recommended reforms to improve transparency and accountability in the collegium system. Important Terms Article 124 (Appointment of Supreme Court Judges) – Judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President in consultation with the CJI and senior judges. Article 217 (Appointment of High Court Judges) – High Court judges are appointed by the President after consultation with the CJI, the Governor, and the Chief Justice of the High Court. Article 222 (Transfer of High Court Judges) – The President can transfer a High Court judge to another High Court after consulting the CJI and the concerned Chief Justices. Collegium System – A system where judges recommend appointments and transfers, reducing executive interference. National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) – A body introduced by the 99th Constitutional Amendment to replace the collegium system, but later struck down as unconstitutional. Basic Structure Doctrine – A constitutional principle stating that certain fundamental aspects of the Constitution (such as judicial independence) cannot be altered by amendments. Judicial Independence – The principle that the judiciary should function free from executive or legislative influence. Judicial Primacy – The concept that the judiciary must have the final say in its own appointments, rather than the executive or legislature. Judicial Review – The power of courts to review and strike down laws or government actions that violate the Constitution.

This case is also known as the Third Judges Case, as it clarified the principles laid down in the Second Judges Case (1993) regarding the collegium system for judicial appointments. Bench A 9-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: Justice S.P. Bharucha Justice M.K. Mukherjee Justice S.B. Majmudar Justice Sujata V. Manohar Justice G.T. Nanavati Justice S. Saghir Ahmad Justice K. Venkataswami Justice B.N. Kirpal Justice G.B. Pattanaik Facts The case originated from a Presidential Reference under Article 143(1) of the Constitution, which allows the President of India to seek the opinion of the Supreme Court on important legal issues. The President of India, K.R. Narayanan, referred nine specific questions to the Supreme Court for clarification regarding the interpretation of Articles 124, 217, and 222 of the Constitution, which govern the appointment and transfer of judges. The reference was made due to doubts and confusion arising from the judgment in the Second Judges Case (1993), which had introduced the collegium system for judicial appointments. The nine questions referred by the President were: Whether the expression “consultation with the Chief Justice of India” in Articles 217(1) and 222(1) requires consultation with a plurality of judges in forming the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, or whether the sole individual opinion of the Chief Justice of India constitutes consultation. Whether the transfer of judges is judicially reviewable, considering the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling that such transfers are not justiciable on any ground except for limited judicial review. Whether Article 124(2) (which deals with Supreme Court appointments) requires the Chief Justice of India to consult only the two senior-most judges or whether there should be wider consultation according to past practice. Whether the Chief Justice of India can act alone, without consulting other judges, while considering materials and information from the Government of India regarding the non-appointment of a judge recommended for appointment. Whether the Chief Justice of India’s consultation with judges should be limited only to those who belong to the concerned High Court or should also include those transferred from other High Courts. Whether in cases where senior High Court judges are overlooked for elevation to the Supreme Court, the reasons for such departure from seniority must be recorded in respect of each such judge. Whether the Government of India is entitled to demand written opinions of the judges consulted and whether such written opinions should be transmitted to the Government along with the Chief Justice of India’s recommendation. Whether the Chief Justice of India is obligated to follow the norms and consultation process before making a recommendation. Whether any recommendations made by the Chief Justice of India without following the prescribed norms and consultation process are binding on the Government of India. Issues Whether the collegium system required consultation with a larger group of judges rather than just the Chief Justice of India and two senior-most judges. Whether judicial review is applicable in cases of transfer of High Court judges. Whether the executive can override a recommendation made by the Chief Justice of India. Whether written opinions of consulted judges must be shared with the Government. Whether departures from seniority in appointments must be recorded with reasons. Ratio Decidendi The Supreme Court gave its opinion on the nine questions as follows: Plurality in Consultation: The Court held that consultation must be with a collegium of judges, not just the Chief Justice of India alone. The collegium for Supreme Court appointments must consist of the CJI and four senior-most judges, while for High Court appointments, it must include the CJI and two senior-most judges. Judicial Review of Transfers: The transfer of High Court judges is subject to limited judicial review. The recommendation must be made by the Chief Justice of India in consultation with four senior-most judges, and the views of the concerned High Court Chief Justice must be obtained. Scope of Consultation: The Chief Justice of India must consult judges familiar with the affairs of the High Court concerned, including those who have previously served in that High Court. Recording of Reasons for Departure from Seniority: If a senior High Court judge is overlooked for elevation, there must be strong, cogent reasons, and these must be recorded. Written Opinions: The government is entitled to receive written opinions of the judges consulted, and these must be transmitted to the Government along with the CJI’s recommendation. Binding Nature of Recommendations: If the CJI makes a recommendation following the prescribed norms, the government must act upon it. If the government returns a recommendation, but the collegium reiterates its recommendation, then the government is bound to accept it. Observations The Supreme Court reaffirmed that judicial independence is a part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution and that the executive must not have the final say in judicial appointments. The collegium system was expanded to ensure greater transparency and collective decision-making. The ruling further limited the executive’s role in judicial appointments, strengthening the judiciary’s control over its own composition. The Court emphasized that the collegium must function collectively and that no single individual, including the Chief Justice of India, could have absolute authority. Decision The collegium system was upheld and expanded to include a larger group of judges in the decision-making process. Transfers of High Court judges were held to be judicially reviewable but only to a limited extent. The CJI’s recommendation became binding on the government once it was reiterated by the collegium. The government was required to accept judicial appointments if the collegium reiterated its recommendation. Important Terms Article 124(2) (Appointment of Supreme Court Judges) – Judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President in consultation with the Chief Justice of India and senior judges. Article 217(1) (Appointment of High Court Judges) – High Court judges are appointed by the President after consultation with the CJI, the Governor, and the Chief Justice of the High Court. Article 222 (Transfer of High Court Judges) – The President can transfer a High Court judge to another High Court after consulting

