Bench A 5-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: Justice J.S. Khehar Justice J. Chelameswar Justice Madan B. Lokur Justice Kurian Joseph Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel Facts The 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014, introduced the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) to replace the collegium system for appointing Supreme Court and High Court judges. The NJAC comprised: The Chief Justice of India (CJI) as Chairperson. Two senior-most judges of the Supreme Court. The Union Minister of Law and Justice. Two eminent persons, nominated by a committee consisting of the Prime Minister, CJI, and the Leader of the Opposition. The NJAC Act, 2014, was passed to regulate the functions of the NJAC. The NJAC was challenged by Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association (SCAORA) and others, arguing that it violated judicial independence, a basic structure principle of the Constitution. Issues Whether the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014, and the NJAC Act, 2014, violated the basic structure doctrine by affecting judicial independence. Whether the collegium system should be retained or replaced with NJAC. Whether the inclusion of executive members (Law Minister and two eminent persons) in the NJAC compromised judicial independence. Whether judicial primacy in appointments should be maintained. Ratio Decidendi The Supreme Court held: NJAC is unconstitutional: The 99th Constitutional Amendment and NJAC Act were struck down as they violated the basic structure of the Constitution by undermining judicial independence. Judicial Primacy in Appointments: The Court ruled that appointments to the judiciary must remain independent of executive control. Collegium System Restored: Since the NJAC was struck down, the collegium system was reinstated. Role of the Executive is Limited: The Court held that allowing the executive a say in judicial appointments created a conflict of interest, as the government is a frequent litigant before the judiciary. Observations The independence of the judiciary is a basic structure principle and cannot be altered by constitutional amendments. The Law Minister’s presence in the NJAC would allow the executive to influence judicial appointments, violating the principle of separation of powers. While the collegium system has flaws, the solution lies in reforming it, not in increasing executive control. Judicial accountability is necessary, but judicial independence cannot be compromised to achieve it. Decision The 99th Constitutional Amendment and NJAC Act were declared unconstitutional. The collegium system was restored as the only valid mechanism for appointing judges. The Court recommended reforms to improve transparency in the collegium system. Important Terms Article 124 (Appointment of Supreme Court Judges) – Judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President in consultation with the CJI and senior judges. Article 217 (Appointment of High Court Judges) – High Court judges are appointed by the President after consultation with the CJI, the Governor, and the Chief Justice of the High Court. Article 222 (Transfer of High Court Judges) – The President can transfer a High Court judge to another High Court after consulting the CJI and the concerned Chief Justices. Collegium System – A system where judges recommend appointments and transfers, reducing executive interference. National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) – A body introduced by the 99th Constitutional Amendment to replace the collegium system, but later struck down as unconstitutional. Basic Structure Doctrine – A constitutional principle stating that certain fundamental aspects of the Constitution (such as judicial independence) cannot be altered by amendments. Judicial Independence – The principle that the judiciary should function free from executive or legislative influence. Judicial Primacy – The concept that the judiciary must have the final say in its own appointments, rather than the executive or legislature. Judicial Review – The power of courts to review and strike down laws or government actions that violate the Constitution.

Bench A 5-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: Justice Dipak Misra Justice A.M. Khanwilkar Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud Justice Ashok Bhushan Justice S. Abdul Nazeer Facts The case was filed by Shanti Bhushan, a senior advocate and former Law Minister, challenging the absolute discretionary power of the Chief Justice of India (CJI) as the “Master of the Roster” in the allocation of cases. Bhushan argued that the power to allocate cases should be exercised collectively by a collegium of judges, rather than being the exclusive prerogative of the CJI. The petition stemmed from concerns over alleged arbitrary allocation of cases and the lack of transparency in the Supreme Court’s internal functioning. The case was filed after a letter written by four senior Supreme Court judges (Justices J. Chelameswar, Ranjan Gogoi, Madan B. Lokur, and Kurian Joseph) became public, raising concerns over the CJI’s case allocation powers. Issues Whether the Chief Justice of India is the sole authority for the allocation of cases as the “Master of the Roster”. Whether the power to allocate cases should be exercised collegially rather than solely by the CJI. Whether the principles of transparency and accountability require a change in the existing system. Ratio Decidendi The Supreme Court upheld that the CJI, as the head of the institution, has the exclusive authority to allocate cases and constitute benches. The Court ruled that the CJI is an institution in himself, and his discretion in bench formation is essential for judicial discipline and smooth functioning. The Court rejected the argument for a collegium-based approach, stating that vesting this power in a collective body would create administrative difficulties and delays. The Court clarified that the CJI’s role as “Master of the Roster” is derived from the Supreme Court Rules and past precedents. Observations The Supreme Court noted that the power to allocate cases must be exercised judiciously and in a fair manner, ensuring that no impression of bias or favoritism arises. It reaffirmed that the CJI is the first among equals and is entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring the efficient functioning of the Supreme Court. While maintaining the status quo, the Court acknowledged the need for greater transparency in the Supreme Court’s internal functioning. Decision The Supreme Court dismissed Shanti Bhushan’s petition, ruling that the CJI alone has the authority to allocate cases and constitute benches. The Court held that the existing system does not violate constitutional principles, and the CJI’s powers as “Master of the Roster” are necessary for the proper administration of justice. Important Terms Master of the Roster – A term used to describe the CJI’s exclusive authority to allocate cases and constitute benches in the Supreme Court. Judicial Independence – The principle that the judiciary must function without external interference, including interference in internal court administration. Collegium System – A system in which senior judges collectively decide on judicial appointments; Bhushan proposed a similar approach for case allocation. Separation of Powers – The doctrine ensuring distinct roles for the executive, legislature, and judiciary; Bhushan argued that the CJI’s unchecked power violated this principle. Judicial Transparency – The idea that court processes, including case allocation, should be open and accountable to the public and legal community.

