Bench: Chief Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das Justice T.L. Venkatarama Aiyar Justice S.K. Das Justice A.K. Sarkar Justice Vivian Bose Facts: Tata Iron & Steel Company (TISCO), headquartered in Jamshedpur, Bihar, manufactured iron and steel products. The company sold these products to buyers both within and outside Bihar. For sales to buyers in other states, TISCO entered into contracts where goods were dispatched from its Jamshedpur plant to destinations outside Bihar. The State of Bihar imposed sales tax on these transactions under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, asserting that the sales were completed within Bihar. TISCO contested this imposition, arguing that the sales occurred outside Bihar and, therefore, were beyond the state’s taxation authority. Issues: Did the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, apply to sales where goods were dispatched from Bihar to buyers in other states? Was the State of Bihar constitutionally competent to levy sales tax on transactions where the goods were delivered outside its territorial jurisdiction? Arguments: Appellant (TISCO): TISCO contended that the sales in question were inter-state transactions, with goods delivered to buyers outside Bihar. Therefore, these sales fell outside the purview of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, as the state lacked the territorial nexus to tax such transactions. Respondent (State of Bihar): The State argued that since the goods originated from Bihar and the sales agreements were executed within the state, it had the authority to levy sales tax on these transactions. The State maintained that a sufficient territorial nexus existed to justify the tax imposition. Ratio Decidendi: Territorial Nexus Doctrine: The Supreme Court applied the doctrine of territorial nexus, which allows a state to levy taxes if a sufficient connection exists between the state and the transaction. The Court observed that the goods were manufactured and dispatched from Bihar, establishing a substantial link between the state and the sales. State’s Taxing Authority: The Court held that the presence of goods within Bihar at the time of the sales provided the state with the authority to impose sales tax. The physical location of the goods within the state’s territory constituted an adequate territorial nexus for taxation purposes. Observations: Nature of Sales Tax: The Court clarified that sales tax is levied on the act of sale, not merely on the movement of goods. Therefore, if the sale transaction has a substantial connection with the taxing state, the state is justified in imposing the tax. Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, as applied to the disputed transactions. The Court ruled that the State of Bihar possessed the legislative competence to levy sales tax on goods manufactured and sold within its territory, even if the goods were subsequently transported to purchasers outside the state. Consequently, TISCO’s appeal was dismissed, and the company was held liable to pay the assessed sales tax. Important Terms: Territorial Nexus: A legal principle that permits a state to tax transactions or entities if a significant connection exists between the state and the subject matter of the tax. Sales Tax: A tax imposed by the government on the sale of goods and services. Inter-State Sales: Transactions where goods are sold and transported from one state to another within a country.

Bench: Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud Justice A.N. Sen Justice R. Misra Facts: In 1953, Rudul Sah was arrested on charges of murdering his wife. On June 3, 1968, the Additional Sessions Judge of Muzaffarpur acquitted him, ordering his immediate release. Despite this acquittal, Sah remained incarcerated until October 16, 1982, resulting in an additional 14 years of unlawful detention. In response, Sah filed a habeas corpus petition under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, seeking his release and compensation for the violation of his fundamental rights. Issues: Whether the prolonged detention of Rudul Sah after his acquittal constituted a violation of his fundamental rights under Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty) of the Constitution. Whether the Supreme Court has the authority under Article 32 to award monetary compensation for the violation of fundamental rights. Arguments: Petitioner’s Arguments: Sah argued that his continued detention after acquittal was illegal and violated his fundamental rights under Article 21. He sought immediate release and compensation for the unlawful imprisonment. Respondent’s Arguments: The State of Bihar acknowledged the wrongful detention but contended that Sah’s release was delayed due to administrative lapses. The State also argued that monetary compensation should be sought through a civil suit rather than a writ petition under Article 32. Ratio Decidendi: Violation of Fundamental Rights: The Supreme Court held that Sah’s prolonged detention after acquittal was a clear violation of his fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21. Award of Compensation under Article 32: The Court established that it possesses the authority to award monetary compensation under Article 32 as a remedy for the violation of fundamental rights. It emphasized that such compensation serves as a necessary relief to ensure the enforcement of fundamental rights and to deter future violations by the state.  