This case is also known as the Second Judges Case, as it reviewed and overruled the decision in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981), leading to the establishment of the collegium system for judicial appointments. Bench A 9-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah Justice A.M. Ahmadi Justice K. Jayachandra Reddy Justice S. Ratnavel Pandian Justice P.B. Sawant Justice Kuldip Singh Justice J.S. Verma Justice Yogeshwar Dayal Justice G.N. Ray Facts The case arose from concerns over executive dominance in judicial appointments and transfers, particularly after the ruling in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981), which had upheld the primacy of the executive. The petition was filed by the SC Advocates-on-Record Association, challenging the executive’s role in judicial appointments and transfers and seeking a reconsideration of the 1981 ruling. The petitioners argued that judicial independence was being undermined by the executive’s power to reject or delay judicial appointments. The case centered on the interpretation of the word “consultation” in Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution, which govern the appointment of Supreme Court and High Court judges. The primary question was whether the President (executive) had the final say in judicial appointments, or if the opinion of the Chief Justice of India (CJI) should be binding. Issues Whether the CJI’s opinion in judicial appointments was binding on the President, or if the executive had the final authority. Whether the process of judicial transfers under Article 222 required the consent of the concerned judge. Whether the 1981 judgment in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India was correctly decided. Whether the system of judicial appointments ensured judicial independence, a fundamental feature of the Constitution. Ratio Decidendi The Supreme Court laid down the following key legal principles: Primacy of the Judiciary in Appointments: The Court overruled S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) and held that in judicial appointments, the Chief Justice of India’s opinion must be given primacy. Collegium System Introduced: The Court established the collegium system, stating that judicial appointments must be made through a collective decision of the CJI and senior judges of the Supreme Court, rather than the executive alone. Meaning of “Consultation”: The word “consultation” in Articles 124 and 217 was interpreted to mean that the executive must act in concurrence with the judiciary. If the executive rejected a recommendation, it had to provide strong reasons, and the judiciary could reconsider the issue. Judicial Transfers: The Court ruled that transfers of High Court judges could be made without their consent, but they had to be done in public interest and not as a punishment. Observations The Court emphasized that judicial independence is a basic structure of the Constitution and must be protected from executive interference. The ruling significantly weakened the executive’s role in judicial appointments, ensuring that the judiciary retained control over its own composition. The judgment laid the foundation for subsequent clarifications on the collegium system in the Third Judges Case (1998). Decision The executive was stripped of its primacy in judicial appointments, and the judiciary was given a decisive role. The collegium system was established, requiring consultation among the CJI and senior judges before recommending judicial appointments. The executive retained the power to send back recommendations for reconsideration, but it could not override the judiciary’s decision. The transfer of judges without their consent was upheld, but safeguards were put in place to prevent misuse. Important Terms Article 124 (Appointment of Supreme Court Judges) – The President appoints Supreme Court judges in consultation with the CJI and other senior judges. Article 217 (Appointment of High Court Judges) – High Court judges are appointed by the President after consultation with the CJI, the Governor of the State, and the Chief Justice of the High Court. Article 222 (Transfer of High Court Judges) – The President can transfer a High Court judge after consulting the CJI. Collegium System – A mechanism where judges themselves recommend judicial appointments and transfers, reducing executive interference. Judicial Independence – The concept that the judiciary should function without external influence, especially from the executive or legislature. Basic Structure Doctrine – A constitutional principle stating that certain fundamental aspects of the Constitution (such as judicial independence) cannot be altered by amendments. Consultation vs. Concurrence – The Court clarified that “consultation” with the judiciary in appointments means that the executive cannot override the judiciary’s opinion without strong, recorded reasons. Significance of the Case This case established the collegium system, which remains the framework for judicial appointments in India. It strengthened the judiciary’s independence, ensuring that executive interference was minimized. The judgment was further clarified in In re Special Reference No. 1 of 1998 (Third Judges Case), which expanded the collegium to include the CJI and four senior-most judges. The collegium system has been criticized for lack of transparency, but it remains in place despite attempts to replace it, such as the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC), which was struck down in 2015.

This case is also known as the First Judges Case, as it was the first major ruling concerning judicial appointments and transfers in India. Bench A 7-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: Justice P.N. Bhagwati Justice A.C. Gupta Justice S. Murtaza Fazal Ali Justice V.D. Tulzapurkar Justice D.A. Desai Justice R.S. Pathak Justice E.S. Venkataramiah Facts The case arose from concerns regarding executive control over judicial appointments and transfers and its potential impact on judicial independence. The main controversy involved the appointment, extension, and transfer of judges in High Courts, which was perceived as an interference by the executive. Several writ petitions were filed, challenging: The non-confirmation of certain Additional Judges of the High Courts despite favorable recommendations from the Chief Justices of the respective High Courts. The short-term extensions given to some Additional Judges instead of confirming them as permanent judges. The transfer of High Court judges without their consent. A circular issued by the Union Law Minister, directing Chief Ministers and Chief Justices of High Courts to obtain prior written consent from judges before recommending their appointments with a possibility of transfer to another High Court. The petitioners, including S.P. Gupta, argued that these actions violated the independence of the judiciary by allowing excessive executive influence over the appointment and tenure of judges. The case also raised a significant question regarding whether Public Interest Litigation (PIL) could be entertained in matters related to judicial appointments and transfers, as the petitions were filed by lawyers rather than by the affected judges themselves. Issues Whether the President (executive) had the final authority in judicial appointments, or if the opinion of the Chief Justice of India (CJI) was binding on the executive. Whether transferring judges between High Courts without their consent violated the independence of the judiciary under Article 222 of the Constitution. Whether the circular issued by the Law Minister, requiring prior consent of judges before recommending appointments, was unconstitutional. Whether public interest litigation (PIL) could be entertained on matters concerning judicial appointments and transfers. Ratio Decidendi The Supreme Court ruled on several key principles: Primacy of the Executive in Judicial Appointments: The Court held that the President (executive) is not bound by the opinion of the Chief Justice of India (CJI) in appointing High Court and Supreme Court judges. While the CJI’s opinion must be given due consideration, it does not have binding primacy over the executive’s decision. This meant that the executive had greater control over judicial appointments than the judiciary itself. Transfers of Judges: The Court ruled that judges can be transferred without their consent