This case is also known as the Fourth Judges Case, as it dealt with the constitutional validity of the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014, and the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, 2014, which sought to replace the collegium system of judicial appointments with the NJAC. Bench A 5-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: Justice J.S. Khehar Justice J. Chelameswar Justice Madan B. Lokur Justice Kurian Joseph Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel Facts The 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014, was enacted to replace the collegium system with a National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) for the appointment and transfer of judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts. The NJAC consisted of six members: The Chief Justice of India (CJI) as Chairperson. Two senior-most judges of the Supreme Court. The Union Minister of Law and Justice. Two eminent persons, nominated by a committee comprising the Prime Minister, CJI, and the Leader of the Opposition. The NJAC sought to give the executive a greater role in judicial appointments and increase transparency. Several petitions were filed by Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association (SCAORA) and others, challenging the constitutional validity of the NJAC, arguing that it violated the independence of the judiciary, which is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Issues Whether the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014, and the NJAC Act, 2014, violated the basic structure doctrine by affecting the independence of the judiciary. Whether the collegium system should be retained or replaced with an alternative system of judicial appointments. Whether the inclusion of the Union Law Minister and two eminent persons in the NJAC diluted judicial primacy in appointments. Whether the role of the executive in judicial appointments created a conflict of interest, as the government itself is a litigant in most cases before the courts. Ratio Decidendi The Supreme Court held: NJAC Unconstitutional: The Court struck down the 99th Constitutional Amendment and NJAC Act as unconstitutional, holding that they violated the basic structure doctrine by undermining the independence of the judiciary. Primacy of Judiciary in Appointments: The Court reaffirmed that judicial appointments must remain independent of executive influence. The collegium system was reinstated, ensuring that the judiciary retained control over its own composition. Executive’s Role Limited: The Court held that giving the executive a say in judicial appointments created a conflict of interest, as the government itself is a frequent litigant before the judiciary. Judicial Review of Appointment Process: The appointment and transfer of judges remain subject to judicial review to ensure fairness and transparency. Transparency in the Collegium System: The Court acknowledged concerns about lack of transparency in the collegium system and called for reforms to improve its functioning. Observations The independence of the judiciary is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be altered by constitutional amendments. The presence of the Union Law Minister and two eminent persons in NJAC would allow the executive to veto judicial appointments, which violates the principle of judicial primacy. The Court emphasized that while judicial accountability is important, it cannot come at the cost of judicial independence. The collegium system is not perfect, but the solution is reform, not executive interference. Decision The 99th Constitutional Amendment and NJAC Act were declared unconstitutional. The collegium system was restored. The Court recommended reforms to improve transparency and accountability in the collegium system. Important Terms Article 124 (Appointment of Supreme Court Judges) – Judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President in consultation with the CJI and senior judges. Article 217 (Appointment of High Court Judges) – High Court judges are appointed by the President after consultation with the CJI, the Governor, and the Chief Justice of the High Court. Article 222 (Transfer of High Court Judges) – The President can transfer a High Court judge to another High Court after consulting the CJI and the concerned Chief Justices. Collegium System – A system where judges recommend appointments and transfers, reducing executive interference. National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) – A body introduced by the 99th Constitutional Amendment to replace the collegium system, but later struck down as unconstitutional. Basic Structure Doctrine – A constitutional principle stating that certain fundamental aspects of the Constitution (such as judicial independence) cannot be altered by amendments. Judicial Independence – The principle that the judiciary should function free from executive or legislative influence. Judicial Primacy – The concept that the judiciary must have the final say in its own appointments, rather than the executive or legislature. Judicial Review – The power of courts to review and strike down laws or government actions that violate the Constitution.