Observations: State Accountability: The Court underscored the responsibility of the state to protect individual rights and held that administrative lapses leading to unlawful detention cannot be justified. Scope of Article 32: The judgment broadened the scope of Article 32, allowing the Supreme Court to grant remedial relief, including monetary compensation, for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Decision: The Supreme Court ordered the immediate release of Rudul Sah and awarded him compensation of ₹30,000 for the 14 years of unlawful detention. Additionally, the Court granted ₹5,000 to cover Sah’s expenses for medical treatment and rehabilitation. The Court also directed the State of Bihar to initiate proceedings to investigate the circumstances leading to Sah’s prolonged detention and to take appropriate action against those responsible. Important Terms: Article 21 of the Constitution: Guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, stating that no person shall be deprived of these rights except according to the procedure established by law. Article 32 of the Constitution: Provides individuals the right to approach the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights, empowering the Court to issue directions or orders, including writs like habeas corpus. Habeas Corpus: A legal writ requiring a person under arrest to be brought before a judge or into court, ensuring that a prisoner can be released from unlawful detention. Monetary Compensation: Financial reparation awarded to an individual for loss or injury suffered due to the unlawful actions of another party, in this case, the state.

Bench: Justice P.N. Bhagwati Justice R.S. Pathak Justice A.N. Sen Facts: Bandhua Mukti Morcha, a non-governmental organization dedicated to eradicating bonded labor, conducted a survey in the stone quarries of Faridabad district near Delhi. They discovered that numerous laborers were working under deplorable conditions, lacking basic amenities, and were subjected to bonded labor practices. The organization addressed a letter to Justice P.N. Bhagwati of the Supreme Court, highlighting these issues and seeking intervention for the release and rehabilitation of these workers. The Supreme Court treated this letter as a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, which allows individuals to approach the Court for enforcement of fundamental rights. Issues: Whether the laborers identified in the stone quarries were bonded laborers. Whether their fundamental rights under Articles 21 (Right to Life) and 23 (Prohibition of Forced Labor) of the Constitution were violated. Whether the Supreme Court had the authority to appoint commissions or investigative bodies under Article 32 to ascertain facts related to the case. Whether the State was obligated to ensure the enforcement of labor laws and the rehabilitation of bonded laborers. Arguments: Petitioner’s Arguments: The petitioner contended that the laborers were subjected to bonded labor, working in inhumane conditions without adequate wages, shelter, or healthcare. This situation amounted to a violation of their fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 23 of the Constitution. The petitioner urged the Court to intervene and direct the authorities to take necessary actions for the laborers’ release and rehabilitation. Respondent’s Arguments: The respondents, including the Union of India and the State of Haryana, argued that existing laws were adequate to address the issues raised. They contended that the laborers were not bonded but were working voluntarily under contractual agreements. The respondents also questioned the maintainability of the writ petition, suggesting that the petitioner lacked locus standi (the right to bring the action). Ratio Decidendi: Recognition of Bonded Labor: The Court recognized that the laborers were indeed bonded, as they were working under coercive conditions with little to no remuneration, unable to leave due to debts or other obligations. Violation of Fundamental Rights: The Court held that the exploitation of laborers in such conditions violated their fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 23. The right to life was interpreted to include the right to live with human dignity, encompassing protection against exploitation. Judicial Activism and PIL: The Court affirmed its authority to treat letters or informal communications as writ petitions in cases of public interest, especially when fundamental rights of marginalized sections are involved. Appointment of Commissions: The Court asserted its power to appoint commissions or investigative bodies under Article 32 to gather facts and ensure effective adjudication, especially when state machinery fails to protect citizens’ rights. Observations: State’s Responsibility: The Court emphasized the duty of the State to identify, release, and rehabilitate bonded laborers. It highlighted the necessity for vigilance committees and the enforcement of labor laws to prevent such exploitation. Human Dignity: The judgment underscored that the right to life includes living with human dignity, free from exploitation and inhumane working