under Article 222, provided the transfer is done in public interest and not as a form of punishment or executive pressure. This meant that while the consent of judges was not mandatory, the executive must justify transfers with valid reasons. Law Minister’s Circular: The Court struck down the circular requiring prior consent from judges, stating that it interfered with judicial independence. It held that such a requirement could create uncertainty and insecurity among judges, affecting their impartiality. Expansion of Public Interest Litigation (PIL): The Supreme Court allowed public interest litigation (PIL) in matters concerning judicial independence. It ruled that lawyers and concerned individuals could file petitions to challenge executive overreach in judicial appointments. This decision played a crucial role in expanding PIL and strengthening judicial accountability. Observations Justice P.N. Bhagwati, in the majority opinion, emphasized that judicial independence is a fundamental pillar of democracy. However, by upholding the executive’s primacy in appointments, the Court weakened the judiciary’s autonomy, making it susceptible to political influence. The judgment highlighted the need for transparency in judicial appointments to prevent favoritism or political interference. Although the Court allowed transfers without consent, it cautioned against misuse, stating that transfers must be made in good faith and public interest. The ruling led to concerns that the government could use appointments and transfers to control the judiciary. This decision was later overruled in the Second and Third Judges Cases (1993 and 1998), which established the collegium system, giving judges greater control over judicial appointments and transfers. Decision The executive’s primacy in judicial appointments and transfers was upheld, meaning that the President and the government had the final authority in judicial appointments. The Law Minister’s circular was declared unconstitutional, as it interfered with the independence of the judiciary. Public Interest Litigation (PIL) was allowed in matters of judicial independence, enabling courts to entertain petitions filed by lawyers and public-spirited individuals on matters affecting judicial appointments. Important Terms Article 124 & 217 (Appointment of Judges): Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts are appointed by the President, in consultation with the Chief Justice of India and other judges. Article 222 (Transfer of High Court Judges): The President can transfer a High Court judge to another High Court after consulting the Chief Justice of India. The judge’s consent is not required, but the transfer must not be arbitrary or punitive. Judicial Independence: The principle that the judiciary must remain free from executive or legislative interference to uphold the rule of law and separation of powers. Collegium System: A system introduced later (in the Second and Third Judges Cases, 1993 and 1998) that reversed the ruling in S.P. Gupta and established a system where judges themselves recommend judicial appointments and transfers. Public Interest Litigation (PIL): A legal mechanism that allows individuals, lawyers, or organizations to file cases in court on behalf of the public, without requiring a direct personal interest in the matter. Doctrine of Separation of Powers: The Constitution divides powers among the legislature, executive, and judiciary, ensuring that no branch can overreach its authority. This case questioned whether the executive’s influence over judicial appointments violated this principle. Significance of the Case S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) significantly impacted judicial independence, as it weakened the judiciary’s control over its own appointments and allowed the executive greater influence. The ruling led to fears that political considerations could dominate judicial appointments, undermining the separation of powers. This decision was

Bench A 7-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: T.S. Thakur, C.J. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. Madan B. Lokur, J. S.A. Bobde, J. A.K. Goel, J. U.U. Lalit, J. L. Nageswara Rao, J. Facts The case involved a series of ordinances issued by the Government of Bihar regarding the takeover of 429 Sanskrit schools and transferring their teachers and staff to the State Government. The first ordinance was promulgated in 1989, followed by five successive ordinances. Each ordinance lapsed after six weeks from the reassembly of the legislature, but the government kept issuing new ordinances instead of passing a law. The last ordinance lapsed in 1992, leaving the status of teachers and employees uncertain. The teachers challenged this action in the High Court, claiming that their services as government employees should be regularized even after the ordinance expired. The High Court ruled that the re-promulgation of ordinances was unconstitutional and that the employees had no legal right to claim government jobs. Issues Can the Governor repeatedly re-promulgate ordinances without placing them before the legislature? Do rights and obligations created by an ordinance continue even after it lapses? Was the Bihar Government’s practice of re-promulgating ordinances a violation of the Constitution? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Re-promulgation of ordinances is unconstitutional: The Supreme Court held that ordinances cannot be used as a substitute for legislation. Successive re-promulgation without legislative approval is a fraud on the Constitution. Temporary nature of ordinances: An ordinance has the same effect as a law, but it must be approved by the legislature within six weeks of reassembly. If it is not approved, it ceases to operate. No enduring rights from an ordinance: The Court ruled that ordinances do not create permanent rights or obligations. Once an ordinance lapses, any benefits derived from it also lapse, unless protected by a law passed by the legislature. Observations Ordinances should be an exception, not a rule: The ordinance-making power is not meant to be a substitute for legislative law-making. It is intended for emergency situations. Judicial Review of Ordinances: The Governor’s satisfaction in issuing an ordinance is subject to judicial review. Courts can examine whether the ordinance was issued to bypass legislative authority. Legislature’s Role: The legislature must have the opportunity to discuss and approve laws. Re-promulgation without legislative approval undermines democracy. Decision The Supreme Court held that the repeated re-promulgation of ordinances by the Bihar Government was unconstitutional. The ordinances ceased to operate after six weeks, and no permanent rights were created for the employees. The petitioners (teachers and staff) were entitled to salaries only until the last ordinance expired in 1992, but they had no right to be treated as permanent government employees. The practice of re-promulgating ordinances was declared a “fraud on the Constitution” and must not be continued in the future. Important Terms 1. Article 213 (Governor’s Ordinance-Making Power) Allows the Governor to issue ordinances when the legislature is not in session. An ordinance has the same force as a law but must be approved within six weeks of reassembly. If not approved, the ordinance ceases to operate. 2. Re-Promulgation of Ordinances The repeated issuance of ordinances without legislative approval is called re-promulgation. The Court held that re-promulgation is unconstitutional and cannot be used to bypass the legislature. 3. Doctrine of Separation of Powers The Constitution divides powers among the legislature, executive, and judiciary. Legislation is the function of the legislature, and the executive (Governor) cannot take over this role through ordinances. 4. Judicial Review of Ordinances The Governor’s decision to issue an ordinance can be challenged in court. The Court can strike down ordinances that violate constitutional principles. 5. Fraud on the Constitution The Court declared that re-promulgation of ordinances without legislative approval is a fraud on the Constitution. It violates democratic principles and legislative supremacy.

