Bench A 2-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court: A.K. Patnaik, J. S.J. Mukhopadhaya, J. Facts The case was filed as a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) challenging the constitutional validity of Section 8(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. According to Section 8(4), a Member of Parliament (MP) or Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) convicted of an offense was not immediately disqualified if they filed an appeal within three months of the conviction. This meant that sitting MPs and MLAs could continue in office despite being convicted of criminal offenses. The petitioners, including Lily Thomas, argued that this provision was discriminatory because an ordinary citizen convicted of a similar offense would immediately be disqualified from contesting elections, but an elected representative was given extra protection. The petitioners claimed that Parliament had no authority to enact Section 8(4) because the Constitution does not differentiate between sitting MPs/MLAs and candidates contesting elections. They also argued that Article 102(1)(e) and Article 191(1)(e) provide for disqualification upon conviction, without any exception. Issues Is Section 8(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 unconstitutional? Can Parliament enact a law that allows convicted MPs and MLAs to continue in office while ordinary citizens face immediate disqualification? Does Section 8(4) violate the principle of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Parliament lacks the power to delay disqualification: The Supreme Court held that Articles 102(1)(e) and 191(1)(e) of the Constitution do not grant Parliament the power to delay the disqualification of convicted MPs and MLAs. Immediate disqualification upon conviction: The Court ruled that as soon as a sitting MP or MLA is convicted for an offense under Section 8(1), (2), or (3), they stand disqualified from holding office immediately. Section 8(4) is unconstitutional: The provision was declared ultra vires (beyond the powers) of the Constitution because it created an unjustifiable classification between elected representatives and ordinary citizens. Observations The Constitution does not distinguish between a person contesting elections and a person already elected when it comes to disqualification. Corrupt and criminal politicians should not be allowed to continue in office simply because they file an appeal. The Court noted that corruption and criminalization of politics undermine democracy, and allowing convicted politicians to remain in office harms the public trust in governance. The doctrine of separation of powers does not permit Parliament to override constitutional provisions on disqualification. Decision The Supreme Court struck down Section 8(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, declaring it unconstitutional. MPs and MLAs convicted of an offense under Section 8 of the Act are immediately disqualified, even if they file an appeal. The judgment ensures that lawmakers convicted of criminal offenses cannot continue in office under the protection of a legal loophole. Important Terms 1. Representation of the People Act, 1951 This Act lays down the qualifications and disqualifications for contesting elections and being a member of Parliament or State Legislatures. Section 8 deals with disqualification on conviction for certain offenses. 2. Section 8(4) of the Act (Now Struck Down) Earlier, MPs and MLAs convicted of an offense could continue in office if they filed an appeal within three months. This provision was declared unconstitutional in this case. 3. Article 102(1)(e) & Article 191(1)(e) (Disqualification of MPs and MLAs) These Articles state that a person shall be disqualified from being a Member of Parliament or State Legislature if they are disqualified under any law made by Parliament. The Court ruled that Parliament cannot create exceptions for sitting MPs/MLAs through laws like Section 8(4). 4. Article 14 (Right to Equality) The petitioners argued that ordinary citizens convicted of a crime face immediate disqualification from contesting elections, whereas MPs and MLAs were given special privileges. The Court ruled that this unequal treatment violated Article 14 and was unconstitutional. 5. Ultra Vires (Beyond the Power) The Court held that Section 8(4) was ultra vires the Constitution, meaning Parliament had no authority to enact such a provision.