conditions. Decision: The Supreme Court directed the State of Haryana to: Establish vigilance committees in each district and subdivision within six weeks to identify and oversee the release of bonded laborers. Appoint District Magistrates to conduct surveys and identify bonded laborers. Collaborate with non-governmental organizations for the rehabilitation of freed laborers. Ensure the implementation of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, and other labor welfare legislations. The Court also instructed the Central Government to: Conduct periodic inspections of workplaces to ensure compliance with labor laws. Organize educational programs to inform workers of their rights and benefits under the law. Important Terms: Article 21 of the Constitution: Guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, which includes living with human dignity. Article 23 of the Constitution: Prohibits trafficking in human beings and forced labor. Bonded Labor: A system where laborers are forced to work to repay debts, often under exploitative conditions, violating their fundamental rights. Public Interest Litigation (PIL): Legal actions initiated in a court of law for the enforcement of public interest where the rights of an individual or a group are affected. Locus Standi: The right or capacity to bring an action or to appear in a court.

Bench: Justice M. Hidayatullah Justice J.C. Shah Justice S.M. Sikri Justice G.K. Mitter Justice V. Ramaswami Facts: The petitioners, Tilokchand Motichand & Ors., collected sales tax from their customers under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953. The Sales Tax Officer ordered the forfeiture of ₹26,563.50 under Section 21(4) of the Act, alleging that the petitioners had not refunded the collected tax to their customers as required. The petitioners filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court on March 28, 1958, challenging the forfeiture order and the validity of Section 21(4), claiming it violated their fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the petition on November 28, 1958, upholding the validity of Section 21(4) and the forfeiture order. In a separate case, Kantilal Babulal & Bros. v. H.C. Patel, the Supreme Court struck down Section 12A(4) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946, on September 29, 1967, on similar grounds. Relying on this judgment, the petitioners filed a writ petition under Article 32 before the Supreme Court on February 9, 1968, seeking a refund of the forfeited amount. Issues: Whether a writ petition under Article 32 is maintainable after a significant delay following the High Court’s dismissal of the initial petition. Whether the doctrine of laches (unreasonable delay) applies to petitions filed under Article 32 for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Arguments: Petitioners’ Arguments: Argued that the forfeiture was unconstitutional, as Section 21(4) violated their fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f). Contended that the right to approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 is itself a fundamental right and should not be barred by any limitation period or the doctrine of laches. Respondents’ Arguments: Asserted that the petitioners had delayed unreasonably in approaching the Supreme Court, as the forfeiture occurred in 1958, and the petition under Article 32 was filed only in 1968. Emphasized that the doctrine of laches should apply to prevent the abuse of the judicial process and ensure finality in litigation. Ratio Decidendi: Application of the Doctrine of Laches: The Supreme Court held that while Article 32 provides a guaranteed remedy for the enforcement of fundamental rights, this remedy is subject to the doctrine of laches. Emphasized that unreasonable delay in filing a petition can lead to its dismissal, even when fundamental rights are at stake. Discretionary Nature of Relief under Article 32: The Court observed that the power to grant relief under Article 32 is discretionary and can be denied if there is an undue delay in seeking the remedy. Observations: Public Policy and Judicial Discipline: The Court noted that the doctrine of laches is founded on public policy, aiming to bring finality to litigation and maintain judicial discipline. Fundamental Rights and Procedural Limitations: While Article 32 provides a guaranteed remedy for the enforcement of fundamental rights, this remedy is subject to procedural limitations, including the doctrine of laches, to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition under Article 32, holding that it was barred by the doctrine of laches due to the petitioners’ unreasonable delay in approaching the Court. Important Terms: Article 32 of the Constitution: Provides individuals the right to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Doctrine of Laches: A legal principle that bars claims where there has been an unreasonable delay in pursuing them, resulting in prejudice to the other party. Ultra Vires: Acts or decisions made beyond the scope of the authority granted by law or corporate charter. Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution: Provided citizens the fundamental right to acquire, hold, and dispose of property; this provision was later repealed by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978.