Bench A 5-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court: P.N. Bhagwati, C.J. Ranganath Misra, J. G.L. Oza, J. M.M. Dutt, J. K.N. Singh, J. Facts Dr. D.C. Wadhwa, a professor and researcher, conducted a detailed study on the use of ordinances in Bihar and found that the State Government had been repromulgating ordinances repeatedly without converting them into laws. The Governor of Bihar had issued 256 ordinances between 1967 and 1981, many of which were repromulgated multiple times for periods ranging from one to 14 years. This practice allowed the executive to bypass the legislature, as ordinances were meant for temporary emergency situations when the legislature was not in session. Dr. Wadhwa filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, arguing that repeated repromulgation of ordinances was a fraud on the Constitution and violated the rule of law. Issues Can the Governor repromulgate ordinances repeatedly without presenting them to the legislature? Does such repromulgation violate the constitutional scheme of separation of powers and the rule of law? Can the executive use the ordinance-making power to bypass the legislative process? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Ordinances are not a substitute for legislation: The Court held that Article 213 (Governor’s ordinance-making power) is meant for emergencies, and ordinances must be replaced by proper legislation. Repromulgation is unconstitutional: The practice of repromulgating ordinances without placing them before the legislature is a fraud on the Constitution. Legislature’s supremacy must be upheld: The executive cannot bypass the legislature by continuously repromulgating ordinances. Ordinances have a limited life: An ordinance must cease to operate after six weeks from the reassembly of the legislature, as per Article 213(2). Observations The Governor’s power to promulgate ordinances is an emergency power and should not be misused to avoid legislative scrutiny. The rule of law and democratic governance require that laws be made by elected representatives, not through executive action. The State of Bihar had created an “ordinance raj”, where governance was being conducted through repeated ordinances instead of laws passed by the legislature. Decision The Supreme Court struck down the practice of repromulgating ordinances as unconstitutional. The Court held that the Governor does not have the power to repeatedly repromulgate ordinances without placing them before the legislature. Ordinances that were repeatedly repromulgated without legislative approval were declared void. Important Terms 1. Article 213 (Governor’s Ordinance-Making Power) Allows the Governor to issue ordinances when the State Legislature is not in session. The ordinance must be laid before the legislature and ceases to be effective after six weeks unless approved. 2. Fraud on the Constitution The Supreme Court ruled that repeatedly repromulgating ordinances to bypass the legislature amounts to a fraud on the Constitution. 3. Rule of Law The principle that all actions of the government must be based on laws enacted by the legislature. The executive cannot govern through ordinances instead of proper laws. 4. Separation of Powers The legislature makes laws, the executive implements them, and the judiciary interprets them. The Bihar Government violated this principle by using ordinances instead of passing laws.

Bench A 5-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: Y.K. Sabharwal, C.J. K.G. Balakrishnan, J. C.K. Thakker, J. R.V. Raveendran, J. D.K. Jain, J. Facts A sting operation conducted by a private news channel in 2005 exposed Members of Parliament (MPs) accepting bribes in exchange for asking questions in Parliament. The scandal involved 10 MPs from the Lok Sabha and 1 MP from the Rajya Sabha. The Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha set up inquiry committees to investigate the conduct of the MPs. The committees found the MPs guilty of misconduct, and they were expelled from their respective Houses. Raja Ram Pal, one of the expelled MPs, along with other expelled members, challenged the decision before the Supreme Court, arguing that: The Parliament had no power to expel its members in such circumstances. The expulsion violated their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19, and 21. The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over the internal matters of Parliament. Issues Does the Parliament have the power to expel its members for unethical or corrupt conduct? Are the actions of the Parliament regarding expulsion subject to judicial review? Does the expulsion violate the fundamental rights of the expelled MPs under Articles 14, 19, or 21? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Parliament has the power to expel its members under Article 105(3) of the Constitution. The power of expulsion is a part of the privileges of Parliament, which are derived from the privileges enjoyed by the British House of Commons at the time of the commencement of the Indian Constitution. Judicial Review of Parliamentary Privileges: While Parliament has the power to expel its members, this power is not beyond judicial review. The Supreme Court held that the courts can interfere if the action of Parliament is unconstitutional, arbitrary, or violates fundamental rights. No violation of fundamental rights: The Court held that the expulsion of the MPs did not violate their rights under Articles 14, 19, or 21, as the action was taken in the larger interest of parliamentary integrity. Observations Parliamentary privileges are subject to judicial review when fundamental rights or constitutional provisions are violated. Parliamentary democracy requires the integrity of its members, and Parliament has the right to expel members whose conduct undermines the dignity of the House. The concept of separation of powers does not mean absolute immunity for Parliament. While courts generally do not interfere in internal parliamentary proceedings, they can intervene when fundamental rights are at stake. Decision The Supreme Court upheld the expulsion of the MPs, stating that Parliament has the right to expel members who act against the dignity of the institution. However, it also ruled that judicial review applies to parliamentary privileges, meaning that courts can examine whether Parliament acted in accordance with constitutional principles. The petitioners’ challenge was dismissed, and the decision to expel the MPs remained valid. Important Terms 1. Article 105 (Powers and Privileges of Parliament) Article 105 grants Parliament and its members certain privileges similar to those of the British House of Commons. These privileges include freedom of speech in Parliament and the power to regulate internal proceedings. The Supreme Court ruled that this includes the power to expel members for misconduct. 2. Parliamentary Privileges Parliamentary privileges are special rights and immunities granted to members of Parliament to ensure they can perform their duties without interference. However, these privileges are not absolute and are subject to constitutional limitations. 3. Judicial Review Judicial review is the power of the courts to examine the actions of Parliament and the government to ensure they comply with the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that while courts cannot interfere in parliamentary procedures, they can review actions that violate fundamental rights or constitutional provisions. 4. Fundamental Rights (Articles 14, 19, and 21) Article 14 (Right to Equality): The expelled MPs argued that their expulsion was arbitrary and violated Article 14. The Court ruled that the expulsion was based on clear evidence of misconduct and was not arbitrary. Article 19 (Freedom of Speech): The MPs claimed that their right to free speech was violated. The Court ruled that parliamentary privileges can override Article 19 in certain cases. Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty): The MPs argued that expulsion affected their ability to earn a livelihood. The Court held that Article 21 does not guarantee a right to hold a parliamentary seat.