Bench A 5-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court: S.P. Bharucha, C.J. G.B. Pattanaik, J. Y.K. Sabharwal, J. Ruma Pal, J. Brijesh Kumar, J. Facts J. Jayalalithaa, former Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, was convicted in two criminal cases related to corruption during her previous tenure (1991–1996). She was sentenced to three years of rigorous imprisonment in one case and two years of rigorous imprisonment in another. Due to her conviction, she was disqualified from contesting elections under Section 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. In April 2001, she filed nomination papers for four constituencies in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly elections. However, all four were rejected due to her disqualification. Despite this, her party, AIADMK, won a majority in the Assembly elections, and she was sworn in as Chief Minister on May 14, 2001. B.R. Kapur filed a petition in the Supreme Court challenging her appointment, arguing that a person who is disqualified from being a legislator cannot be appointed as Chief Minister. Issues Can a person disqualified from being an MLA under Section 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act be appointed as Chief Minister? Does the Governor have the power to appoint a disqualified person as Chief Minister? Can the court interfere in such an appointment through quo warranto proceedings? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) A person who is disqualified under Section 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act cannot be appointed as Chief Minister. Article 164(4) of the Constitution allows a non-legislator to be appointed as a Minister (including Chief Minister) for six months, but only if they are otherwise qualified to become a member of the Legislature. Since Jayalalithaa was disqualified from contesting elections, she could not be appointed as Chief Minister even under Article 164(4). The Governor’s discretion is subject to constitutional limitations; they cannot appoint a person who is constitutionally barred from holding office. The Supreme Court has the authority to issue a writ of quo warranto if a person holds a public office without legal authority. Observations The Constitution does not allow an individual to hold office as Chief Minister if they are disqualified from being a legislator. The appointment of a disqualified person violates constitutional principles and the rule of law. The Governor must ensure that any person appointed as Chief Minister is qualified under the Constitution. The court has the power to intervene when constitutional provisions are violated. Decision The Supreme Court ruled that Jayalalithaa’s appointment as Chief Minister on May 14, 2001, was unconstitutional. Her appointment was quashed, and she was removed from office. The acts performed by her government from May 14, 2001, to the date of judgment were held valid, to prevent administrative chaos. Important Terms 1. Article 164(4) (Appointment of Ministers) Allows a non-legislator to be appointed as a Minister (including Chief Minister) for six months. However, the Supreme Court ruled that this provision does not apply to disqualified persons. 2. Section 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 States that a person convicted of an offence and sentenced to imprisonment for two years or more is disqualified from contesting elections. Jayalalithaa’s disqualification under this section prevented her from being appointed as Chief Minister. 3. Writ of Quo Warranto A legal challenge questioning the authority of a person holding a public office. The Supreme Court ruled that Jayalalithaa’s appointment could be challenged through a writ of quo warranto. 4. Governor’s Discretion in Appointing the Chief Minister The Governor must appoint a person who is qualified under the Constitution. The Governor cannot appoint a person who is disqualified under the law.

Bench A 5-Judge Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court: Dipak Misra, C.J. Dr. A.K. Sikri, J. A.M. Khanwilkar, J. Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. Ashok Bhushan, J. Facts The case concerned the division of powers between the Government of the National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi and the Union Government. The issue arose from conflicts between the Delhi Government (led by the Chief Minister) and the Lieutenant Governor (LG), particularly regarding administrative control over various departments. The 69th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1991, inserted Article 239AA, which granted Delhi a Legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers, while retaining its status as a Union Territory. Despite this, several disputes emerged over whether the LG was bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers or if he had discretionary powers similar to that of a Governor. The Delhi High Court ruled in 2016 that the LG had supremacy in administrative matters. The Delhi Government appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that this ruling undermined Delhi’s democratic governance. Issues What is the status of the NCT of Delhi under the Constitution of India? Does the Lieutenant Governor have independent decision-making powers, or is he bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers? What are the limits of the Delhi Government’s legislative and executive powers under Article 239AA? Does the Union Government have overriding authority over the elected government of Delhi? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Delhi is not a full-fledged state but has a unique status as a Union Territory with an elected government under Article 239AA. The Lieutenant Governor must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except in matters explicitly reserved for the Union Government. The Lieutenant Governor does not have independent decision-making powers and cannot refer every matter to the President under Article 239AA(4). The Delhi Legislative Assembly has the power to make laws on all subjects in the State List and Concurrent List, except on matters related to land, police, and public order. Observations The Constitution intends for Delhi to have a democratic and representative government. The Lieutenant Governor is an administrator, not a Governor. Excessive interference by the LG undermines the principles of federalism and democracy. The Council of Ministers, led by the Chief Minister, is responsible for day-to-day governance. The Union Government retains authority in specific matters but should not override the elected government unnecessarily. Decision The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Delhi Government, holding that: The LG is bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers except in matters beyond the legislative competence of the Delhi Assembly. The LG cannot act independently and must not obstruct the Delhi Government’s decisions unnecessarily. The Delhi Government has the power to make laws and execute policies on subjects under its jurisdiction. However, matters related to land, police, and public order remain under the exclusive control of the Union Government. Important Terms 1. Article 239AA (Special Status of Delhi) Grants Delhi a Legislative Assembly with elected representatives. Specifies that the Lieutenant Governor must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers except in certain cases. 2. Article 239AA(4) (Lieutenant Governor’s Role) Allows the Lieutenant Governor to refer matters to the President if there is a dispute. The Supreme Court ruled that this should be used sparingly and not as a means to override the elected government. 3. 69th Constitutional Amendment (1991) Introduced Article 239AA, granting Delhi partial statehood while keeping it a Union Territory. Established the Delhi Legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers. 4. Executive Powers of Delhi Government The Delhi Government has executive power over subjects in the State List and Concurrent List, except for land, police, and public order. The LG cannot interfere in routine governance matters unless required by law. 5. Federalism India follows a quasi-federal system, meaning that some powers are shared between the Union and States. The Court ruled that Delhi’s special status must be respected, and excessive central control is unconstitutional.

Bench A 5-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court: N. Santosh Hegde, J. S.N. Variava, J. B.P. Singh, J. H.K. Sema, J. S.B. Sinha, J. Facts The case involved two former ministers of Madhya Pradesh, Rajendra Kumar Singh and Bisahu Ram Yadav. A complaint was filed with the Lokayukta alleging that the two ministers illegally released 7.5 acres of land back to its previous owners, despite the land being acquired by the Indore Development Authority. After an investigation, the Lokayukta submitted a report, stating that there was sufficient evidence to prosecute the two ministers under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and for criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B of the IPC. By the time the Lokayukta submitted its report, both ministers had already resigned. The Council of Ministers refused to grant sanction for prosecution, stating that there was no prima facie case against them. The Governor of Madhya Pradesh, after reviewing the evidence, disagreed with the Council of Ministers and granted sanction for prosecution under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The ministers challenged the Governor’s decision in the High Court, which ruled that the Governor could not grant sanction without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Issues Can the Governor grant sanction for the prosecution of ministers under the Prevention of Corruption Act without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers? Is the Governor bound to follow the Council of Ministers’ decision on granting sanction for prosecution? Does the doctrine of necessity allow the Governor to act independently when the Council of Ministers is biased? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Governor’s Discretion in Granting Sanction: The Supreme Court held that although the Governor generally acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, there are exceptions where the Governor can act independently. Doctrine of Bias and Necessity: If the Council of Ministers is biased (i.e., if the accused ministers are part of the government), the Governor can act independently to ensure fair decision-making. Rule of Law and Accountability: The Court emphasized that if ministers could avoid prosecution by refusing to grant sanction, it would lead to a breakdown of the rule of law and democracy. Observations The Governor, as a constitutional head, usually acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers. However, when the entire Council of Ministers is biased, such as in cases involving corruption charges against sitting or former ministers, the Governor can act independently. The High Court wrongly held that the Governor had no discretionary power; the Supreme Court overruled this and upheld the Governor’s power to grant sanction for prosecution in such cases. Decision The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, ruling that the Governor was justified in granting sanction for prosecution. The decision of the High Court was set aside, and the prosecution of the ministers was allowed to proceed. The Court directed that the case be expedited, given its long-standing nature. Important Terms 1. Article 163 (Governor’s Discretionary Power) This article states that the Governor must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except in cases where discretion is explicitly provided by the Constitution. The Court ruled that in cases of bias, the Governor can act independently under the doctrine of necessity. 2. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 Section 13(1)(d) and Section 13(2) deal with criminal misconduct by public servants, such as abuse of power for personal gain. The Lokayukta found that the ministers had misused their position to return acquired land, which constituted an act of corruption. 3. Section 197 of CrPC (Sanction for Prosecution of Public Servants) This section requires prior approval from the competent authority (Governor in the case of ministers) before prosecuting a public servant. The Supreme Court ruled that the Governor could grant sanction independently when the Council of Ministers was biased. 4. Doctrine of Necessity This legal principle states that when the usual decision-making authority is unable to act fairly due to bias or conflict of interest, an alternative authority must take over. The Court applied this doctrine to justify the Governor’s independent decision to grant sanction. 5. Lokayukta The Lokayukta is an anti-corruption ombudsman who investigates corruption complaints against public officials. In this case, the Lokayukta’s report provided sufficient evidence to prosecute the ministers, but the Council of Ministers refused to grant sanction, leading to the Governor’s intervention.

Bench A 7-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court: A.N. Ray, C.J. D.G. Palekar, J. K.K. Mathew, J. Y.V. Chandrachud, J. A. Alagiriswami, J. P.N. Bhagwati, J. V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. Facts The appellants, Samsher Singh and Ishwar Chand Agarwal, were appointed as Subordinate Judges in the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch). Both were on probation, meaning their appointments were not yet permanent. The Punjab Government terminated their services in 1967 and 1969, respectively. The termination orders were issued under Rule 9 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 and Rule 7(3) of the Punjab Civil Services (Judicial Branch) Rules, 1951. Samsher Singh challenged his termination, arguing that it was a punitive dismissal without proper inquiry and that it violated Article 311 of the Constitution. The case also raised the broader issue of whether the Governor of a State acts independently or on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers when exercising executive functions​. Issues Does the Governor act on his own or on the advice of the Council of Ministers while exercising executive powers? Was Samsher Singh’s termination a dismissal in violation of Article 311, or was it a simple termination of a probationer? Do probationers in judicial service have the same protection under Article 311 as permanent employees? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Governor’s Executive Powers: The Supreme Court ruled that the Governor does not act independently but must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in all executive matters unless specified otherwise in the Constitution. Probationers and Article 311 Protection: The Court held that probationers do not have the same protection as permanent employees under Article 311. Their services can be terminated if found unsuitable. However, if the termination is based on misconduct, it must follow the proper procedure under Article 311. Nature of Termination: The Court held that Samsher Singh’s termination was not punitive but was based on an assessment of his suitability during probation. Since it was not a punishment, the rules of natural justice and Article 311 did not apply​. Observations Governor’s Role in Executive Actions: The Governor acts as a constitutional head and is bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers, except where the Constitution provides discretion. Judicial Independence: The Court emphasized the importance of maintaining judicial independence while allowing reasonable administrative control by the executive. Termination vs. Dismissal: If an order terminates a probationer’s service for unsuitability, it is not a punishment. However, if the termination is based on alleged misconduct, it requires an inquiry under Article 311(2)​. Decision The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the termination orders, ruling that Samsher Singh was a probationer and could be terminated without an inquiry if found unsuitable. The Court reaffirmed that the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and does not exercise executive power independently. The orders of termination were set aside on procedural grounds for Ishwar Chand Agarwal, but Samsher Singh’s appeal was dismissed​. Important Terms 1. Article 311 (Protection of Civil Servants) Protects government employees from arbitrary dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank. Requires a reasonable opportunity to be heard before dismissal for misconduct. The Court ruled that this protection does not apply to probationers unless their termination is punitive. 2. Probationer in Government Service A probationer is an employee under evaluation before receiving permanent status. The government can terminate a probationer’s services for unsuitability without following Article 311, but not if the termination is punitive. 3. Governor’s Role Under Article 154 The Governor is the executive head of the state but acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. This principle applies to appointments, removals, and other executive decisions. 4. Natural Justice A probationer is entitled to fair treatment but not a full-fledged disciplinary inquiry unless the termination is punitive.