Bench Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar Justice A.K. Sarkar Justice K.N. Wanchoo Justice K.C. Das Gupta Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar Facts Land Dispute: The petitioners, Daryao and others, claimed to have been in possession of certain lands for over fifty years. The respondents sought possession of this land under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms (Amendment) Act XVI of 1953. Proceedings Before the Revenue Authorities: The respondents initiated proceedings before the revenue authorities, asserting their right to the land based on the aforementioned Act. The Board of Revenue ruled in favor of the respondents, granting them possession of the disputed land. Writ Petition Under Article 226: Aggrieved by the Board’s decision, the petitioners filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Allahabad High Court, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the Board’s decision. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the merits. Writ Petition Under Article 32: Subsequently, the petitioners approached the Supreme Court under Article 32, alleging a violation of their fundamental rights and seeking similar relief. Issues Does the principle of res judicata apply to writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution after a similar petition has been dismissed by a High Court under Article 226? Arguments Petitioners’ Arguments: Contended that the principle of res judicata, being a technical rule, should not bar the enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Argued that the right to approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 is itself a fundamental right and should not be curtailed by procedural doctrines. Respondents’ Arguments: Asserted that the principle of res judicata is based on public policy to ensure finality in litigation and prevent abuse of the judicial process. Emphasized that allowing multiple petitions on the same matter would lead to endless litigation and undermine the authority of judicial decisions. Ratio Decidendi Applicability of Res Judicata to Writ Petitions: The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of res judicata applies to writ petitions under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. Emphasized that finality of decisions is essential for the effective administration of justice and to prevent the misuse of judicial resources. Binding Nature of High Court Decisions: If a writ petition under Article 226 is dismissed on merits by a High Court, the decision is binding on the parties, and a subsequent petition on the same matter under Article 32 is barred by res judicata. Exceptions to the Rule: If a writ petition is dismissed by a High Court not on merits but due to reasons like laches (delay) or availability of an alternative remedy, the principle of res judicata does not apply, and a petition under Article 32 is maintainable. Observations Public Policy and Judicial Discipline: The Court observed that the doctrine of res judicata is founded on public policy, aiming to bring finality to litigation and maintain judicial discipline. Fundamental Rights and Procedural Limitations: While Article 32 provides a guaranteed remedy for the enforcement of fundamental rights, this remedy is subject to the principles of res judicata to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Decision The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petitions filed under Article 32, holding that they were barred by the principle of res judicata, as the matters had already been adjudicated upon by the High Court under Article 226. Important Terms Article 226 of the Constitution: Empowers High Courts to issue certain writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other purpose. Article 32 of the Constitution: Provides the right to individuals to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Res Judicata: A legal doctrine that bars re-litigation of the same issue between the same parties once it has been conclusively decided by a competent court. Laches: An unreasonable delay in pursuing a legal remedy, potentially barring the claim.