This case is also known as the Third Judges Case, as it clarified the principles laid down in the Second Judges Case (1993) regarding the collegium system for judicial appointments. Bench A 9-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: Justice S.P. Bharucha Justice M.K. Mukherjee Justice S.B. Majmudar Justice Sujata V. Manohar Justice G.T. Nanavati Justice S. Saghir Ahmad Justice K. Venkataswami Justice B.N. Kirpal Justice G.B. Pattanaik Facts The case originated from a Presidential Reference under Article 143(1) of the Constitution, which allows the President of India to seek the opinion of the Supreme Court on important legal issues. The President of India, K.R. Narayanan, referred nine specific questions to the Supreme Court for clarification regarding the interpretation of Articles 124, 217, and 222 of the Constitution, which govern the appointment and transfer of judges. The reference was made due to doubts and confusion arising from the judgment in the Second Judges Case (1993), which had introduced the collegium system for judicial appointments. The nine questions referred by the President were: Whether the expression “consultation with the Chief Justice of India” in Articles 217(1) and 222(1) requires consultation with a plurality of judges in forming the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, or whether the sole individual opinion of the Chief Justice of India constitutes consultation. Whether the transfer of judges is judicially reviewable, considering the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling that such transfers are not justiciable on any ground except for limited judicial review. Whether Article 124(2) (which deals with Supreme Court appointments) requires the Chief Justice of India to consult only the two senior-most judges or whether there should be wider consultation according to past practice. Whether the Chief Justice of India can act alone, without consulting other judges, while considering materials and information from the Government of India regarding the non-appointment of a judge recommended for appointment. Whether the Chief Justice of India’s consultation with judges should be limited only to those who belong to the concerned High Court or should also include those transferred from other High Courts. Whether in cases where senior High Court judges are overlooked for elevation to the Supreme Court, the reasons for such departure from seniority must be recorded in respect of each such judge. Whether the Government of India is entitled to demand written opinions of the judges consulted and whether such written opinions should be transmitted to the Government along with the Chief Justice of India’s recommendation. Whether the Chief Justice of India is obligated to follow the norms and consultation process before making a recommendation. Whether any recommendations made by the Chief Justice of India without following the prescribed norms and consultation process are binding on the Government of India. Issues Whether the collegium system required consultation with a larger group of judges rather than just the Chief Justice of India and two senior-most judges. Whether judicial review is applicable in cases of transfer of High Court judges. Whether the executive can override a recommendation made by the Chief Justice of India. Whether written opinions of consulted judges must be shared with the Government. Whether departures from seniority in appointments must be recorded with reasons. Ratio Decidendi The Supreme Court gave its opinion on the nine questions as follows: Plurality in Consultation: The Court held that consultation must be with a collegium of judges, not just the Chief Justice of India alone. The collegium for Supreme Court appointments must consist of the CJI and four senior-most judges, while for High Court appointments, it must include the CJI and two senior-most judges. Judicial Review of Transfers: The transfer of High Court judges is subject to limited judicial review. The recommendation must be made by the Chief Justice of India in consultation with four senior-most judges, and the views of the concerned High Court Chief Justice must be obtained. Scope of Consultation: The Chief Justice of India must consult judges familiar with the affairs of the High Court concerned, including those who have previously served in that High Court. Recording of Reasons for Departure from Seniority: If a senior High Court judge is overlooked for elevation, there must be strong, cogent reasons, and these must be recorded. Written Opinions: The government is entitled to receive written opinions of the judges consulted, and these must be transmitted to the Government along with the CJI’s recommendation. Binding Nature of Recommendations: If the CJI makes a recommendation following the prescribed norms, the government must act upon it. If the government returns a recommendation, but the collegium reiterates its recommendation, then the government is bound to accept it. Observations The Supreme Court reaffirmed that judicial independence is a part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution and that the executive must not have the final say in judicial appointments. The collegium system was expanded to ensure greater transparency and collective decision-making. The ruling further limited the executive’s role in judicial appointments, strengthening the judiciary’s control over its own composition. The Court emphasized that the collegium must function collectively and that no single individual, including the Chief Justice of India, could have absolute authority. Decision The collegium system was upheld and expanded to include a larger group of judges in the decision-making process. Transfers of High Court judges were held to be judicially reviewable but only to a limited extent. The CJI’s recommendation became binding on the government once it was reiterated by the collegium. The government was required to accept judicial appointments if the collegium reiterated its recommendation. Important Terms Article 124(2) (Appointment of Supreme Court Judges) – Judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President in consultation with the Chief Justice of India and senior judges. Article 217(1) (Appointment of High Court Judges) – High Court judges are appointed by the President after consultation with the CJI, the Governor, and the Chief Justice of the High Court. Article 222 (Transfer of High Court Judges) – The President can transfer a High Court judge to another High Court after consulting