Bench A 2-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court: A.M. Ahmadi, C.J. Sujata V. Manohar, J. Facts H.D. Deve Gowda was appointed as the Prime Minister of India in 1996, even though he was not a member of either House of Parliament at the time of appointment. The petitioner, S.P. Anand, challenged this appointment, arguing that only a sitting member of Parliament can be appointed as the Prime Minister. The petition contended that the President of India made a constitutional error in swearing in H.D. Deve Gowda as Prime Minister, as this action allegedly violated Articles 14, 21, and 75 of the Constitution. The petitioner sought a writ under Article 32, requesting that the appointment be declared unconstitutional. Issues Can a person who is not a member of either House of Parliament be appointed as the Prime Minister of India? Does such an appointment violate Articles 14, 21, or 75 of the Constitution? Does Article 75(5) permit a non-member to be appointed as Prime Minister for a temporary period? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Article 75(5) of the Constitution permits the appointment of a person as a Minister, including the Prime Minister, even if they are not a member of either House of Parliament. However, such a person must get elected to either the Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha within six months, failing which they must step down. The Prime Minister and other Ministers are accountable to Parliament, not directly to the electorate, and their legitimacy comes from commanding the confidence of the Lok Sabha. The President has the discretion to appoint a Prime Minister who is not a member of Parliament, provided they are likely to secure a majority in the House. Observations The Supreme Court noted that the framers of the Constitution deliberately included Article 75(5) to allow for such appointments. A similar provision exists at the state level in Article 164(4), which allows a non-member to be appointed as a Chief Minister. The Prime Minister is not directly elected by the people; rather, they are chosen by the elected representatives in the Lok Sabha. The only requirement is that they secure a seat in Parliament within six months. The Court also held that there was no violation of Article 14 (Right to Equality) or Article 21 (Right to Life), as the appointment followed constitutional provisions. Decision The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and upheld the validity of H.D. Deve Gowda’s appointment as Prime Minister. The Court ruled that a non-member of Parliament can be appointed as the Prime Minister, provided they get elected to either House within six months. The President acted within constitutional limits while appointing Deve Gowda. There was no violation of fundamental rights under Articles 14 or 21. Important Terms 1. Article 75(5) (Appointment of Ministers) Allows a person who is not a member of either House of Parliament to be appointed as a Minister (including the Prime Minister) for a maximum of six months. If they fail to get elected within six months, they must vacate the position. 2. Article 14 (Right to Equality) The petitioner argued that appointing a non-member as Prime Minister violated Article 14, as it discriminated against other members of Parliament. The Court rejected this claim, stating that the Constitution itself provides for such an appointment. 3. Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty) The petitioner tried to argue that the appointment affected citizens’ rights to democratic governance, but the Court ruled that there was no direct violation of Article 21. 4. Article 32 (Right to Constitutional Remedies) This article allows citizens to approach the Supreme Court directly if their fundamental rights are violated. The Court held that no fundamental right was violated in this case. 5. Parliamentary System of Government The Prime Minister is not directly elected by the people but is appointed by the President based on the confidence of the Lok Sabha. The Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to Parliament, ensuring accountability.