Bench Justice P. Venkatarama Reddi Justice A.K. Mathur Facts Conviction and Sentencing: Zakarius Lakra was convicted and sentenced to death by the Additional Sessions Judge, Dehradun, for an offense committed on November 15, 1994. The High Court confirmed the death sentence, and the Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence upon appeal. Writ Petition Filed: The parents of the accused filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, challenging the death sentence on the grounds that Zakarius was a juvenile at the time of the offense. They presented school certificates indicating that his date of birth was January 4, 1980, suggesting he was 14 years old when the crime occurred. These certificates were not considered during the initial trial or appeals. Issues Whether the death sentence imposed on Zakarius Lakra should be quashed on the grounds that he was a juvenile at the time of the offense. Arguments Petitioners’ Arguments: Claimed Zakarius was a juvenile at the time of the offense, based on school certificates indicating a birth date of January 4, 1980. Cited previous Supreme Court decisions where the juvenile status of offenders was considered even at advanced stages of legal proceedings, leading to modifications in sentencing. Respondent’s Arguments: Highlighted inconsistencies in Zakarius’s age declarations, noting he had opened a bank account in 1994, which typically requires the individual to be a major. Emphasized the finality of the Supreme Court’s previous decisions upholding the death sentence. Ratio Decidendi (Legal Reasoning) Juvenile Status Consideration: The Court acknowledged the importance of determining the accused’s age at the time of the offense, as it directly impacts the applicability of the Juvenile Justice Act, which prohibits capital punishment for juveniles. Procedural Appropriateness: The Court noted that a writ petition under Article 32 was not the appropriate remedy for challenging the sentence after the dismissal of a review petition. Referred to the precedent set in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, which established the curative petition as the proper legal recourse in such situations. Observations The trial court, while hearing the accused on the question of sentence, noted that Zakarius claimed to be 17 years old at the time of the offense. However, evidence showed he had opened a bank account in 1994, suggesting he was a major. The Supreme Court, in its earlier judgment, had considered this aspect and found no fault in the trial court and High Court’s approach regarding Zakarius’s age. The Court acknowledged that the school certificates indicating Zakarius’s juvenile status were not brought to its notice during the appeal hearing. Decision The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition, stating it was not maintainable under Article 32 for the relief sought. However, the Court permitted the petitioners to convert the writ petition into a curative petition, following the procedure outlined in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, to address the claim of Zakarius’s juvenile status at the time of the offense. Important Terms Article 32 of the Constitution: Provides individuals the right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights. Curative Petition: A legal mechanism allowing the Supreme Court to re-examine its final judgments to prevent miscarriage of justice, even after the dismissal of a review petition. Juvenile Justice Act: Legislation that provides for the care, protection, and rehabilitation of juveniles in conflict with the law, prohibiting capital punishment for offenses committed as juveniles.

Bench A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court comprising: Chief Justice S.P. Bharucha Justice S.S.M. Quadri Justice U.C. Banerjee Justice S.N. Variava Justice Shivaraj V. Patil Facts The case arose from a matrimonial dispute between Rupa Ashok Hurra and Ashok Hurra, who had been separated for several years. Initially, both parties consented to a mutual divorce. However, Rupa Hurra later withdrew her consent, leading to a legal dispute over the validity of the divorce decree. The matter escalated through various courts and ultimately reached the Supreme Court of India, where the primary issue was the validity of the divorce decree granted earlier. After the Supreme Court’s final judgment, Rupa Hurra sought to challenge it, even after her review petition was dismissed, raising questions about the availability of any further relief. Issues Whether an aggrieved person is entitled to any relief against the final judgment or order of the Supreme Court after the dismissal of a review petition. Whether the Supreme Court has the inherent power to reconsider its judgments to prevent abuse of its process and to cure gross miscarriage of justice. Ratio Decidendi (Legal Reasoning) Inherent Powers of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court acknowledged that it possesses inherent powers to reconsider and rectify its judgments to prevent miscarriage of justice. This is crucial to maintain public confidence in the judiciary and ensure fairness. Introduction of the Curative Petition To address situations where gross miscarriage of justice occurs, the Court introduced the concept of a Curative Petition. This allows the Court to re-examine its final judgments in exceptional cases, even after the dismissal of a review petition. Conditions for Filing a Curative PetitionThe Court specified that a Curative Petition can be filed under the following conditions: Violation of Principles of Natural Justice: If the petitioner was not given a fair hearing or was unaware of the proceedings that led to the judgment. Apprehension of Bias: If the judgment was passed by a judge who had a conflict of interest or bias, affecting the impartiality of the decision. Certification by a Senior Advocate: The petition must include a certification by a senior advocate, affirming that the grounds mentioned are substantial. First Raised in Review Petition: The grounds for filing the Curative Petition should have been initially raised in the review petition, which was subsequently dismissed. Observations of the Court The Court emphasized that the Curative Petition is not a regular remedy but an exceptional one, invoked only in cases where there is a gross miscarriage of justice. It underscored the importance of finality of judgments for legal certainty but recognized that procedural fairness and justice are paramount. The Court also noted that frivolous curative petitions would be discouraged, and exemplary costs could be imposed to prevent misuse of this remedy. Decision of the Court The Supreme Court held that an aggrieved person could file a Curative Petition even after the dismissal of a review petition, but only on limited grounds such as violation of principles of natural justice or bias in adjudication. The Court laid down specific guidelines for entertaining Curative Petitions to ensure they are filed in exceptional circumstances and not as a matter of routine. Important Terms Curative Petition: A legal mechanism devised by the Supreme Court to reconsider its final judgments to prevent miscarriage of justice, even after the dismissal of a review petition. Principles of Natural Justice: Fundamental legal principles ensuring fairness, impartiality, and the opportunity to be heard in legal proceedings. Review Petition: A petition filed for re-examination of a court’s judgment, typically on the grounds of apparent errors or new evidence. Miscarriage of Justice: A situation where a grossly unfair outcome occurs in a judicial proceeding, leading to the conviction or punishment of an innocent person. Inherent Powers: Powers possessed by a court to ensure complete justice is done in a case, even if not explicitly provided for by statute or rules.

Bench A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: Justice R.M. Lodha Justice J.S. Khehar Justice Dipak Misra Justice C. Nagappan Justice S.K. Singh Facts The case revolved around the procedure for reviewing death penalty cases in the Supreme Court. In India, after the Supreme Court upholds a death sentence, a convict can file a review petition under Article 137 of the Constitution, which allows the Supreme Court to reconsider its judgment. According to Order XL Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, review petitions were generally heard in chambers (private hearings without lawyers), meaning that the lawyers could not argue in front of the judges. Mohd. Arif, a death row convict, filed a petition arguing that review petitions in death penalty cases must be heard in open court, with oral arguments from lawyers instead of being decided in chambers. He claimed that denying an oral hearing violated his fundamental right to life (Article 21) because the death penalty is the most severe punishment, and every possible safeguard should be given. The case was taken up by the Supreme Court to decide whether all review petitions in death penalty cases should be heard in open court with full arguments rather than being decided in chambers. Issues Whether review petitions in death penalty cases should be heard in open court instead of chambers. Whether the procedure under Order XL Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, which denied oral hearings in review petitions, violated Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty). Whether principles of natural justice require an open court hearing for review petitions in death penalty cases. Ratio Decidendi (Legal Reasoning) Open Court Hearing for Death Penalty Review Petitions The Court ruled that review petitions in death penalty cases must be heard in open court with oral arguments. Since the death penalty is irreversible, the convict must get every possible opportunity to present their case properly before the court makes a final decision. A closed-door hearing (chamber hearing) is not enough in such serious matters. Fair Trial and Natural Justice The Court emphasized that a fair trial and the right to be heard are fundamental rights under Article 21. In cases where a person’s life is at stake, the principle of audi alteram partem (right to be heard) must be followed. Oral arguments allow the convict’s lawyer to highlight errors in the previous judgment that might have led to a wrongful death sentence. Modification of Supreme Court Rules The Court ruled that Order XL Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules must be changed so that all review petitions in death penalty cases are heard in open court with full arguments. This ensures transparency and gives the convict a fair chance to explain why the judgment should be reconsidered. Balancing Judicial Efficiency and Fundamental Rights The government argued that giving oral hearings in all review petitions would slow down the judicial process. However, the Supreme Court clarified that efficiency should not come at the cost of justice, especially in cases where a person’s life is at risk. The Court stated that even though most review petitions are decided in chambers, an exception must be made for death penalty cases due to their extreme nature. Observations of the