This case is also known as the Second Judges Case, as it reviewed and overruled the decision in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981), leading to the establishment of the collegium system for judicial appointments. Bench A 9-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah Justice A.M. Ahmadi Justice K. Jayachandra Reddy Justice S. Ratnavel Pandian Justice P.B. Sawant Justice Kuldip Singh Justice J.S. Verma Justice Yogeshwar Dayal Justice G.N. Ray Facts The case arose from concerns over executive dominance in judicial appointments and transfers, particularly after the ruling in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981), which had upheld the primacy of the executive. The petition was filed by the SC Advocates-on-Record Association, challenging the executive’s role in judicial appointments and transfers and seeking a reconsideration of the 1981 ruling. The petitioners argued that judicial independence was being undermined by the executive’s power to reject or delay judicial appointments. The case centered on the interpretation of the word “consultation” in Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution, which govern the appointment of Supreme Court and High Court judges. The primary question was whether the President (executive) had the final say in judicial appointments, or if the opinion of the Chief Justice of India (CJI) should be binding. Issues Whether the CJI’s opinion in judicial appointments was binding on the President, or if the executive had the final authority. Whether the process of judicial transfers under Article 222 required the consent of the concerned judge. Whether the 1981 judgment in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India was correctly decided. Whether the system of judicial appointments ensured judicial independence, a fundamental feature of the Constitution. Ratio Decidendi The Supreme Court laid down the following key legal principles: Primacy of the Judiciary in Appointments: The Court overruled S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) and held that in judicial appointments, the Chief Justice of India’s opinion must be given primacy. Collegium System Introduced: The Court established the collegium system, stating that judicial appointments must be made through a collective decision of the CJI and senior judges of the Supreme Court, rather than the executive alone. Meaning of “Consultation”: The word “consultation” in Articles 124 and 217 was interpreted to mean that the executive must act in concurrence with the judiciary. If the executive rejected a recommendation, it had to provide strong reasons, and the judiciary could reconsider the issue. Judicial Transfers: The Court ruled that transfers of High Court judges could be made without their consent, but they had to be done in public interest and not as a punishment. Observations The Court emphasized that judicial independence is a basic structure of the Constitution and must be protected from executive interference. The ruling significantly weakened the executive’s role in judicial appointments, ensuring that the judiciary retained control over its own composition. The judgment laid the foundation for subsequent clarifications on the collegium system in the Third Judges Case (1998). Decision The executive was stripped of its primacy in judicial appointments, and the judiciary was given a decisive role. The collegium system was established, requiring consultation among the CJI and senior judges before recommending judicial appointments. The executive retained the power to send back recommendations for reconsideration, but it could not override the judiciary’s decision. The transfer of judges without their consent was upheld, but safeguards were put in place to prevent misuse. Important Terms Article 124 (Appointment of Supreme Court Judges) – The President appoints Supreme Court judges in consultation with the CJI and other senior judges. Article 217 (Appointment of High Court Judges) – High Court judges are appointed by the President after consultation with the CJI, the Governor of the State, and the Chief Justice of the High Court. Article 222 (Transfer of High Court Judges) – The President can transfer a High Court judge after consulting the CJI. Collegium System – A mechanism where judges themselves recommend judicial appointments and transfers, reducing executive interference. Judicial Independence – The concept that the judiciary should function without external influence, especially from the executive or legislature. Basic Structure Doctrine – A constitutional principle stating that certain fundamental aspects of the Constitution (such as judicial independence) cannot be altered by amendments. Consultation vs. Concurrence – The Court clarified that “consultation” with the judiciary in appointments means that the executive cannot override the judiciary’s opinion without strong, recorded reasons. Significance of the Case This case established the collegium system, which remains the framework for judicial appointments in India. It strengthened the judiciary’s independence, ensuring that executive interference was minimized. The judgment was further clarified in In re Special Reference No. 1 of 1998 (Third Judges Case), which expanded the collegium to include the CJI and four senior-most judges. The collegium system has been criticized for lack of transparency, but it remains in place despite attempts to replace it, such as the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC), which was struck down in 2015.