Bench A 5-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court: B.N. Kirpal, C.J. V.N. Khare, J. K.G. Balakrishnan, J. Ashok Bhan, J. Arijit Pasayat, J. Facts The Gujarat Legislative Assembly was constituted in March 1998, and its five-year term was set to expire on March 18, 2003. On July 19, 2002, the Governor of Gujarat dissolved the Legislative Assembly on the advice of the Chief Minister. The last sitting of the dissolved Legislative Assembly was held on April 3, 2002. The Election Commission of India (ECI) initiated steps for holding fresh elections. However, in an order dated August 16, 2002, the ECI stated that it was not in a position to conduct elections before October 3, 2002, which was the last date within six months of the last sitting of the dissolved Assembly as per Article 174(1) of the Constitution. Given the uncertainty, the President of India referred three legal questions to the Supreme Court under Article 143(1) on August 19, 2002, seeking clarity on the relationship between Article 174(1) and the powers of the Election Commission under Article 324. Issues Is Article 174(1) subject to the Election Commission’s decision under Article 324 regarding the schedule of elections for the Assembly? Can the Election Commission set an election schedule that would violate the six-month mandate under Article 174(1), relying on Article 356 (President’s Rule) as a remedy? Is the Election Commission bound to comply with Article 174(1) by conducting elections within six months of the last sitting of the dissolved Assembly? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Article 174(1) does not apply to a dissolved Assembly. It only applies to an existing and functional Legislative Assembly and regulates the interval between its sessions. The Election Commission has exclusive authority under Article 324 to decide the schedule and timing of elections for a new Assembly. The ECI’s decision to delay elections does not mean that Article 356 (President’s Rule) must automatically apply. The imposition of President’s Rule is a separate constitutional process. No fixed period is prescribed in the Constitution for holding elections after the premature dissolution of a Legislative Assembly. However, elections should generally be held within a reasonable time. Observations Article 174(1) and Article 324 operate in separate fields. While Article 174(1) ensures that a functional Assembly meets regularly, Article 324 gives the Election Commission the responsibility of conducting free and fair elections. The absence of a fixed timeline for elections after premature dissolution does not imply indefinite delay. The Election Commission is expected to conduct elections as soon as possible, using all available resources. The imposition of Article 356 (President’s Rule) cannot be used as a substitute for holding elections in a timely manner. Decision The Supreme Court clarified that Article 174(1) does not impose a deadline for conducting fresh elections after dissolution. The Election Commission has full authority to decide the election schedule under Article 324, without being subject to Article 174(1). The decision of the Election Commission to delay elections beyond six months was not unconstitutional. The Supreme Court urged the Election Commission to ensure elections are held within a reasonable time to maintain democratic governance. Important Terms 1. Article 143(1) (Advisory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court) This article allows the President of India to seek the Supreme Court’s opinion on constitutional matters of public importance. In this case, the President sought clarity on the relationship between Article 174(1) and the Election Commission’s powers under Article 324. 2. Article 174(1) (Sessions of State Legislature) Article 174(1) states that six months shall not intervene between the last sitting of one session and the first sitting of the next session of a Legislative Assembly. The Supreme Court held that this applies only to an existing Assembly, not to a dissolved one. 3. Article 324 (Powers of the Election Commission) Article 324 grants the Election Commission exclusive authority over the conduct of elections in India. The Supreme Court ruled that the Election Commission is not bound by Article 174(1) when scheduling elections for a dissolved Assembly. 4. Article 356 (President’s Rule) Article 356 allows the President to impose central rule in a state if its government cannot function in accordance with the Constitution. The Supreme Court clarified that President’s Rule is not an automatic remedy if elections are delayed beyond six months.

Bench A 2-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court: A.K. Patnaik, J. S.J. Mukhopadhaya, J. Facts The case was filed as a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) challenging the constitutional validity of Section 8(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. According to Section 8(4), a Member of Parliament (MP) or Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) convicted of an offense was not immediately disqualified if they filed an appeal within three months of the conviction. This meant that sitting MPs and MLAs could continue in office despite being convicted of criminal offenses. The petitioners, including Lily Thomas, argued that this provision was discriminatory because an ordinary citizen convicted of a similar offense would immediately be disqualified from contesting elections, but an elected representative was given extra protection. The petitioners claimed that Parliament had no authority to enact Section 8(4) because the Constitution does not differentiate between sitting MPs/MLAs and candidates contesting elections. They also argued that Article 102(1)(e) and Article 191(1)(e) provide for disqualification upon conviction, without any exception. Issues Is Section 8(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 unconstitutional? Can Parliament enact a law that allows convicted MPs and MLAs to continue in office while ordinary citizens face immediate disqualification? Does Section 8(4) violate the principle of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Parliament lacks the power to delay disqualification: The Supreme Court held that Articles 102(1)(e) and 191(1)(e) of the Constitution do not grant Parliament the power to delay the disqualification of convicted MPs and MLAs. Immediate disqualification upon conviction: The Court ruled that as soon as a sitting MP or MLA is convicted for an offense under Section 8(1), (2), or (3), they stand disqualified from holding office immediately. Section 8(4) is unconstitutional: The provision was declared ultra vires (beyond the powers) of the Constitution because it created an unjustifiable classification between elected representatives and ordinary citizens. Observations The Constitution does not distinguish between a person contesting elections and a person already elected when it comes to disqualification. Corrupt and criminal politicians should not be allowed to continue in office simply because they file an appeal. The Court noted that corruption and criminalization of politics undermine democracy, and allowing convicted politicians to remain in office harms the public trust in governance. The doctrine of separation of powers does not permit Parliament to override constitutional provisions on disqualification. Decision The Supreme Court struck down Section 8(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, declaring it unconstitutional. MPs and MLAs convicted of an offense under Section 8 of the Act are immediately disqualified, even if they file an appeal. The judgment ensures that lawmakers convicted of criminal offenses cannot continue in office under the protection of a legal loophole. Important Terms 1. Representation of the People Act, 1951 This Act lays down the qualifications and disqualifications for contesting elections and being a member of Parliament or State Legislatures. Section 8 deals with disqualification on conviction for certain offenses. 2. Section 8(4) of the Act (Now Struck Down) Earlier, MPs and MLAs convicted of an offense could continue in office if they filed an appeal within three months. This provision was declared unconstitutional in this case. 3. Article 102(1)(e) & Article 191(1)(e) (Disqualification of MPs and MLAs) These Articles state that a person shall be disqualified from being a Member of Parliament or State Legislature if they are disqualified under any law made by Parliament. The Court ruled that Parliament cannot create exceptions for sitting MPs/MLAs through laws like Section 8(4). 4. Article 14 (Right to Equality) The petitioners argued that ordinary citizens convicted of a crime face immediate disqualification from contesting elections, whereas MPs and MLAs were given special privileges. The Court ruled that this unequal treatment violated Article 14 and was unconstitutional. 5. Ultra Vires (Beyond the Power) The Court held that Section 8(4) was ultra vires the Constitution, meaning Parliament had no authority to enact such a provision.