Court Death penalty is the most serious punishment and must be given only after ensuring all legal safeguards. Errors in judicial decisions can lead to wrongful executions, which are irreversible mistakes. Principle of audi alteram partem (right to be heard) is essential in criminal justice. The Supreme Court acknowledged that its own past decisions in death penalty cases might have errors, and a full review hearing reduces the risk of wrongful execution. The Court also noted that this change does not mean all convicts will escape the death penalty, but it ensures that justice is delivered in the fairest way possible. Decision of the Court The Supreme Court allowed review petitions in death penalty cases to be heard in open court with oral arguments. The Court directed the amendment of Supreme Court Rules to reflect this change. The Court held that this change applies to both pending and future cases. Important Terms Order XL Rule 3 (Supreme Court Rules) – A rule that earlier allowed review petitions to be decided in chambers without oral hearings, which was modified in this case. Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty) – The fundamental right that protects individuals from arbitrary deprivation of life, requiring due process before imposing the death penalty. Review Petition – A legal remedy allowing a party to seek re-examination of a Supreme Court judgment on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record. Natural Justice – A legal principle that ensures fair hearing (audi alteram partem) and absence of bias (nemo judex in causa sua) in judicial proceedings. Death Penalty Jurisprudence – The evolving legal standards and procedural safeguards applicable to capital punishment cases to prevent wrongful executions.

Bench A 5-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: Justice R.M. Lodha Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan Justice A.K. Patnaik Justice Dipak Misra Justice S.J. Mukhopadhaya Facts The case arose from a challenge to the constitutional validity of the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005 (NTT Act). The National Tax Tribunal (NTT) was created under the Act to handle direct tax appeals, replacing the jurisdiction of High Courts under Sections 260A and 260B of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Madras Bar Association (MBA) filed a petition arguing that the Act violated the independence of the judiciary by vesting adjudicatory powers in a tribunal controlled by the executive. The key issues included: Judicial independence: The Act transferred powers of High Courts to a tribunal controlled by the executive. Separation of powers: The government had a say in the appointment, tenure, and removal of tribunal members, raising concerns about judicial independence. Qualifications of tribunal members: The Act allowed non-judicial members to be appointed, raising questions about competence. Issues Whether the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005, violated the doctrine of separation of powers by transferring judicial functions to a tribunal controlled by the executive. Whether the exclusion of High Court jurisdiction over tax appeals was unconstitutional. Whether the composition and appointment process of the tribunal violated judicial independence. Ratio Decidendi Judicial Independence: The Supreme Court held that judicial independence is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, and any law that allows executive control over the judiciary is unconstitutional. Exclusion of High Courts Unconstitutional: The Court ruled that removing tax appeals from High Court jurisdiction and transferring them to a tribunal is unconstitutional, as it violates the separation of powers. Composition of Tribunal Violates Judicial Standards: The NTT Act allowed non-judicial members to be appointed, which was held to be unconstitutional as tribunals performing judicial functions must be headed by judges or persons with judicial experience. Observations The power of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 (High Courts) and Article 32 (Supreme Court) is a basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be taken away. A tribunal cannot replace a High Court in tax matters, especially when the tribunal does not have the same independence as courts. The Court reaffirmed that tribunals must function as an extension of the judiciary and not as executive-controlled bodies. Decision The Supreme Court declared the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005, unconstitutional. The transfer of High Court jurisdiction over tax matters to a tribunal was struck down. The Court ruled that tribunals must follow the same independence and judicial standards as courts. Important Terms Separation of Powers – The doctrine that divides power between the legislature, executive, and judiciary, preventing one branch from interfering in another. Judicial Independence – The principle that the judiciary must function free from executive or legislative control. Article 226 & 227 – Give High Courts judicial review powers, ensuring they can review executive and tribunal decisions. Basic Structure Doctrine – A constitutional principle that certain fundamental features (such as judicial independence) cannot be altered by Parliament. National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005 – The law that sought to create a tribunal to replace High Court jurisdiction over tax appeals, later struck down as unconstitutional. Judicial Review – The power of courts to review and strike down unconstitutional laws or executive actions.