This case is also known as the First Judges Case, as it was the first major ruling concerning judicial appointments and transfers in India. Bench A 7-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: Justice P.N. Bhagwati Justice A.C. Gupta Justice S. Murtaza Fazal Ali Justice V.D. Tulzapurkar Justice D.A. Desai Justice R.S. Pathak Justice E.S. Venkataramiah Facts The case arose from concerns regarding executive control over judicial appointments and transfers and its potential impact on judicial independence. The main controversy involved the appointment, extension, and transfer of judges in High Courts, which was perceived as an interference by the executive. Several writ petitions were filed, challenging: The non-confirmation of certain Additional Judges of the High Courts despite favorable recommendations from the Chief Justices of the respective High Courts. The short-term extensions given to some Additional Judges instead of confirming them as permanent judges. The transfer of High Court judges without their consent. A circular issued by the Union Law Minister, directing Chief Ministers and Chief Justices of High Courts to obtain prior written consent from judges before recommending their appointments with a possibility of transfer to another High Court. The petitioners, including S.P. Gupta, argued that these actions violated the independence of the judiciary by allowing excessive executive influence over the appointment and tenure of judges. The case also raised a significant question regarding whether Public Interest Litigation (PIL) could be entertained in matters related to judicial appointments and transfers, as the petitions were filed by lawyers rather than by the affected judges themselves. Issues Whether the President (executive) had the final authority in judicial appointments, or if the opinion of the Chief Justice of India (CJI) was binding on the executive. Whether transferring judges between High Courts without their consent violated the independence of the judiciary under Article 222 of the Constitution. Whether the circular issued by the Law Minister, requiring prior consent of judges before recommending appointments, was unconstitutional. Whether public interest litigation (PIL) could be entertained on matters concerning judicial appointments and transfers. Ratio Decidendi The Supreme Court ruled on several key principles: Primacy of the Executive in Judicial Appointments: The Court held that the President (executive) is not bound by the opinion of the Chief Justice of India (CJI) in appointing High Court and Supreme Court judges. While the CJI’s opinion must be given due consideration, it does not have binding primacy over the executive’s decision. This meant that the executive had greater control over judicial appointments than the judiciary itself. Transfers of Judges: The Court ruled that judges can be transferred without their consent under Article 222, provided the transfer is done in public interest and not as a form of punishment or executive pressure. This meant that while the consent of judges was not mandatory, the executive must justify transfers with valid reasons. Law Minister’s Circular: The Court struck down the circular requiring prior consent from judges, stating that it interfered with judicial independence. It held that such a requirement could create uncertainty and insecurity among judges, affecting their impartiality. Expansion of Public Interest Litigation (PIL): The Supreme Court allowed public interest litigation (PIL) in matters concerning judicial independence. It ruled that lawyers and concerned individuals could file petitions to challenge executive overreach in judicial appointments. This decision played a crucial role in expanding PIL and strengthening judicial accountability. Observations Justice P.N. Bhagwati, in the majority opinion, emphasized that judicial independence is a fundamental pillar of democracy. However, by upholding the executive’s primacy in appointments, the Court weakened the judiciary’s autonomy, making it susceptible to political influence. The judgment highlighted the need for transparency in judicial appointments to prevent favoritism or political interference. Although the Court allowed transfers without consent, it cautioned against misuse, stating that transfers must be made in good faith and public interest. The ruling led to concerns that the government could use appointments and transfers to control the judiciary. This decision was later overruled in the Second and Third Judges Cases (1993 and 1998), which established the collegium system, giving judges greater control over judicial appointments and transfers. Decision The executive’s primacy in judicial appointments and transfers was upheld, meaning that the President and the government had the final authority in judicial appointments. The Law Minister’s circular was declared unconstitutional, as it interfered with the independence of the judiciary. Public Interest Litigation (PIL) was allowed in matters of judicial independence, enabling courts to entertain petitions filed by lawyers and public-spirited individuals on matters affecting judicial appointments. Important Terms Article 124 & 217 (Appointment of Judges): Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts are appointed by the President, in consultation with the Chief Justice of India and other judges. Article 222 (Transfer of High Court Judges): The President can transfer a High Court judge to another High Court after consulting the Chief Justice of India. The judge’s consent is not required, but