Bench A 5-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court: S.P. Bharucha, C.J. G.B. Pattanaik, J. Y.K. Sabharwal, J. Ruma Pal, J. Brijesh Kumar, J. Facts J. Jayalalithaa, former Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, was convicted in two criminal cases related to corruption during her previous tenure (1991–1996). She was sentenced to three years of rigorous imprisonment in one case and two years of rigorous imprisonment in another. Due to her conviction, she was disqualified from contesting elections under Section 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. In April 2001, she filed nomination papers for four constituencies in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly elections. However, all four were rejected due to her disqualification. Despite this, her party, AIADMK, won a majority in the Assembly elections, and she was sworn in as Chief Minister on May 14, 2001. B.R. Kapur filed a petition in the Supreme Court challenging her appointment, arguing that a person who is disqualified from being a legislator cannot be appointed as Chief Minister. Issues Can a person disqualified from being an MLA under Section 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act be appointed as Chief Minister? Does the Governor have the power to appoint a disqualified person as Chief Minister? Can the court interfere in such an appointment through quo warranto proceedings? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) A person who is disqualified under Section 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act cannot be appointed as Chief Minister. Article 164(4) of the Constitution allows a non-legislator to be appointed as a Minister (including Chief Minister) for six months, but only if they are otherwise qualified to become a member of the Legislature. Since Jayalalithaa was disqualified from contesting elections, she could not be appointed as Chief Minister even under Article 164(4). The Governor’s discretion is subject to constitutional limitations; they cannot appoint a person who is constitutionally barred from holding office. The Supreme Court has the authority to issue a writ of quo warranto if a person holds a public office without legal authority. Observations The Constitution does not allow an individual to hold office as Chief Minister if they are disqualified from being a legislator. The appointment of a disqualified person violates constitutional principles and the rule of law. The Governor must ensure that any person appointed as Chief Minister is qualified under the Constitution. The court has the power to intervene when constitutional provisions are violated. Decision The Supreme Court ruled that Jayalalithaa’s appointment as Chief Minister on May 14, 2001, was unconstitutional. Her appointment was quashed, and she was removed from office. The acts performed by her government from May 14, 2001, to the date of judgment were held valid, to prevent administrative chaos. Important Terms 1. Article 164(4) (Appointment of Ministers) Allows a non-legislator to be appointed as a Minister (including Chief Minister) for six months. However, the Supreme Court ruled that this provision does not apply to disqualified persons. 2. Section 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 States that a person convicted of an offence and sentenced to imprisonment for two years or more is disqualified from contesting elections. Jayalalithaa’s disqualification under this section prevented her from being appointed as Chief Minister. 3. Writ of Quo Warranto A legal challenge questioning the authority of a person holding a public office. The Supreme Court ruled that Jayalalithaa’s appointment could be challenged through a writ of quo warranto. 4. Governor’s Discretion in Appointing the Chief Minister The Governor must appoint a person who is qualified under the Constitution. The Governor cannot appoint a person who is disqualified under the law.

Bench A 5-Judge Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court: Dipak Misra, C.J. Dr. A.K. Sikri, J. A.M. Khanwilkar, J. Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. Ashok Bhushan, J. Facts The case concerned the division of powers between the Government of the National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi and the Union Government. The issue arose from conflicts between the Delhi Government (led by the Chief Minister) and the Lieutenant Governor (LG), particularly regarding administrative control over various departments. The 69th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1991, inserted Article 239AA, which granted Delhi a Legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers, while retaining its status as a Union Territory. Despite this, several disputes emerged over whether the LG was bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers or if he had discretionary powers similar to that of a Governor. The Delhi High Court ruled in 2016 that the LG had supremacy in administrative matters. The Delhi Government appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that this ruling undermined Delhi’s democratic governance. Issues What is the status of the NCT of Delhi under the Constitution of India? Does the Lieutenant Governor have independent decision-making powers, or is he bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers? What are the limits of the Delhi Government’s legislative and executive powers under Article 239AA? Does the Union Government have overriding authority over the elected government of Delhi? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Delhi is not a full-fledged state but has a unique status as a Union Territory with an elected government under Article 239AA. The Lieutenant Governor must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except in matters explicitly reserved for the Union Government. The Lieutenant Governor does not have independent decision-making powers and cannot refer every matter to the President under Article 239AA(4). The Delhi Legislative Assembly has the power to make laws on all subjects in the State List and Concurrent List, except on matters related to land, police, and public order. Observations The Constitution intends for Delhi to have a democratic and representative government. The Lieutenant Governor is an administrator, not a Governor. Excessive interference by the LG undermines the principles of federalism and democracy. The Council of Ministers, led by the Chief Minister, is responsible for day-to-day governance. The Union Government retains authority in specific matters but should not override the elected government unnecessarily. Decision The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Delhi Government, holding that: The LG is bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers except in matters beyond the legislative competence of the Delhi Assembly. The LG cannot act independently and must not obstruct the Delhi Government’s decisions unnecessarily. The Delhi Government has the power to make laws and execute policies on subjects under its jurisdiction. However, matters related to land, police, and public order remain under the exclusive control of the Union Government. Important Terms 1. Article 239AA (Special Status of Delhi) Grants Delhi a Legislative Assembly with elected representatives. Specifies that the Lieutenant Governor must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers except in certain cases. 2. Article 239AA(4) (Lieutenant Governor’s Role) Allows the Lieutenant Governor to refer matters to the President if there is a dispute. The Supreme Court ruled that this should be used sparingly and not as a means to override the elected government. 3. 69th Constitutional Amendment (1991) Introduced Article 239AA, granting Delhi partial statehood while keeping it a Union Territory. Established the Delhi Legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers. 4. Executive Powers of Delhi Government The Delhi Government has executive power over subjects in the State List and Concurrent List, except for land, police, and public order. The LG cannot interfere in routine governance matters unless required by law. 5. Federalism India follows a quasi-federal system, meaning that some powers are shared between the Union and States. The Court ruled that Delhi’s special status must be respected, and excessive central control is unconstitutional.