Bench A 5-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court: S.M. Sikri, C.J. G.K. Mitter, J. K.S. Hegde, J. A.N. Grover, J. P. Jaganmohan Reddy, J. Facts After the dissolution of the Lok Sabha (House of the People) on December 27, 1970, Indira Gandhi continued as Prime Minister along with her Council of Ministers. The petitioner, U.N.R. Rao, filed a writ of quo warranto (a legal challenge questioning the authority by which a public office is held) against Indira Gandhi, arguing that since the House of the People was dissolved, the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers should no longer hold office. The main argument was based on Article 75(3), which states that the Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People. Since the House had been dissolved, the petitioner claimed that the government lost its legitimacy. The respondent (Indira Gandhi) defended her position, stating that the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers do not cease to hold office upon dissolution of the Lok Sabha, and that the President cannot exercise executive power without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Issues Does the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers automatically lose office upon the dissolution of the House of the People under Article 75(3)? Can the President exercise executive powers without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers when the Lok Sabha is dissolved? Is Article 74(1) (which mandates the existence of a Council of Ministers) still applicable even after the dissolution of the Lok Sabha? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Article 74(1) is mandatory: The Supreme Court ruled that Article 74(1), which mandates the existence of a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the President, is mandatory and remains in force even when the Lok Sabha is dissolved. Article 75(3) does not require immediate resignation upon dissolution: The Court clarified that Article 75(3) (which states that the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the House of the People) only applies when the House is in session and not when it is dissolved. The President cannot govern alone: Since India follows a parliamentary system, the President cannot exercise executive power independently without the advice of the Council of Ministers. Continuity of Government: The dissolution of the Lok Sabha does not mean the end of the executive government, as general elections must be conducted, and a new Lok Sabha must be constituted. Observations The Court rejected the argument that the Council of Ministers must immediately resign after the Lok Sabha’s dissolution. The parliamentary system in India is modeled on the British system, where the Prime Minister and Ministers continue to function until the next government is formed. If the petitioner’s argument were accepted, it would mean that the President could rule alone without a Council of Ministers, which is unconstitutional. The President is bound to act on the advice of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers, even when the House of the People is dissolved. Decision The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that Indira Gandhi and her Council of Ministers could continue in office even after the Lok Sabha was dissolved. It held that Article 75(3) does not mean that the Prime Minister must resign immediately after the House is dissolved. The Court reaffirmed that the executive power of the Union is exercised by the President only with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The continuation of the government is essential to ensure administrative stability until the new House of the People is elected. Important Terms 1. Article 74(1) (Council of Ministers to Aid and Advise the President) This article states that there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at its head to aid and advise the President. The Court ruled that this provision is mandatory and that the President cannot act without the Council of Ministers. 2. Article 75(3) (Collective Responsibility of Ministers) This article states that the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the House of the People (Lok Sabha). The petitioner argued that this means the Council of Ministers must resign upon dissolution of the Lok Sabha. The Court rejected this argument, clarifying that responsibility exists when the House is in session, but its dissolution does not require immediate resignation. 3. Writ of Quo Warranto A legal challenge questioning the legitimacy of a person holding a public office. In this case, U.N.R. Rao filed a quo warranto writ against Indira Gandhi, arguing that she had no right to continue as Prime Minister. The Supreme Court dismissed this writ, stating that the continuation of the Council of Ministers was constitutional. 4. Dissolution of Lok Sabha (Article 85(2)) Article 85(2) allows the President to dissolve the Lok Sabha before its term expires. The Court ruled that even after dissolution, the Council of Ministers continues in office until a new government is formed. 5. Parliamentary System of Government India follows a parliamentary democracy, meaning that the executive (Prime Minister and Ministers) is accountable to the legislature (Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha). The Court held that even when the Lok Sabha is dissolved, the Prime Minister and Ministers remain in office to ensure government continuity.