the transfer must not be arbitrary or punitive. Judicial Independence: The principle that the judiciary must remain free from executive or legislative interference to uphold the rule of law and separation of powers. Collegium System: A system introduced later (in the Second and Third Judges Cases, 1993 and 1998) that reversed the ruling in S.P. Gupta and established a system where judges themselves recommend judicial appointments and transfers. Public Interest Litigation (PIL): A legal mechanism that allows individuals, lawyers, or organizations to file cases in court on behalf of the public, without requiring a direct personal interest in the matter. Doctrine of Separation of Powers: The Constitution divides powers among the legislature, executive, and judiciary, ensuring that no branch can overreach its authority. This case questioned whether the executive’s influence over judicial appointments violated this principle. Significance of the Case S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) significantly impacted judicial independence, as it weakened the judiciary’s control over its own appointments and allowed the executive greater influence. The ruling led to fears that political considerations could dominate judicial appointments, undermining the separation of powers. This decision was

Bench A 7-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: T.S. Thakur, C.J. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. Madan B. Lokur, J. S.A. Bobde, J. A.K. Goel, J. U.U. Lalit, J. L. Nageswara Rao, J. Facts The case involved a series of ordinances issued by the Government of Bihar regarding the takeover of 429 Sanskrit schools and transferring their teachers and staff to the State Government. The first ordinance was promulgated in 1989, followed by five successive ordinances. Each ordinance lapsed after six weeks from the reassembly of the legislature, but the government kept issuing new ordinances instead of passing a law. The last ordinance lapsed in 1992, leaving the status of teachers and employees uncertain. The teachers challenged this action in the High Court, claiming that their services as government employees should be regularized even after the ordinance expired. The High Court ruled that the re-promulgation of ordinances was unconstitutional and that the employees had no legal right to claim government jobs. Issues Can the Governor repeatedly re-promulgate ordinances without placing them before the legislature? Do rights and obligations created by an ordinance continue even after it lapses? Was the Bihar Government’s practice of re-promulgating ordinances a violation of the Constitution? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Re-promulgation of ordinances is unconstitutional: The Supreme Court held that ordinances cannot be used as a substitute for legislation. Successive re-promulgation without legislative approval is a fraud on the Constitution. Temporary nature of ordinances: An ordinance has the same effect as a law, but it must be approved by the legislature within six weeks of reassembly. If it is not approved, it ceases to operate. No enduring rights from an ordinance: The Court ruled that ordinances do not create permanent rights or obligations. Once an ordinance lapses, any benefits derived from it also lapse, unless protected by a law passed by the legislature. Observations Ordinances should be an exception, not a rule: The ordinance-making power is not meant to be a substitute for legislative law-making. It is intended for emergency situations. Judicial Review of Ordinances: The Governor’s satisfaction in issuing an ordinance is subject to judicial review. Courts can examine whether the ordinance was issued to bypass legislative authority. Legislature’s Role: The legislature must have the opportunity to discuss and approve laws. Re-promulgation without legislative approval undermines democracy. Decision The Supreme Court held that the repeated re-promulgation of ordinances by the Bihar Government was unconstitutional. The ordinances ceased to operate after six weeks, and no permanent rights were created for the employees. The petitioners (teachers and staff) were entitled to salaries only until the last ordinance expired in 1992, but they had no right to be treated as permanent government employees. The practice of re-promulgating ordinances was declared a “fraud on the Constitution” and must not be continued in the future. Important Terms 1. Article 213 (Governor’s Ordinance-Making Power) Allows the Governor to issue ordinances when the legislature is not in session. An ordinance has the same force as a law but must be approved within six weeks of reassembly. If not approved, the ordinance ceases to operate. 2. Re-Promulgation of Ordinances The repeated issuance of ordinances without legislative approval is called re-promulgation. The Court held that re-promulgation is unconstitutional and cannot be used to bypass the legislature. 3. Doctrine of Separation of Powers The Constitution divides powers among the legislature, executive, and judiciary. Legislation is the function of the legislature, and the executive (Governor) cannot take over this role through ordinances. 4. Judicial Review of Ordinances The Governor’s decision to issue an ordinance can be challenged in court. The Court can strike down ordinances that violate constitutional principles. 5. Fraud on the Constitution The Court declared that re-promulgation of ordinances without legislative approval is a fraud on the Constitution. It violates democratic principles and legislative supremacy.