Bench A 5-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court: N. Santosh Hegde, J. S.N. Variava, J. B.P. Singh, J. H.K. Sema, J. S.B. Sinha, J. Facts The case involved two former ministers of Madhya Pradesh, Rajendra Kumar Singh and Bisahu Ram Yadav. A complaint was filed with the Lokayukta alleging that the two ministers illegally released 7.5 acres of land back to its previous owners, despite the land being acquired by the Indore Development Authority. After an investigation, the Lokayukta submitted a report, stating that there was sufficient evidence to prosecute the two ministers under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and for criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B of the IPC. By the time the Lokayukta submitted its report, both ministers had already resigned. The Council of Ministers refused to grant sanction for prosecution, stating that there was no prima facie case against them. The Governor of Madhya Pradesh, after reviewing the evidence, disagreed with the Council of Ministers and granted sanction for prosecution under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The ministers challenged the Governor’s decision in the High Court, which ruled that the Governor could not grant sanction without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Issues Can the Governor grant sanction for the prosecution of ministers under the Prevention of Corruption Act without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers? Is the Governor bound to follow the Council of Ministers’ decision on granting sanction for prosecution? Does the doctrine of necessity allow the Governor to act independently when the Council of Ministers is biased? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Governor’s Discretion in Granting Sanction: The Supreme Court held that although the Governor generally acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, there are exceptions where the Governor can act independently. Doctrine of Bias and Necessity: If the Council of Ministers is biased (i.e., if the accused ministers are part of the government), the Governor can act independently to ensure fair decision-making. Rule of Law and Accountability: The Court emphasized that if ministers could avoid prosecution by refusing to grant sanction, it would lead to a breakdown of the rule of law and democracy. Observations The Governor, as a constitutional head, usually acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers. However, when the entire Council of Ministers is biased, such as in cases involving corruption charges against sitting or former ministers, the Governor can act independently. The High Court wrongly held that the Governor had no discretionary power; the Supreme Court overruled this and upheld the Governor’s power to grant sanction for prosecution in such cases. Decision The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, ruling that the Governor was justified in granting sanction for prosecution. The decision of the High Court was set aside, and the prosecution of the ministers was allowed to proceed. The Court directed that the case be expedited, given its long-standing nature. Important Terms 1. Article 163 (Governor’s Discretionary Power) This article states that the Governor must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except in cases where discretion is explicitly provided by the Constitution. The Court ruled that in cases of bias, the Governor can act independently under the doctrine of necessity. 2. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 Section 13(1)(d) and Section 13(2) deal with criminal misconduct by public servants, such as abuse of power for personal gain. The Lokayukta found that the ministers had misused their position to return acquired land, which constituted an act of corruption. 3. Section 197 of CrPC (Sanction for Prosecution of Public Servants) This section requires prior approval from the competent authority (Governor in the case of ministers) before prosecuting a public servant. The Supreme Court ruled that the Governor could grant sanction independently when the Council of Ministers was biased. 4. Doctrine of Necessity This legal principle states that when the usual decision-making authority is unable to act fairly due to bias or conflict of interest, an alternative authority must take over. The Court applied this doctrine to justify the Governor’s independent decision to grant sanction. 5. Lokayukta The Lokayukta is an anti-corruption ombudsman who investigates corruption complaints against public officials. In this case, the Lokayukta’s report provided sufficient evidence to prosecute the ministers, but the Council of Ministers refused to grant sanction, leading to the Governor’s intervention.

Bench A 7-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court: A.N. Ray, C.J. D.G. Palekar, J. K.K. Mathew, J. Y.V. Chandrachud, J. A. Alagiriswami, J. P.N. Bhagwati, J. V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. Facts The appellants, Samsher Singh and Ishwar Chand Agarwal, were appointed as Subordinate Judges in the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch). Both were on probation, meaning their appointments were not yet permanent. The Punjab Government terminated their services in 1967 and 1969, respectively. The termination orders were issued under Rule 9 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 and Rule 7(3) of the Punjab Civil Services (Judicial Branch) Rules, 1951. Samsher Singh challenged his termination, arguing that it was a punitive dismissal without proper inquiry and that it violated Article 311 of the Constitution. The case also raised the broader issue of whether the Governor of a State acts independently or on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers when exercising executive functions​. Issues Does the Governor act on his own or on the advice of the Council of Ministers while exercising executive powers? Was Samsher Singh’s termination a dismissal in violation of Article 311, or was it a simple termination of a probationer? Do probationers in judicial service have the same protection under Article 311 as permanent employees? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Governor’s Executive Powers: The Supreme Court ruled that the Governor does not act independently but must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in all executive matters unless specified otherwise in the Constitution. Probationers and Article 311 Protection: The Court held that probationers do not have the same protection as permanent employees under Article 311. Their services can be terminated if found unsuitable. However, if the termination is based on misconduct, it must follow the proper procedure under Article 311. Nature of Termination: The Court held that Samsher Singh’s termination was not punitive but was based on an assessment of his suitability during probation. Since it was not a punishment, the rules of natural justice and Article 311 did not apply​. Observations Governor’s Role in Executive Actions: The Governor acts as a constitutional head and is bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers, except where the Constitution provides discretion. Judicial Independence: The Court emphasized the importance of maintaining judicial independence while allowing reasonable administrative control by the executive. Termination vs. Dismissal: If an order terminates a probationer’s service for unsuitability, it is not a punishment. However, if the termination is based on alleged misconduct, it requires an inquiry under Article 311(2)​. Decision The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the termination orders, ruling that Samsher Singh was a probationer and could be terminated without an inquiry if found unsuitable. The Court reaffirmed that the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and does not exercise executive power independently. The orders of termination were set aside on procedural grounds for Ishwar Chand Agarwal, but Samsher Singh’s appeal was dismissed​. Important Terms 1. Article 311 (Protection of Civil Servants) Protects government employees from arbitrary dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank. Requires a reasonable opportunity to be heard before dismissal for misconduct. The Court ruled that this protection does not apply to probationers unless their termination is punitive. 2. Probationer in Government Service A probationer is an employee under evaluation before receiving permanent status. The government can terminate a probationer’s services for unsuitability without following Article 311, but not if the termination is punitive. 3. Governor’s Role Under Article 154 The Governor is the executive head of the state but acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. This principle applies to appointments, removals, and other executive decisions. 4. Natural Justice A probationer is entitled to fair treatment but not a full-fledged disciplinary inquiry unless the termination is punitive.