Bench A 7-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court: B.P. Sinha, C.J. S.K. Das, J. P.B. Gajendragadkar, J. A.K. Sarkar, J. K. Subba Rao, J. M. Hidayatullah, J. K.C. Das Gupta, J. Facts Berubari Union was a region located in West Bengal, India, near the border with East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). After India’s independence in 1947, border disputes arose between India and Pakistan regarding the territorial control of Berubari Union. The Radcliffe Award, which determined the boundary between India and Pakistan, was unclear about the status of Berubari Union. In 1958, Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru and Prime Minister of Pakistan Feroze Khan Noon signed an agreement (Indo-Pakistan Agreement) to divide Berubari Union between India and Pakistan. The agreement also included an exchange of enclaves (small land areas surrounded by foreign territory) between the two countries. A doubt arose as to whether the implementation of the agreement required a constitutional amendment or could be done by executive action alone. The President of India referred the matter to the Supreme Court under Article 143(1) of the Constitution for advisory opinion. Issues Is any legislative action necessary for implementing the Indo-Pakistan Agreement regarding Berubari Union? If legislative action is needed, would a law passed under Article 3 of the Constitution be sufficient, or is an amendment under Article 368 necessary? Would a law under Article 3 be enough for the exchange of enclaves, or is an Article 368 amendment also required? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) The Supreme Court held that Parliament does not have the power under Article 3 to cede Indian territory to a foreign country. Article 3 allows Parliament to alter state boundaries but not to transfer Indian land to a foreign country. Article 368 (Constitutional Amendment) is required for ceding Indian territory, as it involves modifying the First Schedule of the Constitution, which defines India’s territory. The agreement to transfer Berubari Union to Pakistan amounted to “cession of territory,” which required a constitutional amendment. The exchange of enclaves was also considered a transfer of sovereignty and needed a constitutional amendment. Observations The Indian government cannot transfer territory without amending the Constitution, as the First Schedule specifically defines the country’s boundaries. The preamble of the Constitution does not impose any restrictions on Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution. The treaty-making power of the government is subject to constitutional limitations; even if the government signs an international treaty, it cannot implement territorial changes without following constitutional procedures. The power to acquire territory (Article 1(3)(c)) does not imply the power to cede territory. Decision The Supreme Court ruled that Parliament cannot transfer Indian territory to another country through a law under Article 3. A constitutional amendment under Article 368 is necessary to implement the Indo-Pakistan Agreement regarding Berubari Union. The same requirement applied to the exchange of enclaves between India and Pakistan. As a result of this ruling, the Indian government passed the Constitution (Ninth Amendment) Act, 1960 to implement the agreement. Important Terms 1. Article 143 (Advisory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court) This article allows the President of India to seek advice from the Supreme Court on matters of law or constitutional interpretation. In this case, the President referred the issue of Berubari Union’s transfer to the Supreme Court for an opinion. 2. Article 3 (Alteration of State Boundaries) Article 3 allows Parliament to change state boundaries and names. However, the Supreme Court ruled that Article 3 does not allow Parliament to transfer Indian territory to a foreign country. 3. Article 368 (Constitutional Amendment Procedure) This article provides the procedure for amending the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that territorial changes require an amendment under Article 368 because they modify the First Schedule of the Constitution. 4. Radcliffe Award (1947) This was the boundary commission report that divided India and Pakistan in 1947. The award was unclear about Berubari Union’s status, leading to a territorial dispute. 5. Cession of Territory Cession means the transfer of sovereignty over a piece of land from one country to another. The Supreme Court ruled that India cannot cede its land without a constitutional amendment. 6. Indo-Pakistan Agreement (1958) Signed between India and Pakistan to resolve border disputes. It proposed dividing Berubari Union and exchanging enclaves between the two nations.