Bench A 5-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court: P.N. Bhagwati, C.J. Ranganath Misra, J. G.L. Oza, J. M.M. Dutt, J. K.N. Singh, J. Facts Dr. D.C. Wadhwa, a professor and researcher, conducted a detailed study on the use of ordinances in Bihar and found that the State Government had been repromulgating ordinances repeatedly without converting them into laws. The Governor of Bihar had issued 256 ordinances between 1967 and 1981, many of which were repromulgated multiple times for periods ranging from one to 14 years. This practice allowed the executive to bypass the legislature, as ordinances were meant for temporary emergency situations when the legislature was not in session. Dr. Wadhwa filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, arguing that repeated repromulgation of ordinances was a fraud on the Constitution and violated the rule of law. Issues Can the Governor repromulgate ordinances repeatedly without presenting them to the legislature? Does such repromulgation violate the constitutional scheme of separation of powers and the rule of law? Can the executive use the ordinance-making power to bypass the legislative process? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Ordinances are not a substitute for legislation: The Court held that Article 213 (Governor’s ordinance-making power) is meant for emergencies, and ordinances must be replaced by proper legislation. Repromulgation is unconstitutional: The practice of repromulgating ordinances without placing them before the legislature is a fraud on the Constitution. Legislature’s supremacy must be upheld: The executive cannot bypass the legislature by continuously repromulgating ordinances. Ordinances have a limited life: An ordinance must cease to operate after six weeks from the reassembly of the legislature, as per Article 213(2). Observations The Governor’s power to promulgate ordinances is an emergency power and should not be misused to avoid legislative scrutiny. The rule of law and democratic governance require that laws be made by elected representatives, not through executive action. The State of Bihar had created an “ordinance raj”, where governance was being conducted through repeated ordinances instead of laws passed by the legislature. Decision The Supreme Court struck down the practice of repromulgating ordinances as unconstitutional. The Court held that the Governor does not have the power to repeatedly repromulgate ordinances without placing them before the legislature. Ordinances that were repeatedly repromulgated without legislative approval were declared void. Important Terms 1. Article 213 (Governor’s Ordinance-Making Power) Allows the Governor to issue ordinances when the State Legislature is not in session. The ordinance must be laid before the legislature and ceases to be effective after six weeks unless approved. 2. Fraud on the Constitution The Supreme Court ruled that repeatedly repromulgating ordinances to bypass the legislature amounts to a fraud on the Constitution. 3. Rule of Law The principle that all actions of the government must be based on laws enacted by the legislature. The executive cannot govern through ordinances instead of proper laws. 4. Separation of Powers The legislature makes laws, the executive implements them, and the judiciary interprets them. The Bihar Government violated this principle by using ordinances instead of passing laws.

Bench A 5-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: Y.K. Sabharwal, C.J. K.G. Balakrishnan, J. C.K. Thakker, J. R.V. Raveendran, J. D.K. Jain, J. Facts A sting operation conducted by a private news channel in 2005 exposed Members of Parliament (MPs) accepting bribes in exchange for asking questions in Parliament. The scandal involved 10 MPs from the Lok Sabha and 1 MP from the Rajya Sabha. The Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha set up inquiry committees to investigate the conduct of the MPs. The committees found the MPs guilty of misconduct, and they were expelled from their respective Houses. Raja Ram Pal, one of the expelled MPs, along with other expelled members, challenged the decision before the Supreme Court, arguing that: The Parliament had no power to expel its members in such circumstances. The expulsion violated their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19, and 21. The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over the internal matters of Parliament. Issues Does the Parliament have the power to expel its members for unethical or corrupt conduct? Are the actions of the Parliament regarding expulsion subject to judicial review? Does the expulsion violate the fundamental rights of the expelled MPs under Articles 14, 19, or 21? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Parliament has the power to expel its members under Article 105(3) of the Constitution. The power of expulsion is a part of the privileges of Parliament, which are derived from the privileges enjoyed by the British House of Commons at the time of the commencement of the Indian Constitution. Judicial Review of Parliamentary Privileges: While Parliament has the power to expel its members, this power is not beyond judicial review. The Supreme Court held that the courts can interfere if the action of Parliament is unconstitutional, arbitrary, or violates fundamental rights. No violation of fundamental rights: The Court held that the expulsion of the MPs did not violate their rights under Articles 14, 19, or 21, as the action was taken in the larger interest of parliamentary integrity. Observations Parliamentary privileges are subject to judicial review when fundamental rights or constitutional provisions are violated. Parliamentary democracy requires the integrity of its members, and Parliament has the right to expel members whose conduct undermines the dignity of the House. The concept of separation of powers does not mean absolute immunity for Parliament. While courts generally do not interfere in internal parliamentary proceedings, they can intervene when fundamental rights are at stake. Decision The Supreme Court upheld the expulsion of the MPs, stating that Parliament has the right to expel members who act against the dignity of the institution. However, it also ruled that judicial review applies to parliamentary privileges, meaning that courts can examine whether Parliament acted in accordance with constitutional principles. The petitioners’ challenge was dismissed, and the decision to expel the MPs remained valid. Important Terms 1. Article 105 (Powers and Privileges of Parliament) Article 105 grants Parliament and its members certain privileges similar to those of the British House of Commons. These privileges include freedom of speech in Parliament and the power to regulate internal proceedings. The Supreme Court ruled that this includes the power to expel members for misconduct. 2. Parliamentary Privileges Parliamentary privileges are special rights and immunities granted to members of Parliament to ensure they can perform their duties without interference. However, these privileges are not absolute and are subject to constitutional limitations. 3. Judicial Review Judicial review is the power of the courts to examine the actions of Parliament and the government to ensure they comply with the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that while courts cannot interfere in parliamentary procedures, they can review actions that violate fundamental rights or constitutional provisions. 4. Fundamental Rights (Articles 14, 19, and 21) Article 14 (Right to Equality): The expelled MPs argued that their expulsion was arbitrary and violated Article 14. The Court ruled that the expulsion was based on clear evidence of misconduct and was not arbitrary. Article 19 (Freedom of Speech): The MPs claimed that their right to free speech was violated. The Court ruled that parliamentary privileges can override Article 19 in certain cases. Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty): The MPs argued that expulsion affected their ability to earn a livelihood. The Court held that Article 21 does not guarantee a right to hold a parliamentary seat.