Bench A 2-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court: A.M. Ahmadi, C.J. Sujata V. Manohar, J. Facts H.D. Deve Gowda was appointed as the Prime Minister of India in 1996, even though he was not a member of either House of Parliament at the time of appointment. The petitioner, S.P. Anand, challenged this appointment, arguing that only a sitting member of Parliament can be appointed as the Prime Minister. The petition contended that the President of India made a constitutional error in swearing in H.D. Deve Gowda as Prime Minister, as this action allegedly violated Articles 14, 21, and 75 of the Constitution. The petitioner sought a writ under Article 32, requesting that the appointment be declared unconstitutional. Issues Can a person who is not a member of either House of Parliament be appointed as the Prime Minister of India? Does such an appointment violate Articles 14, 21, or 75 of the Constitution? Does Article 75(5) permit a non-member to be appointed as Prime Minister for a temporary period? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Article 75(5) of the Constitution permits the appointment of a person as a Minister, including the Prime Minister, even if they are not a member of either House of Parliament. However, such a person must get elected to either the Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha within six months, failing which they must step down. The Prime Minister and other Ministers are accountable to Parliament, not directly to the electorate, and their legitimacy comes from commanding the confidence of the Lok Sabha. The President has the discretion to appoint a Prime Minister who is not a member of Parliament, provided they are likely to secure a majority in the House. Observations The Supreme Court noted that the framers of the Constitution deliberately included Article 75(5) to allow for such appointments. A similar provision exists at the state level in Article 164(4), which allows a non-member to be appointed as a Chief Minister. The Prime Minister is not directly elected by the people; rather, they are chosen by the elected representatives in the Lok Sabha. The only requirement is that they secure a seat in Parliament within six months. The Court also held that there was no violation of Article 14 (Right to Equality) or Article 21 (Right to Life), as the appointment followed constitutional provisions. Decision The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and upheld the validity of H.D. Deve Gowda’s appointment as Prime Minister. The Court ruled that a non-member of Parliament can be appointed as the Prime Minister, provided they get elected to either House within six months. The President acted within constitutional limits while appointing Deve Gowda. There was no violation of fundamental rights under Articles 14 or 21. Important Terms 1. Article 75(5) (Appointment of Ministers) Allows a person who is not a member of either House of Parliament to be appointed as a Minister (including the Prime Minister) for a maximum of six months. If they fail to get elected within six months, they must vacate the position. 2. Article 14 (Right to Equality) The petitioner argued that appointing a non-member as Prime Minister violated Article 14, as it discriminated against other members of Parliament. The Court rejected this claim, stating that the Constitution itself provides for such an appointment. 3. Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty) The petitioner tried to argue that the appointment affected citizens’ rights to democratic governance, but the Court ruled that there was no direct violation of Article 21. 4. Article 32 (Right to Constitutional Remedies) This article allows citizens to approach the Supreme Court directly if their fundamental rights are violated. The Court held that no fundamental right was violated in this case. 5. Parliamentary System of Government The Prime Minister is not directly elected by the people but is appointed by the President based on the confidence of the Lok Sabha. The Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to Parliament, ensuring accountability.

Bench A 5-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court: S.M. Sikri, C.J. G.K. Mitter, J. K.S. Hegde, J. A.N. Grover, J. P. Jaganmohan Reddy, J. Facts After the dissolution of the Lok Sabha (House of the People) on December 27, 1970, Indira Gandhi continued as Prime Minister along with her Council of Ministers. The petitioner, U.N.R. Rao, filed a writ of quo warranto (a legal challenge questioning the authority by which a public office is held) against Indira Gandhi, arguing that since the House of the People was dissolved, the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers should no longer hold office. The main argument was based on Article 75(3), which states that the Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People. Since the House had been dissolved, the petitioner claimed that the government lost its legitimacy. The respondent (Indira Gandhi) defended her position, stating that the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers do not cease to hold office upon dissolution of the Lok Sabha, and that the President cannot exercise executive power without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Issues Does the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers automatically lose office upon the dissolution of the House of the People under Article 75(3)? Can the President exercise executive powers without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers when the Lok Sabha is dissolved? Is Article 74(1) (which mandates the existence of a Council of Ministers) still applicable even after the dissolution of the Lok Sabha? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Article 74(1) is mandatory: The Supreme Court ruled that Article 74(1), which mandates the existence of a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the President, is mandatory and remains in force even when the Lok Sabha is dissolved. Article 75(3) does not require immediate resignation upon dissolution: The Court clarified that Article 75(3) (which states that the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the House of the People) only applies when the House is in session and not when it is dissolved. The President cannot govern alone: Since India follows a parliamentary system, the President cannot exercise executive power independently without the advice of the Council of Ministers. Continuity of Government: The dissolution of the Lok Sabha does not mean the end of the executive government, as general elections must be conducted, and a new Lok Sabha must be constituted. Observations The Court rejected the argument that the Council of Ministers must immediately resign after the Lok Sabha’s dissolution. The parliamentary system in India is modeled on the British system, where the Prime Minister and Ministers continue to function until the next government is formed. If the petitioner’s argument were accepted, it would mean that the President could rule alone without a Council of Ministers, which is unconstitutional. The President is bound to act on the advice of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers, even when the House of the People is dissolved. Decision The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that Indira Gandhi and her Council of Ministers could continue in office even after the Lok Sabha was dissolved. It held that Article 75(3) does not mean that the Prime Minister must resign immediately after the House is dissolved. The Court reaffirmed that the executive power of the Union is exercised by the President only with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The continuation of the government is essential to ensure administrative stability until the new House of the People is elected. Important Terms 1. Article 74(1) (Council of Ministers to Aid and Advise the President) This article states that there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at its head to aid and advise the President. The Court ruled that this provision is mandatory and that the President cannot act without the Council of Ministers. 2. Article 75(3) (Collective Responsibility of Ministers) This article states that the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the House of the People (Lok Sabha). The petitioner argued that this means the Council of Ministers must resign upon dissolution of the Lok Sabha. The Court rejected this argument, clarifying that responsibility exists when the House is in session, but its dissolution does not require immediate resignation. 3. Writ of Quo Warranto A legal challenge questioning the legitimacy of a person holding a public office. In this case, U.N.R. Rao filed a quo warranto writ against Indira Gandhi, arguing that she had no right to continue as Prime Minister. The Supreme Court dismissed this writ, stating that the continuation of the Council of Ministers was constitutional. 4. Dissolution of Lok Sabha (Article 85(2)) Article 85(2) allows the President to dissolve the Lok Sabha before its term expires. The Court ruled that even after dissolution, the Council of Ministers continues in office until a new government is formed. 5. Parliamentary System of Government India follows a parliamentary democracy, meaning that the executive (Prime Minister and Ministers) is accountable to the legislature (Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha). The Court held that even when the Lok Sabha is dissolved, the Prime Minister and Ministers remain in office to ensure government continuity.