Bench A 5-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court: B.K. Mukherjea, C.J. Vivian Bose, J. B. Jagannadhadas, J. T.L.V. Venkatarama Ayyar, J. Syed Jaffer Imam, J. Facts A writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was filed by six petitioners engaged in the business of printing, publishing, and selling textbooks in Punjab. They operated under the name “Uttar Chand Kapur & Sons” and had been preparing textbooks for schools, particularly for primary and middle classes. In 1950, the Punjab Education Department issued notifications announcing a policy of nationalizing school textbooks. These notifications restricted private publishers from printing or selling textbooks, effectively monopolizing the business for the state. The petitioners claimed that this violated their fundamental right to carry on their trade under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. They further contended that these restrictions were imposed without the authority of law and thus were not protected under Article 19(6). Issues Does the executive government of a state have the power to engage in trade or business without any legislative sanction? Can the government monopolize a particular trade (such as textbook publishing) without enacting a law to that effect? Does the action of the Punjab government violate the fundamental right to trade under Article 19(1)(g)? Does the nationalization policy infringe upon Article 31, which protects the right to property? Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle) Separation of powers in India is not absolute. The executive can take actions in areas where the legislature has the authority to legislate, provided there is no existing law prohibiting such action. Articles 73 and 162 of the Constitution define the scope of executive power for the Union and State governments, allowing them to act in areas where they have legislative authority. The state can enter business and trade, but if it wants to create a monopoly, it must pass legislation that meets the requirements of Article 19(6). The government’s action did not completely prohibit private publishers from printing books. It only restricted which books could be used in government-recognized schools, which was held not to be a violation of Article 19(1)(g). The government did not seize or confiscate the petitioners’ business, so there was no violation of property rights under Article 31. Observations The Indian Constitution does not enforce strict separation of powers like the U.S. Constitution, but it does differentiate between legislative, executive, and judicial functions. The executive can act in areas where legislation is possible, even without a specific law, as long as it does not infringe fundamental rights. Government monopoly in trade must be backed by legislation, not just executive orders. The Punjab Government’s policy did not completely eliminate private publishers—it only affected government-recognized schools, so there was no total exclusion from the trade. Decision The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners’ claim that the government could not enter the business of publishing textbooks. However, it held that a complete state monopoly in trade requires proper legislation and cannot be imposed through executive orders alone. The Punjab Government’s actions were upheld, as they did not completely ban private businesses, nor did they violate fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(g) or 31. Important Terms Article 32 (Right to Constitutional Remedies) Article 32 allows individuals to approach the Supreme Court directly if their fundamental rights are violated. In this case, the petitioners filed a writ petition under Article 32, claiming that their right to trade under Article 19(1)(g) was being violated. Article 19(1)(g) (Right to Trade and Business) This guarantees every citizen the right to practice any profession or carry on any occupation, trade, or business. However, Article 19(6) allows the government to impose reasonable restrictions, including creating state monopolies through legislation. In this case, the Punjab Government did not impose a total ban on private publishers, so there was no violation of Article 19(1)(g). Article 19(6) (Reasonable Restrictions on Trade) This article permits the government to impose restrictions on trade in the public interest. It also allows the government to carry on trade or business and even create state monopolies through proper legislation. The Punjab Government should have passed a law instead of just issuing executive notifications. Article 31 (Right to Property) [Before It Was Repealed] At the time, Article 31 protected property rights from being taken away by the government without compensation. The petitioners argued that their business was being taken away, but the Court ruled that no property was actually confiscated. Separation of Powers The concept that legislative, executive, and judicial powers should be distinct. The Supreme Court held that India does not follow strict separation of powers like the USA. The executive can take actions that fall under legislative powers, as long as there is no specific law restricting them. Articles 73 and 162 (Scope of Executive Power) Article 73 defines the executive power of the Union, while Article 162 defines the executive power of the States. The executive can act in matters where legislation is possible, even without an existing law. However, if a government wants to create a monopoly, it must pass a proper law.

Bench: A 6-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court: Facts: Issues: Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle): Observations: Decision: Important Terms: 1. Article 131 (Original Jurisdiction of Supreme Court) 2. Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 3. Sovereignty 4. Quasi-Federalism 5. Entry 42, List III (Concurrent List) 6. Article 294 (Property Transfer Between Union and States) 7. Article 298 (State’s Power to Own Property and Trade)