Bench A 7-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: Justice A.M. Ahmadi (Chief Justice of India) Justice M.K. Mukherjee Justice K. Venkataswami Justice B.N. Kirpal Justice S.C. Sen Justice Saghir Ahmad Justice G.T. Nanavati Facts The case arose from multiple writ petitions challenging the validity of Articles 323A and 323B of the Constitution, which provided for the establishment of Administrative Tribunals and barred the jurisdiction of High Courts over matters decided by these tribunals. The 42nd Constitutional Amendment (1976) introduced Articles 323A and 323B, allowing Parliament to create tribunals for adjudicating service matters, tax disputes, and other specialized fields. The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, was enacted under Article 323A, leading to the formation of Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) and State Administrative Tribunals (SATs) for service matters. The petitioners argued that excluding judicial review by High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 violated the basic structure doctrine, as judicial review is a fundamental feature of the Constitution. Issues Whether the exclusion of jurisdiction of the High Courts and Supreme Court over tribunal decisions under Articles 323A and 323B was unconstitutional. Whether Administrative Tribunals could replace High Courts as the final adjudicators in service and administrative matters. Whether judicial review by High Courts and the Supreme Court is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Ratio Decidendi Judicial Review as a Basic Structure: The Supreme Court ruled that judicial review by High Courts and the Supreme Court is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be removed by any constitutional amendment. Tribunals Cannot Replace High Courts: The Court held that tribunals like the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) or State Administrative Tribunals (SATs) cannot function as substitutes for High Courts. High Court’s Supervisory Jurisdiction Restored: The Court struck down provisions that barred the jurisdiction of High Courts under Articles 226 and 227, ruling that tribunal decisions must be subject to judicial review by High Courts. Tribunals to Function as Supplementary Bodies: While tribunals were recognized as useful for reducing the burden on courts, they were to function as subsidiary bodies, with their decisions being reviewable by High Courts. Observations Tribunals Play a Limited Role: The Court observed that tribunals serve an important role in reducing the case load of courts but cannot be considered as replacements for High Courts. Judicial Review is Essential for Democracy: The Supreme Court reaffirmed that judicial review is essential for upholding constitutional rights and ensuring accountability of the executive. Parliament Cannot Oust High Court’s Powers: The ruling made it clear that any law that attempts to exclude judicial review is unconstitutional. Decision The Supreme Court struck down provisions barring judicial review of tribunal decisions, ruling them unconstitutional. The Court held that High Courts have jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to review tribunal decisions. The tribunals would continue to function, but their decisions would remain subject to review by High Courts and ultimately by the Supreme Court under Article 136. Important Terms Article 323A – Allows Parliament to create tribunals for service matters and excludes the jurisdiction of High Courts. Article 323B – Allows tribunals for tax, industrial, and other disputes, with the possibility of excluding the jurisdiction of High Courts. Judicial Review – The power of courts to review and strike down unconstitutional laws or executive actions. Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 – The law that created Central and State Administrative Tribunals to handle service matters. Basic Structure Doctrine – A principle that certain features of the Constitution, such as judicial review, cannot be altered by Parliament. Article 226 & 227 – Grant High Courts the power of judicial review over all lower courts and tribunals. Article 136 – Gives the Supreme Court the power to grant special leave to appeal against any judgment from any tribunal or High Court.