Bench A 5-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court: B.N. Kirpal, C.J. V.N. Khare, J. K.G. Balakrishnan, J. Ashok Bhan, J. Arijit Pasayat, J. Facts The Gujarat Legislative Assembly was constituted in March 1998, and its five-year term was set to expire on March 18, 2003. On July 19, 2002, the Governor of Gujarat dissolved the Legislative Assembly on the advice of the Chief Minister. The last sitting of the dissolved Legislative Assembly was held on April 3, 2002. The Election Commission of India (ECI) initiated steps for holding fresh elections. However, in an order dated August 16, 2002, the ECI stated that it was not in a position to conduct elections before October 3, 2002, which was the last date within six months of the last sitting of the dissolved Assembly as per Article 174(1) of the Constitution. Given the uncertainty, the President of India referred three legal questions to the Supreme Court under Article 143(1) on August 19, 2002, seeking clarity on the relationship between Article 174(1) and the powers of the Election Commission under Article 324. Issues Is Article 174(1) subject to the Election Commission’s decision under Article 324 regarding the schedule of elections for the Assembly? Can the Election Commission set an election schedule that would violate the six-month mandate under Article 174(1), relying on Article 356 (President’s Rule) as a remedy? Is the Election Commission bound to comply with Article 174(1) by conducting elections within six months of the last sitting of the dissolved Assembly? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Article 174(1) does not apply to a dissolved Assembly. It only applies to an existing and functional Legislative Assembly and regulates the interval between its sessions. The Election Commission has exclusive authority under Article 324 to decide the schedule and timing of elections for a new Assembly. The ECI’s decision to delay elections does not mean that Article 356 (President’s Rule) must automatically apply. The imposition of President’s Rule is a separate constitutional process. No fixed period is prescribed in the Constitution for holding elections after the premature dissolution of a Legislative Assembly. However, elections should generally be held within a reasonable time. Observations Article 174(1) and Article 324 operate in separate fields. While Article 174(1) ensures that a functional Assembly meets regularly, Article 324 gives the Election Commission the responsibility of conducting free and fair elections. The absence of a fixed timeline for elections after premature dissolution does not imply indefinite delay. The Election Commission is expected to conduct elections as soon as possible, using all available resources. The imposition of Article 356 (President’s Rule) cannot be used as a substitute for holding elections in a timely manner. Decision The Supreme Court clarified that Article 174(1) does not impose a deadline for conducting fresh elections after dissolution. The Election Commission has full authority to decide the election schedule under Article 324, without being subject to Article 174(1). The decision of the Election Commission to delay elections beyond six months was not unconstitutional. The Supreme Court urged the Election Commission to ensure elections are held within a reasonable time to maintain democratic governance. Important Terms 1. Article 143(1) (Advisory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court) This article allows the President of India to seek the Supreme Court’s opinion on constitutional matters of public importance. In this case, the President sought clarity on the relationship between Article 174(1) and the Election Commission’s powers under Article 324. 2. Article 174(1) (Sessions of State Legislature) Article 174(1) states that six months shall not intervene between the last sitting of one session and the first sitting of the next session of a Legislative Assembly. The Supreme Court held that this applies only to an existing Assembly, not to a dissolved one. 3. Article 324 (Powers of the Election Commission) Article 324 grants the Election Commission exclusive authority over the conduct of elections in India. The Supreme Court ruled that the Election Commission is not bound by Article 174(1) when scheduling elections for a dissolved Assembly. 4. Article 356 (President’s Rule) Article 356 allows the President to impose central rule in a state if its government cannot function in accordance with the Constitution. The Supreme Court clarified that President’s Rule is not an automatic remedy if elections are delayed beyond six months.